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This dissertation explores the deliberative arguments stemming from protests by modern herding 
communities in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China. In each case, I analyze four central 
argument frames – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-otor, and 
disappearance – that have emerged as governments seek to settle and develop herding 
communities, and herders protest in support of their traditional lifestyles. The first case study, 
concerning the Maasai of Tanzania, investigates the ways Maasai communities confront and 
resist tourism at the borders of the Serengeti and Ngorongoro national parks. The second case 
study, addressing the Maasai of Kenya, examines the ways that Maasai communities are resisting 
land privatization near the Maasai Mara and how the associated controversy relates to the 
emergence of hate speech in modern Kenya. The third case study turns to Eurasia, concentrating 
on Mongolian herders and their interactions with the government’s conservation and mining 
programs. The fourth case study considers how Inner Mongolian herders have negotiated their 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China’s cultural and environmental policies to 
produce a diverse body of protest tactics. The argumentative dynamics in each case are 
elucidated through analysis of primary source material and published artifacts, supported by 
explanatory tools drawn from rhetorical theory. A concluding chapter connects common threads 
from the case studies to isolate implications for modern herding communities and generate fresh 
perspective on Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology project. 
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1.0  THE CONTESTED TERRAIN OF MODERN HERDING 
1.1 NOMADS IN THE MODERN WORLD 
One gift item available in the west during the 2013 holiday shopping season was Jimmy 
Nelson’s book of photography, Before They Pass Away.1 The cover depicts a lone Maasai man 
surveying a largely empty, sepia tone landscape. Alone, separated from his family, community, 
and herds, this man’s image sells a coffee table book based on the premise that his way of life 
will soon disappear. Nelson’s text, as well as television programs such as the BBC’s Tribe, and 
feature films such as The Gods Must Be Crazy, tend to portray nomadic peoples as isolated, pure, 
and out of time.2 Such depictions obscure a more complex and challenging reality facing herders 
in today’s world, where state-sponsored conservation programs and corporate mining projects 
increasingly come into conflict with their ways of life. These conflicts are particularly acute for 
herders such as the Maasai and Mongolians on which this dissertation focuses. The herding 
traditions of these communities require large swaths of land, frequent migrations, and the 
crossing of local and national borders, resulting in a plethora of conflicts with governments, 
development projects, and conservationists.  
                                                
1 Jimmy Nelson, Before They Pass Away (New York: teNeues, 2013). 
2 A detailed analysis of the BBC2’s Tribe can be found in Pat Caplan, “In Search of the Exotic: A 
Discussion of the BBC2 Series 'Tribe',” Anthropology Today 21, no. 2 (2005): 3-7. For an analysis of the way The 
Gods Must Be Crazy perpetuates the settlement of hunter gathers in Namibia, see Richard Lee, “The Gods Must be 
Crazy, But the State Has a Plan: Government Policies Towards the San in Namibia,” Canadian Journal of African 
Studies 20, no. 1 (1986): 91-98.  
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Many academics, development workers, and government officials first encounter herding 
peoples through tourism advertisements and mass media. For example, the Maasai live in the 
Serengeti ecosystem and their images are frequently coupled with displays of wild animals and 
pristine parklands in publications such as National Geographic. This presentation of herder 
communities alongside wildlife produces an exotic, idealized, and naturalized image of the 
Maasai that is at times strengthened through juxtaposition to western cultural artifacts that 
further emphasize the Maasais’ primitivism.3 While some articles do illustrate the changing 
aesthetic between tourism, consumption, and environmental preservation, they infrequently 
differentiate between changing western and herder aesthetics.4 As environmental communication 
scholar Phaedra Pezzullo notes, through these images, herder communities have “already come 
to signify significant spaces in [our] personal and national imaginaries through secondary 
sources.”5 These imaginaries animate settlement projects, conservation zones, and mineral 
extraction industries that promise to bring needed capital and human services to herder 
communities.6  
The dominance of these images and imaginaries in western discourse and academia 
create significant complications for Maasai and Mongolian communities seeking to assert claims 
in public argument over access to their traditional herding terrain. These claims come in many 
                                                
3 Roderick P. Neumann, “Primitive Ideas: Protected Area Buffer Zones and the Politics of Land in Africa,” 
Development and Change, no. 28 (1997): 559-582. 
4 Anne Marie Todd, “Anthropocentric Distance in National Geographic’s Environmental Aesthetic,” 
Environmental Communication 4, no. 2 (2010): 206-224. 
5 Phaedra Carmen Pezzullo, Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Pollution, Travel, and Environmental Justice 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 171. 
6 The connection between conservation and mining projects is outlined in Fran McShane and Luke 
Danielson, “The Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development Project and Indigenous Peoples,” Cultural Survival 
Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2010), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/mining-
minerals-and-sustainable-development-project-and. 
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forms, from stern statements that herders are not disappearing to rejection of inappropriate 
human services offered by western development organizations. 
This dissertation explores the position of herding communities in the modern world by 
examining case studies from Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China. In each case, I analyze four 
central argument frames – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-otor, and 
disappearance – which have emerged as governments seek to settle and develop herding 
communities, and herders argue in support of their traditional lifestyles. The first case study, 
concerning the Maasai of Tanzania, investigates the ways Maasai communities confront and 
resist tourism at the borders of the Serengeti and Ngorongoro national parks. The second case 
study, addressing the Maasai of Kenya, examines the ways that Maasai communities are resisting 
land privatization near the Maasai Mara and how the associated controversy relates to the 
emergence of hate speech in modern Kenya. The third case study turns to Eurasia, concentrating 
on Mongolian herders and their interactions with the government’s conservation and mining 
programs. The fourth case study considers how Inner Mongolian herders have negotiated their 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China’s cultural and environmental policies to 
produce a diverse body of protest tactics. The argumentative dynamics in each case are 
elucidated through analysis of primary source material and published artifacts, supported by 
explanatory tools drawn from rhetorical theory. A concluding chapter connects common threads 
from the case studies to isolate implications for modern herding communities and generate fresh 
perspective on Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology project. 
 In this opening chapter, I examine how prevailing scholarship depicts nomadic and 
herder communities, and how those dominant narratives contribute to the expectation that 
herders are disappearing from the modern world. Then, I examine the entailments of this 
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rhetoric, focusing on ways that western science has inspired government sponsored settlement 
programs and spurred herder petitions and protest movements. This introduction also presents 
my guiding research questions, which focus on how competing visions of nomadic identity 
underwrite argumentation and protests in Maasai and Mongolian land disputes. I explain how 
these questions will be pursued using a critical approach that blends archival research and oral 
history interviews with argumentative analysis, to elucidate and interpret the multiple 
stakeholder positions at play in my case studies. Finally, I introduce the four central argument 
frames used in this dissertation – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-otor, 
and disappearance – and the ways that those frames motivate the interpretive work of this 
project. 
1.2 SPEAKING OF HERDERS AND NOMADS 
Throughout this dissertation, I use the term herder to describe Mongolian and Maasai 
communities. I have chosen this term from the multiple, at times contradictory terms of herder, 
nomad, and pastoral-nomad used to describe these communities. This decision is based on the 
literal and figurative translation of the traditional phrases used by Mongolians and Maasai to 
describe themselves. Maasai herders use the term kínèjì, and the Mongolians use malchid; both 
are mass nouns that that translate to the English term “herder.”  
Western literature typically refers to Maasai and Mongolian communities as nomads, 
pastoral nomads, or pastoralists. Labeling a community as “nomads” tends to suggest that 
members wander through the fixed gridlines of nation-state geography as “random atoms,” 
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acting in a backward, uncivilized manner.7 This misunderstanding of Maasai and Mongolian 
herders misses the complex, often hierarchical structures of their communities and networks of 
exchange. The label “nomad” also tends to reinforce a dualism that ossifies divisions between 
the nomadic and settled communities, between the civilized and the barbarian, between the 
knowable and unknown, and between right and wrong. Throughout this text, I have avoided 
referring to Maasai and Mongolian communities as “nomads” in an attempt to separate myself, 
and my work, from this discourse. 
Colonial encounters with local communities created a preference for the specific, 
ethnographic term of “pastoral nomad” to mark communities such as the Maasai and Mongolians 
as separate from other types of nomads such as migrants, wanderers, and hunter-gatherers.8 This 
definition is based on two factors: the keeping of domesticated herds and seasonal migrations 
between pasture lands. However, I have avoided using the term “pastoral nomads” as it is also 
used by invaders, colonizing governments, national governments, and development organizations 
to justify boundaries and ratify selective histories, resulting in real, lasting implications for land 
use, conservation, development, and tourism with little regard to the multiple, geographically 
diverse communities collected by the term “pastoral nomad.”9 This collective term has been 
legitimated through essentializing misrepresentations of herder communities that foreground the 
                                                
7 Gabriel Lafitte, “Modern Freedoms, Nomadic Freedoms,” Rukor weblog, accessed February 2, 2014, 
http://rukor.org/modern-freedoms-nomadic-freedoms/. 
8 In using the terms “colonial” and “colonizer” through out this dissertation, I am aware of the perspective 
of internal and external colonization, and the long histories of colonialism in each of the countries discussed in this 
dissertation. Maasai and Mongolian herding communities live within a complicated milieu of multiple colonialisms, 
which has produced new hierarchies, community standards, and practices of communication. These experiences 
have also cultivated a sense of determined resilience that is reflected in each case study of herder communities. 
9 Among the dense body of literature concerning colonial anthropological classifications, I have found the 
following three articles most helpful: Rada Dyson-Hudson and Neville Dyson-Hudson, “Nomadic Pastoralism,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 9 (1980): 15-61; Allison Palmer, “Colonial and Modern Genocide: 
Explanations and Categories,” Ethnic and Race Studies 21, no. 1 (1998): 89-115; and Richard D. Waller, 
“Interaction and Identity on the Periphery: The Trans-Mara Maasai,” The International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 17, no. 2 (1984): 243-284. 
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“pure” or “essential” elements of pastoral nomadism while omitting anomalies or changes in 
tradition.10 Consider that in Mongolia, the label of “pure pastoralists” is used to characterize 
those who identify as herders, while development organizations justify deployment of the term 
“absentee herders” in similar contexts because the subjects in question own but do not move with 
herds.11 For example, a part-time teacher might identify equally as both a herder and teacher, but 
to a development organization she is identified by her mode of employment – as a teacher. The 
concept of “pure pastoralism” creates blind spots in development policies targeted only at visible 
herders. These policies may help “pure pastoralists,” by providing lines of credit to buy fodder 
during environmental catastrophes. However, “absentee herders,” such as the teacher who also 
keeps herds, would not be classified as a herder under this framework, and therefore is not able 
to access those same lines of credit to protect her herds. 
 Similarly, anthropological treatments of pastoral-nomads that are tied to 
underdevelopment discourse block understandings of how herder communities have appropriated 
technology and adapted to modern conditions.12 For example, the colonial British government 
used ethnographic terminology such as “pastoral-nomads” to sub-divide the Maasai by defining 
                                                
10 While Christopher Miller is concerned with Francophone Africa, his arguments regarding the 
essentialization of pastoral-nomadic communities also apply to Maasai and Mongolian experiences. Christopher L. 
Miller, Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
11 Often times these herders have moved to urban areas seeking employment, leaving their animals with 
younger family members. They plan to return to the countryside and a herder lifestyle upon retirement or after they 
have earned a predetermined amount of money in the city. For a discussion of this practice among Mongolians, see 
Maria Fernandez-Gimenez, “Reconsidering the Role of Absentee Herd Owners: A View from Mongolia,” Human 
Ecology 27, no. 1 (1999): 1-27. 
12 Examples of anthropological texts that do not consider herder adaptations to modernization can be found 
in Bernhard Grzimek’s text and film by the same name, The Serengeti Shall Not Die. A detailed analysis of these 
productions is provided in Chapter Two. Bernhard Grzimek and Michael Grzimek, Serengeti Shall Not Die (New 
York: Dutton, 1961), and Bernhard Grzimek and Michael Grzimek, Serengeti Shall Not Die, Motion Picture, 
Directed by Bernhard Grzimek (1960; Frankfurt: Okapia KG Kulturfilmproduktion), Video. Similarly, Christopher 
Evans and Caroline Humphery examine the ways that Mongolian identity has been presented in Chinese Tourist 
Camps in Christopher Evans and Caroline Humphery, “After Lives of the Mongolian Yurt: The 'Archaeology' of a 
Chinese Tourist Camp,” Journal of Material Culture 7, no. 2 (2002): 189-210. 
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them as cattle herders who were both not Kikuyu and not British.13 While this definition was 
effective for early colonial policy, it failed to differentiate between the Maasai and other pastoral 
nomadic groups such as the Barabaig, and cannot account for Maasai who have lost their herds 
or married Kikuyus.14 Additionally, while we know that the Maasai are not Kikuyu, the British 
definition does not include the symbols, customs, and traditions used as identity markers by the 
Maasai. With these texts as foundational touchstones, it is difficult to assess Maasai arguments 
made from identity, or made about identity loss. Because of the history and modern policies 
based on the term “pastoral nomad,” I have chosen to utilize the term herder when discussing 
Maasai and Mongolian communities and identities. 
1.3 DISAPPEARING HERDERS 
Deliberations concerning herder communities often feature rhetoric characterizing members of 
these communities as being primitive, barbarian, savage, underdeveloped, uneducated, and 
impoverished.15 Education scholars Rowena Fong and Paul Spickard’s interviews with Han 
Chinese university students revealed that these terms, in English, are used to make specific 
classifications of ethnic minorities. This report indicates a statistically significant trend amongst 
Han Chinese students to use “primitive” to describe Mongolians and “barbarian” to describe 
                                                
13 The Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group in Kenya. John G. Galaty, “Being ‘Maasai,’ Being ‘People-of-
Cattle’: Ethnic Shifters in East Africa,” American Ethnologist 9, no. 1 (1982): 1-20. 
14 The intricacies of ethnic relationships in Northern Tanzania and Southern Kenya, with special attention 
to the Maasai are outlined in Kenneth King, “Development and Education in the Narok District of Kenya: The 
Pastoral Maasai and Their Neighbors,” African Affairs, 71 (October 1972): 389-401.  
15 Thomas Hall, “Civilizational Change: The Role of Nomads,” Comparative Civilizations Review 24 
(Spring 1991): 34-57.  
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Tibetans.16 These labels bolster claims that herders are less evolved, less sophisticated, or a 
completely different species than those that live in settled communities. Social Darwinists play a 
critical role in much of this literature by extending arguments based on the “survival of the 
fittest” to assert that herders have no place in the modern world. In Dark Vanishings: Discourse 
on the Extinction of Primitive Races, Patrick Brantlinger, James Rudy Professor Emeritus at 
Indiana University, Bloomington argues, “whether seen as antiquated or infantile, all savages 
were lost, misplaced in time . . . in contrast to the ancestors of the progressive races, modern 
savages were like dead branches on the tree of life, born out of their due time.”17 In Brantlinger’s 
view, “savages,” including herding communities, are discursively held in a lose/lose situation; 
either they uphold traditions in a losing battle with modernity or they embrace modernity at the 
risk of debasing herder and modern identity. To explain the effect of this discursive space, he 
proposes scholars utilize the term proleptic elegy. 
An elegy, which laments the dead, is typically presented after death. Proleptic elegies 
also express grief, but are presented in anticipation of death or extinction.18 This rhetorical tool is 
commonly used by development planners, national governments, and social scientists who 
understand herders to be a dying race. These statements are presented in the future perfect, 
                                                
16 This study conducted amongst Han Chinese university students is one of the few produced by Chinese 
scholars that points to disharmony and apparent racism by Han Chinese towards minority ethnicities in China. 
Rowena Fong and Paul R. Spickard, “Ethnic Relations in the People's Republic of China: Images and Social 
Distance between Han Chinese and Minority and Foreign Nationalities,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies no. 13, 
(Spring 1994): 26-94. 
17 Patrick Brantlinger, Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800-1930 
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 2003), 168. 
18 In addition to providing a comprehensive overview of the literature on proleptic elegy as a rhetorical 
genre, Robert Cox shows the importance of the genre as a rhetorical tool with potential to enrich understanding of 
environmental controversy. Robert Cox, “The Die Is Cast: Topical and Ontological Dimensions of the Locus of the 
Irreparable,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 68, no. 3 (1982): 227-39. 
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speaking about the future loss of identity.19 Theoretically, herders can respond to these proleptic 
elegies by contradicting the expectation of future disappearance and demanding action from the 
state to secure their community’s livelihood. Yet, governments, international aid organizations, 
and development officials often drown out or ignore herder arguments, opting instead to focus 
their attention on settlement and development as opposed to demands to maintain or return to 
traditions. Unable to find traditional forums for their arguments, Maasai communities in 
Tanzania have turned to YouTube to present their arguments on a global stage. Similarly, 
Mongolians in Inner Mongolia have turned to road blockades and protests, reported via social 
media, to combat state-sponsored proleptic elegies.  
Brantlinger tracks the use of proleptic elegies from the 1800s to 1930s when literary 
theorists, anthropologists, and cultural historians developed and reflected upon sentimental and 
scientific justifications for eliminating “savage” people. This form of speech has been used by 
missionaries who needed to explain why they had failed to recruit communities into their fold 
and by governments when they encountered pressure from their constituents to stop battling with 
indigenous populations.  
Proleptic elegies were most commonly used as preemptive arguments. Before settlers 
arrived they were educated by the state or church to accept and justify the removal of populations 
that had previously occupied the frontier. These proleptic elegies could be presented as 
sentimental truths that prepared missionaries to resist the humanizing effect of living with 
“savages.” This rhetoric was seen as necessary because before encounters “savages” could be 
labeled as an unknowable, less than human, other and easily dismissed. However, once an 
                                                
19 Specific proleptic elegies for the Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya, and Mongolians of Mongolia and Inner 
Mongolia are addressed in each case study chapter. In this introduction I am concerned with establishing a historic 
lineage for this rhetorical tool and continuity between multiple proleptic elegies.  
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encounter occurred it was necessary to prove to missionaries and colonists that although 
“savages” appeared just as human as settled communities, they lacked specific, scientific traits. 
These colonizing and exterminating projects can appear disjointed, yet Jane Stafford, Professor 
of English at Victoria University of Wellington, has argued that continued use of proleptic elegy 
ties periods of history together, allowing researchers to understand how sentimental truths 
became scientific, and how they are produced by both the colonizer and the colonized.20 
The theories of Social Darwinism and the rhetoric of savagery used in modern proleptic 
elegies emerged from older schools of cephalic indexing, a 19th century method of measuring 
skulls to differentiate between races and classify racial libido. In the 1930s these theories were 
used to argue for inherent racial differences in intelligence. John Jackson of the Annenberg 
School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania writes that the development of these 
studies demonstrates an argumentative move from attributes that can be observed (skull shape) to 
those that are only understood via essence (mental and moral characteristics).21 Modern Social 
Darwinists have further developed these arguments by highlighting the lack of knowledge, 
education, religion, or morals of nomadic and herding communities. 
While scholarship examining proleptic elegies between 1800 and 1930 informs this 
study, my dissertation builds on extant literature by arguing that government and development 
organizations have continued to use this strategy to legitimate settlement projects with proleptic 
elegies. The implications of modern proleptic elegies are different from historic examples. 
Governments have come to expect that herders will settle and become farmers rather than 
expecting that they will vanish or die off. Yet, many similarities in framing and presentation of 
                                                
20 Jane Stafford, “Terminal Creeds and Native Authors,” Journal of New Zealand Literature 24, no. 2 
(2007): 153-184.  
21 John Jackson, “Whatever Happened to the Cephalic Index? The Reality of Race and the Burden of 
Proof,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 40, no. 5 (2010): 438-458.  
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these arguments remain. Today, governments, non-governmental organizations, and 
development projects identify herder communities by primitive, barbarian, savage, 
underdeveloped, uneducated, and impoverished traits and then justify their disappearance as 
markers of national progress. For example, Mongolian Prime Minister Enkhbayer uses a 
proleptic elegy when he states, “to survive we [Mongolians] have to stop being nomads.”22 This 
proleptic elegy does not require Enkhbayer to celebrate the loss of nomadism, but does allow 
him to call for international aid, development projects, and government programming to facilitate 
the end of nomadism. Thomas Hall, a world systems analyst, argues that these labels are used in 
complex arguments prefaced by the superior qualities of modern life.23  
Calling for the end of nomadism, herding, or traditional lifestyles is a dangerous 
rhetorical maneuver that has real world implications for marginalized communities. Drawing 
from Social Darwinist classification of nomads and herders as lower humans, proleptic elegies 
have been coupled with metaphors of illness to support claims that nomads and herders are either 
terminally ill or not at all human. The experiences of Eastern European Roma demonstrate the 
stakes for herding communities such as Maasai and Mongolians that confront this form of 
discourse. For example, Dez Csete, mayor of Csur, Hungary, stated in 2000, “I believe that the 
Roma of Zmoly have no place among human beings. Just as in the animal world, parasites must 
be expelled.”24 Han Chinese residents of Inner Mongolia have used similar language to describe 
herders. For example, the Han Chinese truck driver who ran over and killed a protesting Inner 
                                                
22 Andrei Marin, “Between Cash Cows and Golden Calves: Adaptations of Mongolian Pastoralism in the 
'Age of the Market'” Nomadic Peoples 12, no. 2 (2008): 75-101.  
23 Hall, “Civilizational Change: The Role of Nomads.” 
24 For a detailed analysis of sub-human classification and metaphors of illness regarding Roma 
communities, see Nazli Baykal, “The Discursive Construction of Ethnic Identity: Sulukule Case, Turkey,” The 
Linguistics Journal, (September 2009): 120-154; and Valeriu Nicolae, “Words That Kill,” Index on Censorship, no. 
1 (2006): 138. 
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Mongolian herder told reporters, “my truck is fully insured, and the life of a smelly Mongolian 
herder costs me no more than 40,000 Yuan (approx. 8,000 USD).”25 Similarly, at independence, 
Maasai in Tanzania were told by President Nyerere and government officials that they must 
discard their traditional clothing and “dress in something better than a dirty sheet” before 
participating in local and national deliberations.26  
Communication scholars have addressed the effects of dehumanizing rhetoric, but these 
analyses often examine harm to mainstream communities that were recently scapegoated and/or 
dehumanized (such as Jewish communities in Nazi Germany) or long-term dehumanization of 
local ostracized communities (such as studies of slavery and lynching). Rarely has attention 
turned to how academics, policy makers, and activists dehumanize human herder communities as 
remote and often unknowable others. Throughout this dissertation, I will trace the way that 
proleptic elegies have been used to construct a frame of disappearance, arguing that Maasai and 
Mongolian herding communities will soon settle and disappear from their pasturelands. I will 
pay particular attention to moments when a proleptic elegy is linked to rhetoric of conservation, 
which claims herding lifestyles are unsustainable and must end. 
1.4 LAND LOSS AND RECLAMATION OF PASTURELANDS 
Herders have frequently been expelled from traditional pasturelands in an attempt to prevent or 
repair environmental degradation. Arguments supporting these evictions are sometimes based on 
                                                
25 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Mongolian Herder Brutally Killed by Chinese 
Coal Truck Driver,” Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website, May 19, 2011, 
http://www.smhric.org/news_376.htm.   
26 “Tanzania: Dressing up the Masai,” Time, November 24, 1967, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844158,00.html. 
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the logic of ecologist Garret Hardin’s tragedy of the commons thesis, which holds that 
environmental degradation occurs when too many people share occupancy in a location and 
eventually overtax the land.27 Another angle of argument advanced to justify herder expulsion is 
supported by a focus on the emptiness of lands on which the herding community lives.28 This 
argument allows scholars, governments, and development agencies to assert that herders are not 
only destroying land but also destroying the purest land left on earth. These evictions are often 
linked to the Latin term terra nullius meaning “land belonging to no one,” defined either as land 
that was never claimed by a state, or land which has been relinquished by sovereignty. While 
Maasai and Mongolian communities contend that their land is not empty or unclaimed, they 
generally lack access to the traditional evidence such as permanent structures or titles needed to 
substantiate land claims in modern courts. 
The tragedy of the commons, juxtaposed with colonial expansion, resulted in eviction of 
the Maasai from their lands in 1890, 1904, 1906, and 1916. During the twenty-six years between 
1890 and 1916, the Maasai were evicted from sixty percent of their land to make way for 
European ranches. The establishment of the Serengeti (Tanzania 1951) and Maasai Mara (Kenya 
1961) created the next wave of evictions. Then at independence in 1961, Tanzania embraced 
President Julius Nyerere's movement of African Socialism under the philosophy of ujamaa, or 
unity, and villigization, including “livestock villages” for Maasai communities. Kenya gained 
independence in 1963 and followed Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta’s philosophy of harambee, or 
coming together, to create self-reliance. When land redistribution occurred in Kenya, it favored 
                                                
27 Hardin’s theory was first published in 1968, but his research indicates that the basic theory was in 
practice long before he coined the term “tragedy of the commons.” Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 
Science 162, no. 3859 (1968): 1243-1248. 
28 Lioba Lenhart and Michael J. Casimir, “Environment, Property, Resources and the State: An 
Introduction,” Nomadic Peoples 2, no.5 (2001): 6-20. 
  14 
those who shared the prime minister’s ethnic affiliation, and eventually led to privatized sub-
division of grazing and farming lands.29 Despite these policies, land disputes have continued. For 
example, in 2009 in the Kilosa District of Tanzania, conflict between agriculturalists and herders 
resulted in government seizure of all cattle and eviction of the Maasai. While international 
pressure eventually allowed the Maasai to return to their lands, the laws and conflicts prompting 
these evictions have not changed.30 No communication-based analysis of these conflicts has yet 
been undertaken, perhaps because claims by ethnic groups in Kenya and Tanzania are often seen 
as a risk to national unity and suppressed by the government.31  
In Mongolia, herders were first moved in 1976 to make way for the Great Gobi Strictly 
Protected Area, a 5,311-hectare conservation area designed to stop desertification. This was and 
still remains the largest protected area in Mongolia, covering twenty-seven percent of the Gobi-
Alti providence. Despite this and similar evictions, desertification has continued. According to 
Mongolia’s Fourth National Report on the Implementation of [the] Convention of Biological 
Diversity, by 2009 seventy-one percent of Mongolia was threatened by desertification.32 
Mongolian reports differ from those in East Africa because they identify both herding practices 
and mining industry as causes of the threats to the environment. Since Mongolia’s 1991 
democratic revolution, conflicts have occurred between herders, urban communities, and 
international mining firms, each seeking access to shrinking pasturelands. While many of these 
                                                
29 For a discussion of land distribution along ethnic lines, see Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, Kenya: 
Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2005). 
30 Dorothy Louise Hodgson, Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in a Neoliberal 
World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). 
31 For a discussion of minority rights and activism in Kenya, see Makoloo, Kenya: Minorities, 2. 
32 Ministry of Nature, Environment and Tourism of Mongolia, Mongolia’s Fourth National Report on 
Implementation of Convention of Biological Diversity (Ulaanbaatar: Government of Mongolia, 2009), 9.  
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clashes coalesce around the Oynun Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi mines, in 2011 herders from 18 
providences protested in Ulaanbaatar against large and small mining projects.33  
In China, the Cultural Revolution resulted in the arrest and persecution of at least 100,000 
Mongolians who resisted collectivization and the cultural politics of the Chinese Communist 
Party. This history has been used as a reference point for divisions between Mongolian herders, 
farmers, and urbanites, and between Han and Mongolian citizens of the People’s Republic of 
China. The Chinese government has attempted to smooth over these poor relations by 
establishing university and government position quotas for Mongolians, allowing exemption 
from the national birth control policies, and sponsoring specific ethnic events. Yet, these policies 
were not able to prevent the 1981-1982 protests by Mongolian students over “filling up Inner 
Mongolia” with Han Chinese.34 More recently, conflict erupted as 650,000 herders were evicted 
from traditional pasturelands.35 These evictions, which the government calls “environmentally-
driven resettlement,” are paid off with education, public health, and housing services. However, 
such policies still restrict movement of herding communities under the auspices of saving land 
and limiting the effects of climate change.36  
For Maasai and Mongolian communities, pasturelands need not be demarcated by maps, 
and the use of fences or boundaries only serve to obstruct traditional grazing patterns. Today, 
herders commonly know where parkland borders begin, however the surrounding areas known as 
                                                
33 “Protesting Herders on Horseback Replaced by People's Assembly, But They Will Return,” U.B. Post 
(Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia), April 26, 2011. 
34 William Jankowiak, “The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia,” The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs no. 19/20 (January – July 1988): 269-288. 
35 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Complaint Against the Chinese Government's 
Forced Eviction of Ethnic Mongolian Herders,” Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website, 
accessed June 20, 2013, http://www.smhric.org/Hada/Evict_1.htm. 
36 Yan Tan, “Chinese Perspectives on Climate Change and Resettlement: Background Paper to the 
Population-Environment Research Network (Pern) Cyberseminar” (working paper, University of Adelaide, 2011). 
http://www.populationenvironmentresearch.org/papers/Tan_PERNcyberseminar_2011.pdf. 
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“buffer zones” that are only loosely defined. Buffer zones inhabit a murky legal ground, 
sometimes legislated, sometimes drawn on maps by conservation organizations, and sometimes 
enforced by rangers who have seen neither legislation nor maps. These zones are favored by 
conservationists as additions to “fortress conservation” used in the Serengeti, Maasai Mara, 
Great Gobi, and Xilingol Grasslands. Fortress conservation prohibits all herd and herder 
movements within the conservation area. Rather than continually patrolling the conservation land 
borders, conservation organizations and rangers patrol and regulate the buffer zone. They argue 
that if buffer zones are properly regulated, then the designated conservation land is secure. 
Herders, however, argue that buffer zones are illegally and erratically enforced. As a result of 
these conflicts, wide divisions have emerged between herders and conservationists. 
1.5 WESTERN SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
The theoretical rationale for both conservation lands and buffer zones clashes with herding 
community approaches to conservation. For example, the Wildlife Conservation Society’s 
president Steven Sanderson stated, “[I have] believed for some time that the entire global 
conservation agenda has been ‘hijacked’ by advocates for indigenous peoples, placing wildlife 
and biodiversity at peril.”37 As journalist Mark Dowie notes, these conflicts affect many more 
communities than Maasai and Mongolians. Since the beginning of colonialism in Africa, 
approximately 14 million indigenous people have been evicted from land in the name of 
conservation. Dowie argues that conservation refugees live unnecessarily difficult lives due to 
                                                
37 Mark Dowie, Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-Year Conflict Between Global Conservation and 
Native Peoples (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), xxv. 
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evictions that conservationists have since admitted were unnecessary. These evicted people are 
not suffering from environmental challenges such as heat, drought, flood or disease. Instead, they 
are specifically moved from their homelands to establish conservation reserves. Dowie argues 
that conservation reserves have directly affected the Maasai in Kenya who are moved from 
independent self-sustaining communities to radically poor and needy communities, and as a 
result they have come to distrust conservationists: “It should be no surprise, then, that tribal 
peoples like the Maasai, who have seen their lands plundered for two hundred years by foreign 
colonizers do regard conservationists as just another colonizer, an extension of the deadening 
forces of economic and cultural hegemony.”38 
Similar evictions are occurring in Inner Mongolia where the Southern Mongolian Human 
Rights Information Center reports that at least 168,431 herders have been evicted from their 
pasturelands.39 Cambridge anthropologists Christopher Evans and Caroline Humphrey report that 
the Chinese government prefaced these evictions with descriptions of herders as “backward” and 
“unhealthy” while simultaneously arguing that herder lands could be better used for state 
agricultural projects.40 The only reminder of herder communities in Inner Mongolia, as found by 
Evans and Humphery, is tourist camps and ethnographic parks where “Mongolian culture” is 
presented for international visitors (see Figure 1).  
                                                
38 Dowie, Conservation Refugees, xxvi. 
39 “Complaint Against,” Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center Website. 
40 Evans and Humphery, “After-Lives of the Mongolian Yurt,” 189. 
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Figure 1: Beijing Chinese Ethnic Culture Park.41 
 
Both Maasai and Mongolian herding communities have argued that local traditional 
relationships between herds, herders, and pasturelands have resulted in the world’s best-
preserved landscapes. However, development organizations seldom consult with herder 
communities, and when they do, a high threshold is set for herders to prove that their curative 
relationship with nature does not threaten the environment.42 While herder communities could 
implement their own conservation programs that do not depend on fortress conservation or 
                                                
41 The Beijing Chinese Ethnic Culture Park displays the traditional homes, dances, and costumes of 
minority communities in China. The Mongolian exhibit is in a grassy field that also houses the Kazakh, Ewenki, 
Kirgiz, and Yugur exhibits. Primary events occur in the blue and white cement ger and under the banner of prayer 
flags. Allison Hahn, August 2013. 
42 Neumann, “Primitive Ideas,” 564. 
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buffer zones, these international development organizations often assume that herders lack both 
the education and technology to understand conservation.43 The resulting conflicts are typical of 
controversies in which scientists are unwilling or incapable of using local knowledge.44 Even 
when herders are incorporated into conservation programs, their role is often dictated by the 
development organization. For example, human geographer Mara Goldman demonstrates that 
Maasai knowledge is included in some conservation programs by western scientists who conduct 
interviews with Maasai elders. However, beyond those interviews, the Maasai do not have any 
decision-making rights or participation roles in actual conservation projects. Further, only 
Maasai knowledge that can be explained in western scientific terms is included in the final 
reports. Often this information is filtered through conceptual metaphors in which the concrete 
experiences of herders, such as detailed history of grazing in a specific pasture, are indexed by 
abstract and simple terms such as “good.” These recordings then further limit Maasai 
participation in future projects because the conceptual metaphors make it seem that the Maasai 
                                                
43 For a discussion of these limitations, see Andrew Warren, “Changing Understandings of African 
Pastoralism and the Nature of Environmental Paradigms.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 20, 
no. 2 (1995): 193-203. Also see Hijaba Ykhanbai, Enkhbat Bulgan, Ulipkan Beket, Ronnie Vernooy, John Graham, 
“Reversing Grassland Degradation and Improving Herders' Livelihoods in the Altai Mountains of Mongolia,” 
Mountain Research and Development 24, no. 2 (2004): 96-100. 
44 Bryan Wynne examines division between local communities and scientists in Chernobyl by describing 
the ways that sheepherders and farmers were “black-boxed” in ways that were consistent with cultural idioms and 
how knowledge beyond which the cultural limits of science were suppressed. Communication scholars have argued 
that “unblack-boxing” – when community members realize that scientists misunderstood or analyzed risks and 
reform their relationships – can occur through public debate and intercultural communication. For example, 
LaFever’s study of treaty negotiation between First Nations and the Canadian government articulates the success of 
un-black boxing to restore both ecological and community relationships. Building intercultural movements and 
networks of contingent relationships between stakeholders such as conservationists and herders is critical to creating 
successful environmental programs. Unfortunately, these relationships have not yet emerged between herders such 
as the Maasai and Mongolians and conservation programs. For a detailed discussion, see J. Robert Cox, “Beyond 
Frames: Recovering the Strategic in Climate Communication,” Environmental Communication 4, no. 1 (March 
2010): 122-133; Al Gedicks, “War on Subsistence: Mining Rights at Crandon/Mole Lake, Wisconsin,” in Life and 
Death Matters, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2011), 151-180; Olga Kuchinskaya, 
“Twice Invisible: Formal Representations of Radiation Danger,” Social Studies of Science 43 (2103): 78-96; 
Marcella LaFever, “Communication for Public Decision-Making in a Negative Historical Context: Building 
Intercultural Relationships in the British Columbia Treaty Process,” Journal of International and Intercultural 
Communication 1, no. 2 (2008): 158-180; and Brian Wynne, “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities 
and Public Uptake of Science,” Public Understanding of Science 1, no. 3 (1992): 281-304. 
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have little to say, or have not conducted their own analysis, of conservation science.45 Despite 
this power differential, studies such as Hassan Roba’s dissertation from the Norwegian 
University of Life Sciences explicitly encourage use of conceptual metaphors by western 
ecologists in data collection when working with herders. In Roba’s study, Ariaal and Rendille 
herders walk around their pastures with western ecologists. During these walks, the herder’s 
ecological knowledge is recorded and mapped not through traditional methods or language, but 
through prescribed, single English language terms such as “good,” “cold,” and “degraded.”46 
Problematically, the context, differentiation, and cultural entailments of these terms are absent 
from the recorded, one word descriptions. 
Even when western scientists and herding communities are able to communicate without 
conceptual metaphors, their discussions are still bounded by culturally situated understandings of 
risk and value. As anthropologist Susan Crate illustrates, Northern Siberians explain climate 
change as a “softening” of the land. To western scientists, a softening of the climate will improve 
life in Northern Siberia by raising temperature and extending growing seasons for cash crops. 
Yet, Crate’s informants see risks in flooded fields, winter ice, and shortened growing seasons for 
subsistence crops.47  
                                                
45 Mara Goldman, “Tracking Wildebeest, Locating Knowledge: Maasai and Conservation Biology 
Understandings of Wildebeest Behavior in Northern Tanzania,” Environmental and Planning D: Society and Space 
25, no.2 (2007): 307-331. 
46 The Ariall and Rendille are herding communities in Eastern and Northern Kenya. Hassan G. Roba, 
“Global Goals, Local Actions: A Framework for Integrating Indigenous Knowledge and Ecological Methods for 
Rangeland Assessment and Monitoring in Northern Kenya” (doctoral thesis, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 
2008), 36, http://www.umb.no/statisk/noragric/publications/phdtheses/hassan_fulltext_thesis.pdf. 
47 Crate’s study focuses on reindeer herders in Northeastern Siberia (Russia). These communities are 
frequently compared to the Tsatan reindeer herders who live in northern Mongolia. Susan Crate, “Climate Change, 
Culture Change, and Human Rights in Northeastern Siberia,” in Life and Death Matters, ed. Barbara Rose Johnston 
(Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2011), 412-426. 
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1.6 MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT 
Many governments and development organizations have failed to engage in equal status 
intercultural relationships with herding communities. Instead, herders have been encouraged by 
conservationists and western scientists to settle and plant crops, become democratic and non-
nomadic, and utilize western health facilities.48 Many of these programs are couched in the 
policy register of poverty reduction, with herders labeled as “subsistence agriculturalists” who 
are in need of daily income and expenditure maximization. These calculations debase 
community definitions of poverty and ignore the economic foundations of (partially) self-
sustaining communities who do not need to buy goods from markets.49 Despite these 
discrepancies, herder communities are often listed as the poorest of the poor and targeted for 
aggressive development campaigns.  
Poverty is the metric that justifies these programs, yet education is the metric that 
determines when herders have learned enough to make choices for themselves. Unfortunately, 
this same education often destroys the community cohesion necessary to produce effective 
resistance.50 Human rights education and campaigns frequently accompany these development 
projects. However, these programs seldom encourage compliance with a particular human right 
                                                
48 For a detailed explanation of these projects, see Elliot Fratkin, “Pastoralism: Governance and 
Development Issues,” Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 26 (1997): 235-261; Joy K. Asiema and Francis D. P. 
Situma, “Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: The Case of the Pastoral Maasai of Kenya,” Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy, no. 5 (1994): 149-171; Benson P. Fraser, William J. Brown, Corey 
Wright, and Steven L. Kiruswa, “Facilitating Dialog About Development through Digital Photograph: Seeing 
through the Eyes of Maasai Women,” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 5, no. 1 (2012): 20-
42.  
49 For a detailed analysis of the herder’s rejection of rhetorics of poverty, see David M. Anderson, Poor Are 
Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000). 
50 For a detailed discussion of the effect of development programs on herding communities, see Galaty, 
“Being “Maasai.” Also see Elliott Fratkin and Robin Mearns, “Sustainability and Pastoral Livelihoods: Lessons 
from East African Maasai and Mongolians,” Human Organization 62, no. 2 (2003): 112-122. 
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defined by documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Instead they reinforce 
a stereotype that creates or reifies inequalities among the members of a community.51 For 
example, Human Rights development programs often emphasize the way that women are 
silenced by oppressive community norms but do not address the silencing of herder communities 
by national or international norms.52 Finally, public health projects that target practices such as 
female genital mutilation/circumcision amongst Maasai communities commonly use a rhetoric of 
the “dark continent” and “new barbarianism” to justify new and more invasive development 
projects.53 Medical and gender development discourse is less common among Mongolian 
communities (which do not practice female genital mutilation/circumcision) and have a “reverse 
gender gap” or a greater proportion of women completing university degrees then men. Yet, we 
can see the same effects of hegemonic assumptions regarding Human Rights and herders as 
organizations such as World Vision and the World Bank develop programs in response to the 
perceived poverty of Mongolian herders.  
Development policies are often coupled with fortress conservation programs, resulting in 
a double pressure to evict and settle herders. Anthropologist Arturo Escobar writes that the 
development discourse of these agencies, “leaves behind the imagination of development.”54 As 
he explains further, “The emergence of powerful social movement discourse, which although 
still unclear about its possible directions, has quickly become a privileged arena of intellectual 
                                                
51 Lisa Brooten, “Human Rights Discourse and Development of Democracy in a Multi-Ethnic State,” Asian 
Journal of Communication 14, no. 2 (2004): 174-191. 
52 For an example of how this results in informative yet constricted scholarship, see Fraser, et al., 
“Facilitating Dialog.”  
53 Neumann, “Primitive Ideas,” 567. 
54 Arturo Escobar, “Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social 
Movements,” Social Text 31/32, no. 21 (1992): 21. 
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inquiry and political action.”55 Privilege becomes apparent as these development organizations 
make decisions for herders, but herders are excluded from decision making until they have been 
sufficiently educated, liberated, or empowered.56  
Communication scholars have criticized the loss of tradition that accompanies these 
development agencies, their agendas, and the complications of using traditional arguments in 
western settings.57 Many of these studies address the loss of tradition by those who resist and are 
forced to the margins of society as well as by those that attempt to make changes from within 
development organizations. In one such study, communication scholar Richard Morris indicates 
that for many indigenous communities, anyone who participates in the dominant society, even 
when working to change that society, has “mark[ed] themselves as counterfeit in the eyes of 
[both] their people and members of the dominant society.”58 Maasai leaders, such as Member of 
Parliament Moringe ole Parkipuny, whom I interviewed in 2012, echo this concern, noting the 
difficult space occupied by well-educated Maasai who have the tools to assist their community 
but no longer hold the ethos necessary to rally community attention or commitments.59 
Programs that force modernization and social development on herding communities, such 
as the boarding schools which almost all Maasai and Mongolian herding activists are required to 
attend, have had broad ranging and long term effects on community deliberation, cohesion, and 
stability. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that these programs are evidence of genocide 
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58 Richard Morris, “Educating Savages,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, no. 83 (1997): 166. 
59 Moringe ole Parkipuny (First Maasai Member of Parliament), in discussion with the author, July 17, 
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because they deconstruct the social fiber and traditions of herding communities.60 Similarly, 
Maasai and Mongolian advocates, as well as many other herding communities not analyzed in 
this dissertation, have spoken out against modernization and settlement programs as targeted to 
end their ways of life. Yet, despite these studies and arguments, I have not found any academic 
texts that call for reinvigorating, or even simply leaving alone, Maasai or Mongolian herder 
communities.  
The extant analysis that comes closest to addressing these issues concerns connections 
between forced modernization and mobile communities by examining the fate of Roma 
communities in Eastern Europe. Earlier in this chapter I referenced the use of illness metaphors 
in anti-Roma discourse. Yet, there are many texts regarding nomads, herders, and Roma and it 
can be difficult to differentiate and determine which are offensive or problematic. Scholars 
writing about Roma communities ask their western readers to consider their texts and programs 
about “gypsies” by replacing gypsy with Jew and judging the acceptability of the program. A 
similar corrective could be used to test statements regarding the expulsion of herder communities 
and may garner more deliberation by calling attention to the loss of culture coupled with 
proleptic elegies that foreclose space for community rebuttal, to assist governments and NGOs 
that wish to change their arguments and rhetoric but lack clear models and guidelines. This 
methodology is particularly helpful when examining modern conflicts, petitions, and protests by 
herding communities. 
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1.7 PETITION AND PROTEST 
By describing herders as primitive nomads who need to enter “the modern technological world,” 
reporters and policy analysts both legitimate settlement and discourage the reader from searching 
for evidence of herder participation in deliberations about or resistances to modernization. Yet, 
responses by Maasai and Mongolian communities to both proleptic elegies and evictions do exist 
and can be found in social media. While some communication scholars have reported on the 
availability of these tools and their role in altering geographical isolation and social structures of 
the Gobi by allowing people to move through social space, connections have not yet been drawn 
between those tools and herders’ protest rhetoric.61  
Communication scholars have, however, begun to investigate the context of globalization 
and the possibilities of unsettling or re/staging identity via social media. These scholars ask if we 
have entered a period of time when articulations and disarticulations (and the power inherent in 
these representations) can be upset by the possibility of multiple modernities.62 Herders in the 
Mongolian Gobi who use the Internet to discuss protest methodology with a human rights 
organization in Washington D.C. present an excellent illustration of the challenges encountered 
in modernity. These communities are creating and discovering radically new ways to articulate 
their identity and engage with local, national, and international governments. While traditional 
studies of herding communities have been concerned with boundaries and borders, this recent 
turn opens space for a discussion of globalization, industrialization and land privatization 
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alongside environmental risks.63 By examining case studies in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and 
Inner Mongolia, this dissertation works to contribute to the study of the use of social media by 
herding communities to engage in local and international deliberation. 
1.8 FRAME ANALYSIS 
This dissertation employs frame analysis to support investigation of the controversies associated 
with modern herder community land disputes. Each case study features analysis of four argument 
frames that structure the selected controversies – bounded land, movement-as-wandering, 
movement-as-otor, and disappearance. When assessing case studies in Tanzania and Kenya, I 
focus particularly on the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering and disappearance, 
each used by the government in an attempt to compartmentalize Maasai identity and control 
deliberations about the Maasai community’s future. Case studies from Mongolia and Inner 
Mongolia use the same frames, but emphasize clashes between governmental arguments made 
using frames of bounded land and disappearance, and herders’ claims that enact an argument 
frame that I call movement-as-otor. Throughout all four case studies, similarities are drawn in 
the ways that governments have used frames of bounded land, which emphasize western 
cartography, division and sale of land parcels, and concepts of trespass to regulate and control 
both human and wildlife populations. I find additional similarities in the way that frames of 
disappearance, which employ proleptic elegies to anticipate the disappearance of herding 
communities, have been used to justify, promote, and expand settlement and educational 
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programs for herders. However, throughout this dissertation I also mark points of divergence in 
the way that frames of movement differ between the Maasai and Mongolian case studies. When 
analyzing Maasai communities I find historic entailments of the colonial frame of movement-as-
wandering, which was, and still is, used to justify the need to constrain the Maasai and use their 
land in “more productive” ways. Regarding Mongolian herders in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, 
I find that the government says little about herder’s migrations. Instead, herders frequently 
attempt to frame the argument by invoking movement-as-otor, the name of a traditional practice 
of moving herds to find the best grazing lands and avoid environmental risks, which is now used 
to confront governmental expectations of settlement and appropriation of herding lands for 
national parks and mining projects.  
My analysis of these four frames is grounded in the rich body of literature addressing 
rhetorical frames and their use in the study of argumentation. Rhetorical frames are useful in 
enabling arguers to license normative leaps from “is” to “ought” in policy making. This move 
from “is” to “ought” commonly occurs as implicit assumptions and structures are extracted from 
generative metaphors or value terms that can be used to link particular positions to issues.64 
These values are then used in the production of “boundary framing” and “adversarial framing” 
which delineate the boundary between good and evil, and construct protagonists and antagonists 
for particular deliberations.65 
                                                
64 A detailed analysis of linking value to issues through frames can be found in Brewer’s discussion of how 
pro-life movements linked abstract values such as equality or traditional morality to specific policy-making 
deliberations. Paul R. Brewer, “Framing, Value Words, and Citizens’ Explanations of Their Issue Opinions,” 
Political Communication, no. 19 (2002): 303-316. 
65 For a discussion of how boundary frames have been used in Dutch and European Union deliberations, 
see Robert Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” 
Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000): 611-639. 
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Frames are found in persuasive stories, discourse regarding environmental change, and 
can be used to gain or change allegiances of advocacy and development groups. For example, 
social ecologist Oladele Ogunseitan argues that rhetorical frames act as “persuasive stories” that 
have been particularly useful in deliberations about climate change and vulnerability in Africa.66 
In my study, I am interested in the persuasive stories told by, for, and about herding 
communities, and the ways that these stories interact in argumentative contexts to imagine and 
mobilize new possibilities. 
Sociologists Robert Benford and David Snow would label these types of narratives as 
“collective action frames,” generated through two types of discursive processes: frame 
articulation and frame amplification. Frame articulation occurs when events and experiences of 
the stakeholder group are aligned in a unified and compelling fashion. This alignment highlights 
specific portions of an experience while allowing other aspects to recede to the distance. In this 
way, frames need not be new, but instead shed a new angle, vantage point, or interpretation on 
specific deliberations. Frame amplification is then used to bring a sharp focus on to a punctuated 
issue, belief, or event that symbolizes the larger frame. The collective action frame is used to 
affect not only individual attitudes and perceptions, but also assist in the negotiation of shared 
meanings.67  
My study focuses on the ways collective action frames of Maasai and Mongolian 
communities are negotiated and the moments when revisions become possible. As Benford and 
Snow posit, frames can proffer, buttress, and embellish new identities by suggesting new 
relationships and lines of action. Articulated and amplified frames affect the construction of 
                                                
66 Oladele Ogunseitan, “Framing Environmental Change in Africa: Cross-Scale Institutional Constraints on 
Progressing from Rhetoric to Action against Vulnerability,” Global Environmental Change, no. 13, (2003): 105. 
67 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 614. 
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message meaning, and perceptions by organizing information and constructing worldviews 
through reciprocal interactions among individuals, social groups, and cultural products such as 
new and social media.68 Rhetorical frames become relevant to policy-making decisions and 
physical conflicts as they transcend individual perceptions and influence community reactions. 
Urban studies scholars such as Sandra Kaufman and Janet Smith have analyzed the success and 
failure of collective action frames in brownfield deliberations, highlighting the times when 
discrepancies between frame and reality result in intra and extra-group conflict.69 Their western 
focus is typical in the field of communication, which has largely failed to explore ways that 
frame analysis can productively inform study of international and intercultural deliberations. 
The following chapters assess the ways herders, conservationists, and government 
officials construct and use frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, movement-as-otor, 
and disappearance in conflicts and deliberations. Additionally, I pay particular attention to frame 
alignment – when stakeholders bridge, amplify, extend, or transform a frame to bring members 
into a collective, and reframing in response to lost opportunities or the fostering of new 
agreements. Reframing is not an easy process, often requiring that adversarial stakeholders 
enlarge their own worldviews while considering and reevaluating arguments from their 
adversaries.70 
I am intrigued by the use of frames to initiate or incite conflicts between stakeholder 
groups, as well as the potential for frames to be used for the management and resolution of 
potential conflicts. A deep body of literature has examined the ways that framing patterns have 
                                                
68 For a detailed discussion of the way that these interactions have affected both public opinion and policy, 
see Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
69 Sanda Kaufman and Janet Smith, “Framing and Reframing in Land Use Change Conflicts,” Journal 
of Architectural and Planning Research 16, no. 2 (1999): 168. 
70 Entman, Projections of Power, 69. 
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contributed to intractable conflicts. For example, communication scholar Barbara Gray argues 
that local communities and environmentalists often come into conflict when they construct place-
based identities linked to specific lands. These local communities frame their core identities 
through land use and community orientation to specific locations. For example, members of the 
World Wildlife Foundation may construct their own identities as servants and guardians of wild 
lands in the Serengeti. Conflicts then occur over who can and should direct policy—the Maasai 
who live in and around the Serengeti, or World Wildlife members who dedicate their time and 
money to protecting the Serengeti? In Gray’s assessment of conflicts in Northern Minnesota, 
local communities use frames to promote their “localness” while activists attempt to grapple with 
changing identities through frame negotiation.71 Similarly, in my analysis of the Serengeti, 
Maasai community members clash with conservation organizations – both advocating for 
environmental sustainability through mutually exclusive methodologies. By assessing the 
construction and negotiation of arguments by multiple stakeholder groups, this dissertation asks 
how herding communities, such as the Maasai and Mongolians produce and use arguments in the 
complex milieu of environmental deliberation.  
1.9 CRITICAL APPROACH AND CASE STUDY SELECTION 
The Maasai and Mongolian communities, two of the largest herding populations in the world, 
share many characteristics. For example, both are split communities with widely different 
economic, political, land, agriculture, and cultural traditions. The Mongolian population is 
71 Barbara Gray, “Strong Opposition: Frame-Based Resistance to Collaboration,” Journal of Community & 
Applied Psychology, no. 14 (2004):166-176. 
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currently split between Mongolia and China, while the Maasai population is split between Kenya 
and Tanzania. Beyond being split herder communities, Maasai and Mongolian herders have been 
selected for this study because of their burgeoning legacy of protest activity. 
My research asks how competing visions of herder identity underwrite argumentation and 
protests in Maasai and Mongolian land disputes. Through this research, I hope to call academic 
attention to critical herder issues and analyze the multiple competing claims made for, by, and 
about herder communities. Such lines of inquiry are especially ripe for communication-based 
analysis for several reasons. First, herders engage in a wide array of fascinating communication 
practices, including the use of mass media, social media, and oral traditions as a means of 
formulating and communicating the interests of small communities in an effort to protest against 
international agents. Second, a communicative perspective positions the study to shed unique 
light on how the figure of the “nomad” is being mobilized metaphorically in lively academic 
discussions regarding the evolving nature of political agency and state power in a rapidly 
globalizing world. 
The relationship of the Maasai and Mongolians to their respective states is complicated 
and varies between community, state, and nation. My dissertation’s tandem analysis design is 
especially appropriate given the two population’s similar economic structure (socialist in China 
and Tanzania, capitalist in Kenya and Mongolia), economic sectors (agriculture, minerals, and 
tourism), mining politics, political structure, cultural policies, and Maa or Mongolian linguistic 
resistance to government definitions of nomad, herd, state, and sovereignty. Further, the same 
Multinational Corporation (Monsanto), International Aid Organizations (USAID, GTZ, Qatar 
Foundation, and Chinese Development assistance), Multi-National Organizations (UN, 
UNESCO, OECD) and International NGO’s (Conservation International, Mercy Corps, and 
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World Wildlife Foundation), are present in these nations and exert significant effects on Maasai 
and Mongolian communities. Throughout my analysis I ask if these similarities have created 
quilting points, moments when multiple identities can be connected to leverage emancipatory 
identity. While engaging in multiple, geographically diverse communities has required much 
fieldwork and travel, the resulting study avoids the risk of presenting the problems facing herder 
communities are isolated events. My study of the Maasai and Mongolian communities – two of 
the world’s largest and most vocal herder communities – strives to show how we can understand 
herders in ways that remain meticulously aware of localities and differences while faithfully 
analyzing the diversity of arguments presented by herder communities. 
Evidence for this analysis is drawn from oral history interviews and archival documents. 
Between 2010 and 2013, I conducted sixty-three interviews in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia and 
China.72 Oral history interviews encourage interview participants to articulate their personal 
narratives in ways that accent elements most important to them. Through open-ended interview 
questions, I worked to establish continuity, conversion, and clash between individual interviews 
with herders, NGO workers, rural educators, and government officials. Further, interview 
questions were designed to prompt dialogue regarding participants’ sense of relationship 
between land and herder communities before and after a land dispute.  
Interviewees were identified using a snowball method, beginning with local 
acquaintances from my prior experiences in each country.73 Interviews with NGOs and 
                                                
72 Preliminary interviews, which are not included in this count, were conducted when I was a Fulbright 
Fellow at the National University of Mongolia (2006-2007), when I was Director of the University of Pittsburgh 
Mongolian Field Studies Program (2005-2010), and when I was employed as an ethnographer with the Project on 
Early Nomadic Pastoralism, a joint project between Indiana University of Pennsylvania and the Mongolian 
University of the Humanities (2004-2005).   
73 Support for these interviews was provided by the American Center for Mongolian Studies, the University 
of Pittsburgh Graduate Student Organization, the University of Pittsburgh International Studies Travel Fund, the 
African Heritage Nationality Room Summer Fellowship, and the University of Pittsburgh Arts and Sciences 
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government officials were conducted in both national capitals and local towns. Interviewing 
herders required more travel, frequently to camps inaccessible by paved roads or public 
transportation. To reach and interview these herders, I hired local drivers and teachers as 
traveling companions. These hires were critical as a single American woman appearing by 
herself to ask for interviews is unheard of amongst many of these communities. By working with 
drivers and teachers, with whom I had developed decade-long friendships, I was able to meet 
with herding communities on familiar terms, better understand the relationships that span the 
East African and Eurasian steppe, and not get lost in the process. Traveling with these 
companions also enabled herding communities to feel more at ease during my visit. For example, 
my drivers were almost always male and the teachers were almost always female, enabling me to 
speak with both male and female herders in a way that might not be possible if I traveled only 
with a female companion (and would therefore be un-chaperoned when speaking to male 
community members) or a male companion (a situation that would have placed herders in an 
uncomfortable position as they tried to determine the exact nature of my relationship with the 
driver — a determination which would implicate everything from the types of food served to 
sleeping arrangements). Following each interview I asked interviewees to suggest other 
community members I might approach to arrange an interview. I recorded each interview using a 
hand-held audio recorder, transcribed the interview, and when necessary, translated the interview 
from Mongolian or Swahili to English.  
Interviewing herding communities for this dissertation presented some unique challenges. 
While oral historians recommend conducting private, or small group interviews in a quiet setting, 
I was working with herding communities who often live in one-room tents or cobb houses. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Summer Research Fellowship. Preliminary interviews were funded by a Fulbright Fellowship and a Foreign 
Language and Area Studies (FLAS) grant.  
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During each interview, relatives, neighbors, and children wandered in and out of the family’s 
dwelling. Sometimes those entering the home would sit down and join the conversation, 
recounting how their families had experienced similar or different conflicts.74 This resulted in 
more nuanced and textured conversations, in which interviewees would clarify and explain their 
positions, with contextual information from multiple community members included as 
contributions. Additionally, I gained an intergenerational perspective into how land conflicts had 
changed as herding communities experienced a transition from colonial, socialist, and 
democratic governments. However, these many entries and exits from the interview also caused 
complications in teasing out individual voices in the audio recording and encouraging younger 
herders to participate in the interview rather than defer to their elders, as is expected in their 
communities. 
In Mongolia, these interviews were very long – sometimes spanning one or two days. 
This length occurred because I was traveling long distances to meet with families in rural areas 
without any outside accommodations. Frequently I arrived at a family’s camp without prior 
notice, was invited for tea and sharing of national and community news that my companions and 
I had gathered en-route. The proposed interview format was then explained and approved prior 
to commencement of conversation. At some point during the interview, preparations would begin 
for a meal and we would be invited to camp with the family for the evening. As a result of my 
extended visit with families, interviews would frequently conclude, only to restart a few hours 
later as an interviewee remembered a new detail or revision. In Kenya and Tanzania the 
interviews were shorter and the drives longer as families were uncertain where I - as a single 
                                                
74 The number of interviews indicated in the previous chapter, sixty-three, indicates the number of 
interview sessions, not the number of participants (which is much higher, given the frequent entering and exiting of 
interlocutors during the interview process). 
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American student of an age that the Maasai community expected would be married - should 
sleep. Despite this limitation, interviews with Maasai families were still much longer than 
expected by academics working with western settled communities. Often I was invited for tea, 
snacks, and to visit the herds and water catchments.  
Many of the Maasai and Mongolian herders that I interviewed lead a self-sufficient or 
semi-self sufficient lifestyle. I never paid for an interview. However, I did give tea, flour, sugar, 
and biscuits to each family that I visited. These gifts are both an expected exchange between 
visitor and host, and replaced the food that my traveling companions and I consumed during our 
stay with each family.  
I was never denied an interview, however, I was at times pointed to prior interviews that 
the herders had given for another researcher. For example, in the Kenyan and Tanzanian chapters 
I have frequently cited AgFax interviews because interviewees pointed me to specific interviews 
in which they or their family members participated. Each herder that I interviewed was aware of 
the tenuous relationship between themselves and their national governments. The effects of these 
difficult relationships are seen in many ways in this dissertation. Oral historians accept either 
verbal or written consent for interviews, but prefer a written deed of gift between interviewee 
and interviewer. In my case, I frequently obtained a verbal rather than written agreement. In 
Kenya, many interviewees read the deed-of-gift form and said, “yes I agree.” However, given 
their experience with colonial and national governments, which have used herder signatures to 
take away land or herds, these community members were unwilling to sign any form.75 Other 
herders, especially those in Eastern Mongolia, asked that I transcribe the interview alongside the 
                                                
75 In these instances, I asked the teacher or professor traveling with me to write a letter indicating that each 
interviewee was informed of my research agenda and that their answers could be used in future publications, 
including this dissertation. 
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audio recording, and then reviewed the transcription before my departure. These interviewees 
were attentive to ensuring that their words were recorded exactly as they intended. Because of 
their relationship with the state, pending court cases, or possible illegal border crossings, herders 
frequently provided me with pseudonyms, asked that I not record their precise geographic 
location, or requested that I not take photographic images of their families or herds. Following 
each interview I asked if the participants would like to retract their interview.76 Because of the 
potential political implications of these questions, all interviewees were given the option of 
remaining anonymous and heads of each household approved any pictures that I took of their 
family, camps, and herds.  
Following Fong and Spickard’s example, all interviews were conducted in English, or 
with simultaneous translation from Maa or Mongolian to English so that the interviewee could 
control the ways that their words are recorded.77 This approach ensures that terms such as 
nomad, barbarian, and civilized are contextualized and defined as the speaker intended. This 
method may be surprising to western readers who do not expect herding communities to have 
fluency in the English language. However, it is my experience that each family that I visited had 
a family member with English language training. Including discussions of how interviewee’s 
words would be translated into English both allowed greater control for herders over the way that 
their interviews are recorded, helped herders to understand how the interview will be studied, 
and encouraged younger family members to participate in the interview.78 Following 
                                                
76 Retractions only occurred twice, once in Kenya and once in Mongolia. In both of these instances the 
participants and I decided to delete the entire interview from my recorder rather than risk that the recorded contents 
might be confiscated or copied before I had the opportunity to return to my office and delete a specific line or 
section of the interview. Those retracted interviews are not included or referenced in this dissertation. 
77 Fong and Spickard, “Ethnic Relations,” 30. 
78 For example, in Eastern Mongolia I interviewed a family of three, including a mother, father, and 
daughter. When I first asked for an interview, the family agreed that I should interview the father. However, when 
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transcription, I used an inductive analytical approach to interpret the texts, complemented by a 
close analysis of particular moments of tension between oral histories and archival documents. 
In my research, oral history interviews are juxtaposed with archival documents including 
government reports, ethnographic studies, photographs, news reels, educational materials, and 
propaganda productions to understand the multiple, historical interpretations and representations 
of herder identity. When using archival documents, I pay equal attention to final government 
documents and initial ethnographic field notes. From this diversity of sources I ask what 
information concerning herder identity was collected by ethnologists yet excluded from reports 
or academic publication. Additionally, what information was collected by local government 
agents and then changed or omitted before submission to higher levels of government? These 
questions are inspired by historian Robert Tignor’s comparative study of Kenyan and British 
archives. He reports that materials recording colonial government failures are often held in 
Kenyan archives, but missing from those in England. Meanwhile, documents labeled as “state 
secrets” in Kenya are readily accessible in England.79 By consulting multiple archives I hope to 
not only access the widest diversity of primary source material, but also to understand what 
information has been withheld by government administrations. This is done through document 
collection at national, local, and university archives in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China as 
well as those at the United States Library of Congress, the National Geographic Foundation 
Archives, the Smithsonian Institute, Harvard University’s Tozzer Library, Indiana University’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
the methodology of including English translation was explained, the daughter was invited to participate. She then 
discussed with her mother how specific elements of the family’s narrative should be told. In the middle of the 
interview three of her father’s friends came to visit and entered the family’s ger (tent). This resulted in myself, my 
traveling companion, and our driver, the mother, father, and daughter, and three new herders – a total of nine people 
in an eight-foot diameter tent. The visitors suggested that the mother and daughter leave the tent to make more room, 
but as the daughter now had a role in the discussion, and was engaging her mother to fulfill that role, both stayed 
and participated in the interview. 
79 Robert L. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya : The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 
to 1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
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African Studies Collection, and the Dutch International Institute of Social History. The variety of 
archives examined in this dissertation allows me to access historic documents purged or lost 
from Tanzanian, Kenyan, Mongolian, and Chinese libraries during periods of political transition. 
Field visits to ethnographic museums in each nation further enrich this study’s 
examination of how ethnographic reports about herder/nomadic communities present that 
information to the public. Many of these museums utilize Social Darwinist theories of racial 
differentiation and social evolution to explain the history and culture of herder communities. 
While ethnographic museums have fallen out of favor in the United States, they still contribute to 
public education and identity authorization in the nations considered in this dissertation. By 
visiting these museums and their archives I have asked how institutions construct and represent 
herders and herder communities. These visits helped me to better understand the complexity of 
herder participation and reflect on nationally sponsored ethnographic narratives.  
In what follows, I present case studies of modern herder communities in Tanzania, 
Kenya, Mongolia, and China. Each case study assesses the government and herder’s use of the 
central frames of land, movement-as-wandering or movement-as-otor, and disappearance. I then 
trace the historic and modern trajectory of frame use and shifts to understand how these frames 
are constructed and negotiated. These analyses are couched in a historical understanding of 
frame construction and negotiation that begins in the colonial period for each community. The 
case studies then draw from collected oral history interviews and archival research to explicate 
the dominant and regressive frames of deliberation. I conclude each chapter with an examination 
of emergent conflicts, protests, and the use of new-media by herding communities. Chapters Two 
and Three examine the Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya, while chapters Four and Five address 
Mongolians in Mongolia and China. I have chosen this order as it reflects the historic creation of 
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state sponsored conservation zones predicated on the eviction of herder communities that began 
in Tanzania and was then replicated in Kenya. While Mongolian and Inner Mongolian 
conservation zones were not directly linked to the Serengeti or Maasai Mara, many of the same 
nonprofit and international aid organizations, such as the German GTZ and Frankfurt Zoological 
Society, utilize the Serengeti as a model for their work in Mongolia. Chapter Six connects these 
intrinsic studies of Maasai and Mongolian communities to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s 
metaphors of nomadology and the war machine. In this chapter I examine the accusation that 
Deleuze and Guattari have romanticized nomadic communities to produce their metaphor of 
nomadology. Then I ask if this metaphor has functioned as a mechanism to silence or exclude 
herder communities, or if the metaphor illustrates rhetorical tools that herder communities can 
use to leverage acts of resistance against the state. I argue that because the Maasai and 
Mongolians are among the specific people that Deleuze and Guattari have referenced when 
establishing the metaphor, modern Maasai and Mongolian experiences are one of the best places 
to evaluate the application of nomadology. I conclude this study with a discussion of the need for 
greater analysis and representation of herder communities in academic study and the ways 
Maasai and Mongolian herders can offer critical insights to academics examining the 
applicability and utility of nomadology to understand both the general struggle against late 
modern capitalism and the utility of nomadology to understand the plight of modern nomadic and 
herding communities.  
 
  40 
2.0  TANZANIA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Northern Tanzania’s rich and complicated history is reflected in the multitude of names ascribed 
to the same geographic space. This is Maasailand, home to fierce warriors and their herds of 
cattle. This is also the land where Bernard Grzimek filmed vast herds for his film The Serengeti 
Shall Not Die, and the colony where first the Germans and then the British established sisal and 
cattle plantations. The Maasai, along with many other herder and hunter-gatherer communities, 
have been evicted and resettled in this area by German imperialists, British colonialists, and the 
independent Tanzanian government. In this chapter I investigate the arguments made to justify 
these evictions, modernizations, and development programs, as well as explore the patterns of 
counter-arguments advanced by herder communities. 
My study begins by foregrounding the history of colonial governance and development of 
the Serengeti National Park. From this context, I find three argument frames emerging - bounded 
land, movement-as-wandering and disappearance. I examine the way that the colonial 
government utilized the frame of bounded land to explain the demarcation, parceling, and sale 
Maasai grazing lands to create private hunting reserves and farms. This frame, which spoke to 
the sensibilities of European settlers, encouraged rhetorics of ownership and trespass that were 
misaligned with Maasai community interpretations of space and the relationships between 
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human and animal populations. However, the Maasai communities’ arguments garnered minimal 
attention at this time because the colonial government used a second frame, that of movement-
as-wandering, to explain that Maasai herders were moving aimlessly across northern Tanzania. 
This frame of movement-as-wandering allowed colonial officials to depict the Maasai as an 
inferior race, which did not have the right to land or deliberation. Finally, building on the 
expectation of Maasai inferiority, the government used a frame of disappearance, through the 
production of proleptic elegies that explained that Maasai communities would soon develop, give 
up their herds, and join in the modernization of Tanzania. 
After examining the government’s arguments, I turn my attention to the ways that Maasai 
community members have responded to the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, 
and disappearance. Drawing from academic, juridical, and protest literatures, this analysis points 
to the complexity of Maasai argumentation and emergent divisions between community 
members who have obtained college educations and those who have focused on enlarging their 
herds. 
In the final portion of this chapter I examine the interaction between the government’s 
frames, Maasai resistance, and private tour company investment in Northern Tanzania. 
Specifically, I am concerned with the ongoing conflict between Maasai communities and 
Thomson Safaris over the Sukenya Farm Enashiva Reserve, a private nature reserve located in 
Loliondo division along the eastern edge of the Serengeti National Park. Leased and regulated by 
an American tour company, this space is advertised to tourists as “the Serengeti without rules” 
where tourists can hunt otherwise protected animals and the company can hire security guards 
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alongside park rangers.80 The 12,617-acre plot has been the subject of multinational protests, 
fact-finding missions, presidential statements, and UN declarations. 
In my analysis of Thomson Safaris’ lease of land in the Loliondo valley I argue that while 
the frames of bounded land and movement-as-wandering are still used in Tanzanian deliberation, 
it is the frame of disappearance that has gained a dominant position. Through the examination of 
Maasai protests movements, recorded and distributed via YouTube, I investigate the entailments 
of the dominance of the frame of disappearance and resulting Maasai protest tactics that employ 
social media to place pressure on the government of Tanzania aiming to preserve Maasai herding 
traditions. 
2.2  WANDERING HERDERS  
In 1885 the Society for German Colonization and German East Africa Company began 
colonizing East Africa in search of natural resources, new markets, and hunting grounds. The 
company quickly dissolved and signed its land claims over to the Imperial German government 
in 1891. While many coastal communities signed treaties with both the German East African 
Company and the German imperial government, the Maasai participated in revolts and attacks, 
recorded in government reports and traveler’s diaries that depict the Maasai as fierce warriors, 
not to be crossed or trusted.81 Despite Maasai resistance to colonial projects, colonial 
                                                
80 “Loliondo, Tanzania,” Natural High Safaris, accessed on November 29, 2012, 
http://www.naturalhighsafaris.com/explore/tanzania/serengeti-loliondo. 
81 For a discussion of Maasai resistance see historian Lotte Hughes’ work, “Malice in Maasailand: The 
Historical Roots of Current Political Struggles,” African Affairs 104, no. 415 (2005): 207-224; and Moving the 
Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Also see Navaya ole Ndaskoi, The Roots 
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administrators began regulating hunting and sale of animal products by Europeans and Bores 
through permit and taxation schemes. The colonial administration’s rationale for these policies 
was explained by Imperial Governor Hermann von Wissmann’s 1896 Wildlife Ordnance: 
I felt obliged to issue this Ordinance in order to conserve wildlife and to avoid 
that many species become extinct which can be expected for the not all that 
distant future, if the present conditions prevail ... We are obliged to think also of 
future generations and we should secure them the chance to find leisure and 
recreation in African hunting in future times. I am also planning to create Hunting 
Reserves in game rich areas in order that wildlife can find their refuge and 
recovery. In such areas hunting of game will be permitted only with the explicit 
prior permission of the Imperial Government. Their establishment should also 
serve science, in order to conserve such game species that have already become 
rare in East Africa.82  
 
Von Wissmann’s method of combining parks and permitting schemes has remained popular 
since 1896. However the warrant for these policies has shifted from European hunting and 
agriculture, to local hunting, and then from local hunters to local herding. 
Von Wissmann worried about the threat of wildlife extinction as a result of European 
hunting and justified his permitting scheme as a way to regulate European tourists and hunters. 
Yet, his contemporaries argued that it was local communities, not European hunters, who were 
decimating wildlife populations.83 Through local and international publications, this view of 
local communities as over-hunters took hold and began to influence scientific deliberation about 
wildlife populations. Although reports emerged in 1911 indicating that European agricultural 
projects posed the primary threat to wildlife populations, these findings were ignored by 
European colonists who continued to blame local communities for over-hunting wildlife 
                                                                                                                                                       
Causes of the Maasai Predicament (Oslo, Norway: Resource Center for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2006), 
http://www.galdu.org/govat/doc/maasai_fi.pdf. 
82 Maasai were only required to obtain a permit if they were exporting meat or animal products for profit. 
Rolf D. Baldus, “Wildlife Conservation in Tanganyika under German Colonial Rule,” (unpublished manuscript, 
accessed on November 24, 2012), http://www.wildlife-baldus.com/download/colonial.pdf. 
83 Baldus, “Wildlife Conservation,” 2. 
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populations.84 At this time, European colonialists claimed Maasai pasturelands and violently 
evicted herders and their herds.85 The combined desire to preserve wildlife for future hunting 
campaigns, and to confine herders to specific locations, resulted in the colonial administration’s 
early support for fortress conservation.86  
While agriculturalists had already begun the eviction of herders, fortress conservation 
policies intensified these programs, now sponsored and directed by the colonial state. The 
Maasai were not consulted regarding the location or boundaries of these parks. While they were 
compensated for eviction and resettlement, those calculations were based on agricultural rather 
than herder needs. The resulting policies regulated herders to living in too-small lands with herds 
that could not follow traditional pathways. The colonial administration justified these evictions 
and constraints through a frame of “movement-as-wandering” and terra nullius, explaining that 
the Maasai move across, and therefore waste, too much land. This argumentative strategy was 
explained by Sr. Charles Eliot, Governor of the British East African Protectorate.  
I cannot admit that wandering tribes have a right to keep other and superior races 
[sic] out of large tracts merely because they have acquired the habit of straggling 
over far more land than they can utilize.87  
                                                
84 For example, the Ngorongoro Crater was claimed by Aldof and Friedrich Siedentopf as a sheep farm. 
These European farmers then tried, unsuccessfully to exterminate all wildlife and communities living in the area. 
For a discussion of these evictions, see Ndaskoi, “ Roots Causes,” 10. Similar narratives of expulsion and mass-
hunting exist for the regions around Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru are found in Baldus, “Wildlife 
Conservation,” 4-5. 
85 A history of these evictions, court cases adjudicating eviction, and attention to eviction from international 
organizations was presented at the United Nations Human Rights’ 2005 Working Group on Minorities. A report of 
these findings is available at Commission on Human Rights, Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (Geneva: United Nations High 
Commission for Human Rights, 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/11WGMinorities.aspx.  
86 Detailed discussions of fortress conservation can be found in Dan Brockington and Katherine 
Homewood, “Degradation Debates and Data Deficiencies: The Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania,” Africa: Journal 
of the International African Institute 71, no. 3 (2001): 449-480. Also see Dan Brockington, Rosaleen Duffy, and Jim 
Igoe, Nature Unbound (London: EarthScan, 2008). 
87 Sr. Charles Eliot is quoted by University of Exeter Professor of African studies, John Markakis. John 
Markakis, Pastoralism on the Margin (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004), 7, 
http://www.minorityrights.org/1054/reports/pastoralism-on-the-margin.html 
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Here, Eliot uses the frame of movement-as-wandering to negatively describe the Maasai’s 
lifestyle. His argumentative move is an example of how colonial powers use the frame of 
movement-as-wandering to justify colonialism as a project that teaches, advances, and develops 
communities such as the Maasai. By describing the Maasai as an inferior community, Eliot 
makes it difficult for the reader to assess, or even acknowledge the Maasai communities’ 
arguments. From this line of reasoning, the acquisition of Maasai lands by colonial 
administrations is a win-win scenario, the land is better used by other communities, and the 
Maasai are encouraged to stop wandering and settle on lands that they can utilize properly. 
The implications of arguments such as Eliot’s are seen in the divisions of Maasai lands 
and forced settlement projects that began during German control of Tanganyika between 1891 
and 1919 and continued after the reassignment of Tanganyika to British East Africa by the 
Treaty of Versailles. During this twenty-nine year period, the Maasai were evicted from sixty 
percent of their land.88 Additional land was lost during the independence movement in 1962 and 
continues today as fortress conservation remains the most popular method of conservation in 
East Africa.  
As a result of these evictions, the Maasai community had to radically alter their traditions 
of moving across wide swaths of land between modern Tanzania and Kenya. The colonial 
government created new boundaries and told the Maasai where they could, and could not live. 
Then, when the Maasai resisted the construction of these boundaries, they were accused of 
trespassing on already-claimed land. Additionally, not only were the Maasai removed from 
specific lands, their movements across land were constrained by railways and fences built 
                                                
88 Hughes, Moving the Maasai, 23-50. 
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through grazing lands. The impact of these boundaries was two fold, as the Maasai were 
confined to smaller and smaller spaces, the government used the frame of movement-as-
wandering less frequently because the Maasai were indeed no longer moving across wide 
distances. Instead, the Maasai communities were confined to small parcels of land, and had many 
difficulties reconciling the desire to maintain large herds and the government’s enforcement of 
land divisions.  
Western scientific studies of Maasai living conditions and lands argue that the Maasai 
hold too many cattle for their land, resulting in over-grazing. These studies seldom account for 
evictions that forced the Maasai into too-small spaces, nor do they assess the Maasai’s traditional 
remedy for overgrazing, moving between multiple pastures.89 While the frame of movement-as-
wandering had created conditions of over-crowding and over-grazing, the frame of bounded land 
was used to make arguments by analogy between Maasai communities and European 
pastoralists. These arguments contend that land is degraded because it is not owned by individual 
shepherds.90 While the analogy between Maasai herders and European shepherds is precarious, 
German and British colonial administrations and the independent nation of Tanzania have 
continued to utilize the argument. Negative aspects of Maasai communities, such as 
overcrowding, poor public health, animal welfare, and land degradation, are commonly 
presented as symptoms of the tragedy of the commons. In these deliberations, land ownership, 
occupation, and rights, are all negotiated through the frame of bounded land. When Maasai 
communities are considered, attention is always paid to negative descriptions of the community, 
                                                
89 This criticism of policy making is advanced by Brockington and Homewood, “Degradation Debates”; 
Hughes, Moving the Maasai; and Katherine Homewood and W. A. Rodgers, Maasailand Ecology: Pastoralist 
Development and Wildlife Conservation in Ngorongoro, Tanzania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
90 While the term tragedy of the commons was coined by Garrett Hardin in 1968, this form of argument was 
advanced much earlier in both African and European debates. For an early example of this type of argumentation, 
see Charles Allsopp Hindlip, British East Africa, Past, Present, and Future (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905). 
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which are then used as warrants to further limit access to land. For example, recall Eliot’s 
description of the Maasai which I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the “habit of straggling 
over far more land than they can utilize,” which used the frame of movement-as-wandering to 
subdivision and sale of land in northern Tanzania.  
To justify constraint of Maasai communities onto smaller parcels of land, the colonial 
government of Tanzania had to change its descriptions of Maasai identity, from that of 
wandering to an attachment to one particular location. The resulting demarcation of 
“Maasailand” is apparent in early colonial projects through mapping, treaties, and land 
allotments to theorize and legislate where the Maasai should and should not live.91 
Documentation of Maasai lands were based on two, not always mutually exclusive, assumptions, 
(a) the Maasai had come from elsewhere and were interlopers, and (b) the Maasai were the 
dominant tribe in the area.92 These arguments assume the frame of movement-as-wandering, but 
also indicate the higher status of the frame of bounded land. At this time, maps indicating 
“Maasailand” produced a demarcation and constraint of residence. The resulting maps were then 
used to plan and develop colonial farms, railways, conservation areas, and parks as well as 
calculate restitution for Maasai land loss due to these projects. Communities not indicated on the 
original map lost all bargaining power in future treaties and negotiations.  
                                                
91 Prior to this period the Maasai moved to Tanzania from Kenya and were portrayed in the literature as in a 
space of flux and war. For an example of “Maasailand,” see Mohamed Amin, John Eames, and Duncan Willetts, 
Last of the Maasai (London: Bodley Head Ltd, 1987), 16. 
92 A colonial interpretation of the Maasai’s position in this region is based on ethnographic methodology 
which was used to divide tribes for census taking. This resulted in questions such as the division between the Maasai 
and the Samburu who are sometimes also called Maasai, or a Maasai sub-group, or Maasai-like, or a totally different 
tribe. This differentiation has extensive effects on who can claim access to “Maasailand.” The background for these 
deliberations is compellingly presented in anthropologist Susan Kent’s collected volume of essays, Susan Kent, 
“Interethnic Encounters of the First Kind: An Introduction,” in Ethnicity: Hunter-Gatherers and the “Other;” 
Association or Assimilation in Africa, ed. Susan Kent (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 
2002). 
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It is unclear if the Maasai participated in the creation of these colonial maps. Even when 
consultation is alluded to in historic documents, it is unclear who was specifically consulted, 
what was their authority within the Maasai community, and if those same consultants were also 
signatories on the final maps. What is at stake in these maps is not boundaries, but the 
determination to connect the Maasai with a set of boundaries. If, as colonial administrations 
reasoned through a frame of movement-as-wandering, “nomads” simply roam, then Maasailand 
is a meaningless demarcation – Maasailand would simply be wherever the Maasai are currently 
living. However, if the Maasai interpretation of the land - of Maasailand as a unique, culturally 
significant place - is accepted, then the sale of Maasailand to international companies is an 
appropriation of both Maasai land and culture. While the British Colonial office grappled with 
the difference between these interpretations, today’s Tanzanian government has skirted the 
question of “Maasailand” by relying on the frame of disappearance. As I will discuss below, the 
Tanzanian government argues that because the Maasai will modernize and join the ethnic unity 
of Tanzania, questions of ethnic lands and boundaries are no longer necessary or relevant.  
Today, the frames of both bounded land and movement-as-wandering continue to appear 
in government discourse. However, both of these frames have taken secondary positions to the 
frame of disappearance. In these arguments, Maasai herding is presented as an activity out of the 
past, one that has no place in the modern world. The frame of disappearance echoes prior 
arguments about wildlife populations. However, while deliberations about wildlife disappearance 
prompted fortress conservation, deliberations about Maasai disappearance have been met with 
praise as a step toward modernity that also preserves wildlife communities. While the 
expectation that the Maasai would disappear was in use during early colonial discourse, the use 
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of the frame of disappearance and proleptic elegies did not come into a prominent position until 
wildlife tourism to East Africa increased after World War II.93  
The significant increases in tourism to Tanzanian after World War II have been linked to 
the 1958 release of zoologist Bernhard Grzimek’s The Serengeti Shall Not Die. This film 
presents the frame of disappearance to European and American audiences through aerial 
filmography that captured and displayed panoramic, Technicolor images of African wildlife and 
wilderness. This film was used by Grzimek to argue that the preservation of East African herds 
was just as necessary as preserving European cultural heritage cites.94 While the German 
censorship board rejected Grzimek’s original text because it made “impermissible equation[s]” 
between man-made and natural cites, no limitation was placed on visual images. Modern 
analysts have argued that Grzimek’s visual presentation was an equally, if not more effective, 
argument than the verbal text.95 Beyond persuading international organizations to support 
conservation in Tanzania, Grzimek’s film had an impact on the desire of European tourists to 
visit and experience this “last living cultural treasure of Africa.”  
                                                
93 For a detailed discussion of late British colonial policy, including the differences between investment in 
urban development in Kenya and reliance on agricultural projects in Tanganyika, see John Iliffe, “Tanzania under 
German and British Rule” in Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader Vol. 1 Politics, eds. Lionel Cliffe 
and John S. Saul (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), 8-16. 
94 This goal is explained by Boes’ examination of the film, “encouraging a long-view of the land, which 
eschews individualism, and often even people. From this distance, when Tanzanians are seen, they look much like 
wild animals to be counted, surveyed, and controlled by Europeans.” Tobias Boes, “Political Animals: Serengeti 
Shall Not Die and the Cultural Heritage of Mankind,” German Studies Review 36, no. 1 (2013): 48. 
95 The redacted text from Grzimek’s film was as follows: “These last remaining herds of African game are 
a cultural heritage (Kultureller Gemeinbesitz) of all mankind, just like our cathedrals and ancient monuments: the 
Acropolis, St. Peter’s, and the Louvre in Paris. Only a few centuries ago, the Roman temples were being wantonly 
torn down for the sake of building materials. If today any government of whatever political shade dared to pull down 
the Acropolis in Athens in order to build worker’s flats, the whole civilized world would cry out furiously against 
such outrage. Similarly, no man- black or white- should ever be allowed to endanger the future of these last living 
cultural treasures of Africa. God made the earth subject to the will of man. But surely not so that he might 
completely destroy his creations!” Quotation and translation found in Boes, “Political Animals,” 42. 
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International tourism to Tanzania increased from 400 in 1956 to 52,000 in 1972.96 
Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere reflected on this increase of tourism, and began to 
construct policies and parks to attend to tourists’ expectations and needs.97 One of the primary 
requirements was that tourists encounter an expected landscape, a pristine – human free – land 
like that in the film. Problematically for President Nyerere, tourists arrived not to the savannas of 
Grzimek’s film, but to lands filled with communities such as the Maasai who did not agree with 
or support government conservation projects.98 Grzimek reflected on the conflicts that he 
experienced during filming and their effect on the film project while placing blame on Maasai 
communities.  
The Masai were the cause of all our hard work…Because of them we had to learn 
to fly. They were the reason why we were so far from Frankfurt and why we had 
been counting, marking and dyeing animals for the past weeks and months…A 
national park must remain a piece of primordial wilderness to be effective. No 
men, not even native ones should live inside its borders.99  
 
In this argument, Grzimek utilizes a frame of bounded land justified by expected wildlife 
disappearance. His statement, published in 1958 at the creation of the Serengeti National Park, 
resulted in new evictions for the Maasai and a re-emergence of the frame of movement-as-
wandering. However, this time the frame of movement-as-wandering was applied to wildlife 
                                                
96 Thomas Lekan, “Serengeti Shall Not Die: Bernhard Grzimek, Wildlife Film, and the Making of a Tourist 
Landscape in East Africa,” German History 29, no. 2 (June 2011): 4. 
97 In 1961, President Nyerere stated, “I personally am not very interested in animals. I do not want to spend 
my holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favor of their survival. I believe that after diamonds 
and sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with its greatest source of income. Thousands of Americans and 
Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals.” Quoted in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American 
Mind, 3 ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982): 382. 
98 While reports as early as 1931 had indicated that the Maasai did not interfere with conservation efforts, 
and Maasai community members argued that they were the original, and best conservationists, the government was 
persuaded by Grzimek's argument, human populations and wildlife conservation were mutually exclusive. This 
argument was advanced in the frame of movement-as-wandering, first to prove that the Maasai were causing some 
sort of damage, then to prove that evictions would not harm the Maasai, because the community in motion. 
99 Note that Grzimek uses the spelling “Masai” rather than the modern spelling “Maasai.” Although I have 
used the modern spelling throughout this dissertation, I have not changed the spelling found in historical documents, 
such as Grzimek and Grzimek, Serengeti Shall Not Die, 245.  
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populations, not the Maasai. Conservationists argued that herds must be permitted to migrate 
between the Tanganyikan Serengeti and the Kenyan Maasai Mara and the best way to do this 
was constrain herders such as the Maasai.100 The interplay of the frames of bounded land, 
movement-as-wandering, and disappearance demonstrates the government’s deft division and 
hierarchy of human and wildlife arguments. When discussing human communities, attention was 
given to the frame of land. For example, the eviction of 10,000 Maasai and their herds to create 
the Serengeti received little public attention. To an international public, these evictions were 
non-events because the land either already was, or already should be, without human residents. 
When asked about human residents in the Serengeti, policy makers highlighted land agreements 
between government officials and Maasai elders that exchanged Serengeti lands for eternal 
access to the Ngorongoro.101 Speaking at the completion of these agreements the British 
Governor of the Legislative Council said: 
On all grounds of equity and good faith no government could contemplate 
excluding the Maasai from the whole of the great game areas...the policy was 
altered to establishing the Park in the plains to the west, leaving the conservation 
of the Ngorongoro area to be built around the interests of its inhabitants.102  
 
In this agreement, the government outlines specific spaces – bounded lands – where Maasai 
interests are to be accounted for during park planning and development. At the same time, a 
hierarchy between human and wildlife arguments was created by the government in an attempt to 
                                                
100 There is no substantive evidence to indicate that the Serengeti National Park was built using fortress 
conservation because of Grzimek’s work. Rather, I am indicating a commonality of European conservationist 
thought in 1958.  
101 The binding nature of an agreement signed by the elders is contentious. Ole Ndaskoi contradicts the 
European assumption of a organized Maasai military machine under a single command implementing a national 
policy in her report “The Roots Causes of Maasai Predicament.” In this report, she references ole Parkipuny’s 1975 
Master’s Thesis to argue that the Maasai have never had a “chief” nor an “apex of the pyramid.” While, Europeans 
frequently assumed that medicine-men and rain-makers lead the community, according to both ole Ndaskoi and ole 
Parkipuny, these men did not have political power or leadership positions. Ole Ndaskoi, “The Roots Causes,” 5. 
102 James Bellini, Ngorongoro: Broken Promises - What Price Our Heritage? (Arusha, Tanzania: 
Pastoralists Indigenous Non-Governmental Organizations Forum, 2008), 8.  
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calm Maasai resistance to the Serengeti. A year later, the British Governor of Tanganyika 
explained the government’s intentions for the Ngorongoro, including the government’s decision-
making criteria to regulate human/wildlife conflicts, to the Maasai Federal Council. He said, “the 
government intends to protect the game animals in the area, but should there be any conflict 
between the interests of the game and the human inhabitants, those of the latter must take 
precedent.”103 This agreement clearly indicates that Maasai community needs will always come 
first in Ngorongoro policy making. However, this guarantee was made through a frame of 
bounded land – the Maasai are not an ethnic group with a right to the Ngorongoro, instead they 
are “human inhabitants.” This phrase indicates that the Maasai only have a right to protest if they 
currently inhabit the Ngorongoro. As such, Maasai outside of the government-determined 
Ngorongoro boundaries will not have the right to speak on Ngorongoro matters. This distinction, 
between decision making by an ethnic group and decision making by inhabitants, is critical to 
understanding modern conflicts between Maasai communities and the government in this region. 
Following independence in 1961, the Tanzanian Games Parks Law of 1975 authorized 
the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) to “safeguard and promote the interest of 
the Maasai citizens of the United Republic engaged in cattle ranching and the dairy industry 
within the Conservation Area.”104 The text of this agreement further removes the Maasai from 
decision-making roles in determining the future use of lands in northern Tanzania. While the 
British described the Maasai as “human inhabitants,” the independent Tanzanian government 
described the Maasai as “Maasai citizens” who were engaged in activities within the park. The 
second part of this statement may appear to be a return to the frame of movement-as-wandering – 
                                                
103 Bellini, Ngorongoro: Broken Promises, 9. 
104 Bellini, Ngorongoro: Broken Promises, 8. 
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today the Maasai are engaged in activities in the Ngorongoro but tomorrow they may be engaged 
elsewhere. However, it is critical that the Maasai are named as citizens of Tanzania – this 
broadens the frame of bounded land to include all national land, while allowing all other 
Tanzanian citizens to make an equal claim to traditionally Maasai lands. This re-articulation of 
identity foreclosed the government’s use of a frame of movement-as-wandering while 
undercutting the power of Maasai land claims. The Ngorongoro, a land now owned and 
controlled by the government through the NCAA, was presented as a commodity in Tanzania’s 
tourist industry. At this time, the government and its office, the NCAA, reinterpreted the 
Ngorongoro not as a Maasailand but as a moneymaking tourist destination.105 This shift in 
government interpretation resulted in changes in national deliberations regarding Maasai rights 
to traditional culture within the Ngorongoro.  
 
Figure 2: Maasai herders on the road to the Serengeti.106 
 
                                                
105 The Maasai’s agreement with the British Colonial Office is absent from this discussion, as are any 
indications that the Maasai left the Serengeti only with the assurance of continued access to the Ngorongoro. For a 
detailed narrative of this process, see, Joshua Hammer, “Last Days of the Masai?,” Conde Nast Traveler, November 
2010, http://www.cntraveler.com/features/2010/11/Last-Days-of-the-Masai. 
106 Images such as this, of Maasai herders in traditional clothing moving across Tanzanian pasturelands are 
what the government of Tanzania is attempting to block from the view of tourists. Allison Hahn, July 2012. 
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The visual prominence of traditional Maasai culture in the Serengeti tourist region 
frustrated Tanzanian government officials who continually used proleptic elegies to describe the 
Maasai as a savage people out of time. Frustrations mounted as tourist attention was drawn to the 
pre-modern Maasai who provided evidence of either resistance to or failure of modernization in 
Tanzania. The Maasai were seen as challenging national discourses that presented Tanzania as 
the first African Socialist State, a model of modernization and civilization for emergent post-
colonial African nations. In an attempt to control both these discourses and images captured by 
tourists, the government designed projects to “civilize” the Maasai and appointed officials like 
Mkwang’ata to direct policies to Maasai communities. Time Magazine reported on 
Mkwang’ata’s success in an article titled “Dressing up the Maasai,”  
[Mkwang’ata who] instructed tribesmen to throw away their animal skins and 
skimpy loincloths and “dress in something better than a dirty sheet or a meager 
yard of cloth that exhibits your buttocks,” has also warned them against allowing 
tourists to “take your naked pictures.” He has backed up his crusade with 
penalties. In the past few weeks, about 250 Masai caught disobeying the new 
regulations have been locked up briefly in cells in the regional center... If 
necessary, says Mkwang'ata, police are prepared to herd the Masai into mass 
baths, burn their ceremonial garb in public and shave off their ochered hair.”107 
 
The same report indicates that the Maasai “seem resigned to ultimately becoming more 
Westernized.”108 In this statement, the government utilizes a frame of disappearance to support 
the successful westernization of Maasai communities. Arguments regarding Maasai lands, herds, 
and migrations are absent from these deliberations – the Maasai are presented as a people out of 
time, a dehumanized community that must be quarantined until they accept the government’s 
modernization efforts. When they are modernized, the Maasai will no longer identify as an ethnic 
group, but as citizens of Tanzania. In this newfound national identity, deliberation about lands 
                                                
107 Nyerere’s appointment of Mkwang'ata to civilize the Maasai was reported in Time Magazine. See, 
“Tanzania: Dressing,” Time, 40. 
108 “Tanzania: Dressing,” Time, 40 
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and herds will be irrelevant because the Maasai which required these spaces will no longer exist 
in Tanzania. 
Today, the Tanzanian government continues this rhetoric of modernization through a 
two-part argument – that the Maasai must modernize, and that those who do not modernize are 
not truly Tanzanian. The first part of this argument was made by President Jakaya Kikwete in his 
2005 inaugural address. Two translations of his speech are found in the literature and the 
differing translations of his statement provide us a window into both the frame of disappearance 
in Tanzania and the way that frame is moderated for an international stage. Each of these 
quotations has been translated from Swahili to English in the source documents. Joshua Hammer 
a journalist writing for CondeNast Magazine quoted Kikwete as stating:  
Mr. Speaker, we must abandon altogether nomadic pastoralism which makes the 
whole country pastureland...The cattle are bony and the pastoralists are sacks of 
skeletons. We cannot move forward with this type of pastoralism in the twenty 
first century.109  
 
While the official government publication of Kikwete’s speech states: 
 
We will take deliberate measures to improve the livestock sector. Our people 
must change from being nomadic cattle herders to being settled modern livestock 
keepers. We will take measures to improve pastures, veterinary care, cattle dips 
and auctions.110  
 
The first statement was translated by a reporter attending the inaugural address. The second is a 
hansard, a British term for a transcript that is not verbatim, but rather has been edited to remove 
grammatical mistakes, repetitions, and redundancies. Comparison of these translations shows 
radical differences, from that of “abandon” to “change,” and from “nomadic-pastoralists” to “the 
                                                
109 Hammer, “Last Days of the Masai?.” 
110 Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, “Speech by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency 
Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, on Inaugurating the Fourth Phase Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Parliament Buildings, Dodoma,” December 30, 2005, 
http://www.tanzania.go.tz/hotuba1/hotuba/051230_bunge_eng.htm. 
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livestock sector.” A generous interpretation could account for these differences as a problem of 
translation and determine that the second translation – that by the Tanzanian government – is the 
most accurate. A less generous interpretation would be that after initial international pressure, the 
Tanzanian government edited the text to soften the official statement. The confusion created by 
these changes has broad reaching implications – the Tanzanian government claims that Kikwete 
never specifically addressed herders in his inaugural address, and herders claim that they heard 
him do exactly that. For my analysis, however, each of these translations is sufficient evidence of 
the frame of disappearance. Kikwete is creating the rhetorical possibility that soon Maasai 
communities will stop living in traditional ways. Later in the same speech Kikwete states 
“national unity is the unity among citizens, who like to consider themselves Tanzanians first, 
before identifying themselves by tribe, race, religion, gender or region of origin.”111 Analysis of 
Kikwete’s syllogism indicates that the Maasai must disappear: if all Tanzanians are modernized, 
and the Maasai are not modernized, then the Maasai are not Tanzanians.  
Kikwete’s reasoning is reflected in public speeches by his officers, such as Prime 
Minister Peter Pinda’s 2009 answer to MP John Cheyo’s demand for an explanation of the 
persecution of herders in the Kilosa district. Previously, the national government provided long 
warrants for government policy towards the Maasai. However, in this questioning period, PM 
Pinda responded, “If you ask me where will pastoralists go I will ask you where did they come 
from?”112  
PM Pinda’s speech lasted for two hours, yet only this line has been extracted and 
replicated in international media and NGO reports. PM Pinda’s statement references the historic 
                                                
111 Kikwete, “Speech by the President.” 
112 Quoted by Maasai activist Navaya ole Ndaskoi, Inconvenient Pastoralists of Gwata and  
Kongwa (Arusha, Tanzania: Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization Forum, 2011), 4. 
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frame of movement-as-wandering and the Maasai’s migration from elsewhere, often presumed to 
be in Northern Africa - Egypt, Ethiopia, or at least Kenya.113 PM Pinda’s implicit argument is 
that the Maasai are not from Tanzania and therefore do not deserve protection from the state. On 
face, this appears to be a return to the frame of movement-as-wandering that was used by the 
colonial administration to appropriate Maasai lands. However, I suggest that PM Pinda is 
actually using a frame of disappearance. The existence of traditional Maasai in Tanzania is no 
longer possible – due to colonial and early independence policies, all Tanzanian Maasai have 
been westernized and are no different from any other ethnic group. According to this logic, 
anyone that still acts as a traditional Maasai must not be Tanzanian. To be clear, I am not arguing 
that the Tanzanian government in general or PM Pinda specifically is unaware that some 
Tanzanian citizen-Maasai still live in traditional ways. Rather, I am suggesting that the 
government of Tanzania has produced a body of rhetoric and argumentation that limits the state’s 
view of traditional Maasai. 
The effect of these blinders, articulated through the frame of disappearance, are apparent 
not only in state discourse, but in private tourist corporations’ promotion of Tanzania. I began 
this chapter with a quotation from Natural High Safaris, “Loliondo could perhaps be described as 
                                                
113 A detailed discussion of the Maasai’s migration from the north to Tanzania can be found in Sonia 
Bleeker, The Masai, Herders of East Africa (New York: Morrow, 1963). Also see Ahmend Mohiddin, “Ujamaa Na 
Kujitegemaa.” In Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader Vol. 1 Politics, ed. Lionel Cliffe and John S. 
Saul (Nairobi:3 East African Publishing House, 1972), 165-177. However, the critical point here is not to deliberate 
about where the Maasai came from, but rather that Pinda is arguing that they encroached on Tanzanian land from 
elsewhere. This argument is not made against Indian landholders, who arrived as subjects of the British Empire, 
long after the Maasai. Nor is it made against the corporations currently using land that the Maasai are trying to 
reclaim. By referencing this history of Maasai migration Pinda successfully sidetracks the attention of deliberators to 
determine where the Maasai are really from, while advancing the frame of movement-as-wandering by reminding 
the audience that the Maasai are always, already, in movement.  
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the Serengeti with fewer rules.”114 These types of statements and publications reveal the tourist 
industry’s relationship with and understanding of traditional land rights,  
Loliondo is actually a huge Maasai community area but in our opinion is worth 
treating as a separate park because the range of safari activities on offer here is 
significantly greater than those within the Serengeti National Park boundaries.115 
  
In this promotional literature, the government’s frame of disappearance and hierarchy of the 
frame of disappearance over the frame of land is transferred from government to industry. 
Loliondo is actually a huge Maasai Community area – frame of land, but in our opinion is worth 
treating as a separate park – frame of disappearance. The Maasai have disappeared from view 
and the Loliondo is just like the Serengeti, free of human inhabitants.  
2.3 MAASAILAND 
Maasai communities have responded to colonial and government frames of bounded land, 
movement-as-wandering, and disappearance by combining anthropological terminology, 
juridical procedures, and street protests that reveal the complexity and intricacies of modern 
Maasai communities and identity. The arguments surveyed in this section explore both 
stabilizing and disturbing effects of intra-Maasai deliberation on community cohesion and the 
ability to articulate Maasai needs and demands to national and international publics by bending 
received argument frames. 
For example, in response to the depiction of the Maasai as a wandering, homeless tribe, 
Tanzanian Maasai communities have produced explicit, English language publications that 
                                                
114 “Loliondo, Tanzania,” Natural High Safaris. 
115 “Loliondo, Tanzania,” Natural High Safaris. 
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clarify their lifestyle.116 One of the best-known Maasai advocates is Moringe ole Parkipuny, who 
earned a Ph.D. at the University in Dar es Salaam and was elected as the first Maasai Member of 
Parliament representing the Ngorongoro district. From his multiple positions as a Maasai elder, 
Tanzanian statesman, and Professor of Political Science, ole Parkipuny has access to the 
complexity of Maasai argumentation and has become a leader in Maasai deliberation. He defines 
the Maasai’s lifestyle using the anthropological term “transhumance,” whereby families move 
utilizing a pattern that “involves regular cyclical movements of livestock over substantial 
distances, up to 20 kilometers at times, between two or three places in response to seasonal 
climatic changes.”117 According to Parkipuny, these movements are necessary to find supplies, 
pastureland, and water. By extension, the community’s herding patterns are also necessary to 
preserve the natural balance and ecological stability of the Maasai’s community, herds, and 
surroundings.  
Ole Parkipuny’s use of “transhumance” responds to the government’s arguments 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Specifically, in response to Eliot’s use of the frame of 
movement-as-wandering, which used a description of “wandering” and “habit of straggling,” ole 
Parkipuny responds that Maasai migration is a directed, cultural link to Maasai identity. In this 
response, he specifies why and how herders keep their herds. Ole Parkipuny’s response to the 
government’s division and sale of land is less direct, he addresses only “places,” and he does not 
claim individual or collective ownership to those lands. At first, it may seem that ole Parkipuny 
is accepting the government’s demarcation of “Maasailand” to indicate a specific location – 
indeed ole Parkipuny goes so far as to indicate a specific geographic range for Maasai places. 
                                                
116 The use of English here is critical because it cuts out any misinterpretations and broader literature. 
Additionally, both Swahili and English are second – and colonial – languages for the Maasai.  
117 Moringe ole Parkipuny, “Some Crucial Aspects of the Maasai Predicament,” in African Socialism in 
Practice: The Tanzanian Experience, ed. Andrew Coulson (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979), 138. 
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However, further investigation demonstrates the work of Maasai scholars to respond to the 
government’s definition of Maasailand. For example Eliamani Laltaika, Lecturer in the Faculty 
of Law at Tumaini University, Iringa (Tanzania) defined Maasailand in 2009.  
I think Maasai land goes much beyond what you can see. I think it really goes 
towards Kenya. Our ancestors used to roam freely, including the Serengeti and all 
these parks in the northern highlands, but then the colonial government started 
introducing different game reserves, game controlled areas, and all this was a 
deliberate way of taking land from the Maasai. We are constrained; everywhere 
around this village belongs to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority, and 
the current general management plan criminalizes grazing animals in any part of 
this forest. And while I was growing up, we used to graze animals freely in any of 
these places.118  
 
In this interview, Laltaika recalls the historic lifestyle of Maasai communities, and seems to 
accept the government’s frame of movement-as-wandering when he states, “we used to graze 
animals freely…[now] we are constrained.”119 While he reproduces the government’s frame of 
movement-as-wandering, Laltaika does not accept the modern implications of this frame, that the 
Maasai will settle and soon disappear. If he had accepted settlement, or if he had accepted 
environmental arguments about human-less nature reserves, he would not be describing these 
constraints, he would not even be identifying as Maasai before identifying as Tanzanian. While it 
could be argued that the government has not yet completed the integration of the Maasai, the 
remainder of Laltaika’s interview indicates the Maasai’s resistance to both governmental and 
colonial arguments. Speaking to his Maasai community, Laltaika supports juridical resistance.  
The Maasai must just go ahead and claim your rights, because if you don’t do so, 
nobody will. So we do not have to fight using any other means than using law… I 
think there is no other way to achieve this goal apart from hammering the right 
                                                
118 By claiming “some of them more than sixty years old,” Laltaika is referring to both Tanzanian and 
colonial land divisions, and their illegitimacy according to Maasai cultural arguments. Eliamani Laltaika, interview 
by Lazarus Laisar, Agfax: Reporting Science in Africa: Defending the Rights of Livestock Keepers, April 2009, 
http://www.agfax.net/transcript/agfax241.pdf. 
119 Neither in this interview, nor in his other texts, does Laltaika engage in a definitional deliberation 
concerning Maasai pastoralism. However, his later texts cite ole Parkipuny’s 1979 publication and definition. 
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nail, and this means lobbying and advocating for the change of these draconian 
laws, some of them more than sixty years old.120  
 
While Laltaika has reached a wide and well-educated audience, his suggestions have 
been met with resistance by local Maasai community members who have not achieved the same 
levels of education or do not have access to government processes. Laltaika and ole Parkipuny, 
who speak English and Swahili fluently, are able to approach courts and legislative bodies to 
demand changes. Yet their community members, who often lack such fluencies and have only 
experienced punishment and repression from the courts, are unlikely to claim their rights in the 
ways suggested by Laltaika. The differences in these resistances do not indicate that one is more 
legitimate than the other. Rather, they point to a complexity of Maasai communities and 
identities that is lacking in governmental rhetoric that legitimates a singular, hegemonic Maasai 
identity. 
When the Tanzanian government confronts multiple articulations of Maasai identity, it 
responds by arguing that anyone presenting an unexpected Maasai identity must not be from 
Tanzania. For example, when Maasai women protested in Arusha, Thomson Safaris suggested 
that it was Kenyan Maasai that initiated the protests.121 From these reactions, it is apparent that a 
womens’ protest was beyond the state-definition of Maasai identity. 
Laltaika is optimistic that the Maasai will be able to access the Tanzanian legal system to 
claim their right of movement; “I can predict a lot of changes in policy, a lot of changes in legal 
                                                
120 Laltaika, Agfax: Reporting Science. 
121 Susan Nordlund reported in 2012 that blame for protests against Thomson Safaris was attributed to 
Kenyan women, “A business associate of the company chimed in that the whole problem was ‘a local Kenyan 
Maasai woman that encouraged all locals to squat on the land and use it for their benefit’ and this chiming in made 
me less likely to forget. Much later did I hear of the Tanzanian government’s habit of accusing ‘troublemakers’ of 
being from the nearest neighboring country.” Susanna Nordlund, “The Sukenya Farm Conflict – What Thomson 
Safaris Are Up to in Loliondo and How I Became a Prohibited Immigrant in Tanzania,” View from the Termite 
Mound weblog, March 18, 2010, http://termitemoundview.blogspot.com/2010/03/sukenya-farm-conflict-what-
thomson.html. 
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aspects, and I’m positive that where we are heading, pastoralism will be recognized and 
pastoralists will be given their rights.”122 Earlier in 2008 he stated “these challenges need a 
rethink of governmental approaches and indeed a review of a myriad of legal and policy 
instruments related to pastoralism.”123 Yet, despite his optimism, Laltaika indicates a limitation 
to juridical activism when he states, “some of them [Maasai] are aware of their rights, some of 
them are not.”124 Further, my 2012 interview with ole Parkipuny indicated an even deeper 
division - none of the Ngorongoro residents will listen to their Parliamentary representatives. All 
they care about now is cows, having larger and larger herds.125 As a result of under-education 
about Maasai rights, both Laltaika and ole Parkipuny have begun rights education programs for 
their communities. While international examples prove the potential of these projects, they have 
also received much resistance in Tanzania by non-Maasai who wonder whether the Maasai have 
the right to continue traditional movements across large swaths of land.  
Maasai communities are not controlled or directed by Laltaika or ole Parkipuny. Instead, 
many communities maintain traditional methods of governance through panels of elders and 
divisions between genders and age group sets. These Maasai community members respond to 
Tanzanian government policies and programs with a complex blend of arguments ranging from 
those that challenge the legitimacy of the Tanzanian nation-state, the reasoning behind nature 
reserves, and sale of local lands. These arguments frequently reference an oral history that 
predates the nation of Tanzania and European colonization, and extends before and beyond the 
nation boundaries of Tanzania. These arguments indicate that while the Maasai have the same 
                                                
122 Laltaika, Agfax: Reporting Science. 
123 Elaimani Laltaika, “Jatropha in Maasailand: Why, How and for Whose Benefit?.” Paper presented at the 
Climate Law Confrence in Developing Countries Post 2012: North and South Perspective, Ottawa, Canada, 
September 2008., 11. 
124 Laltaika, Agfax: Reporting Science. 
125 Ole Parkipuny, in discussion with the author, July 17, 2012 
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rights as other Tanzanian citizens, Tanzania has no right to constrain the Maasai within Tanzania 
or to limit Maasai herds via fortress conservation. One of the most quoted arguments is advanced 
by Edward ole Mbarnoit in “Last of the Maasai,” a photographic text co-authored by Mohamed 
Amin, Duncan Willetts, John Eame.126  
It is we Maasai who have preserved this priceless heritage in our land. We were 
sharing it with the wild animals long before the arrival of those who use game 
only as a means of making money. So please do not tell us that we must be 
pushed off our land for the financial convenience of commercial hunters and 
hotel-keepers. Nor tell us that we must live only by the rules and regulations of 
zoologists...If Uhuru [freedom / independence] means anything at all, it means 
that we are to be treated like humans, not animals.127 
 
In this statement, ole Mbarnoit does not need to reference a specific location – not a tree, or a 
border, or a village – but rather the attachment and ownership of the land by the Maasai. “Our 
land” describes Maasai land as communal, as opposed to “my land” or government land. 
Similarly, the government’s frame of bounded land is referenced by the appeal, “please do not 
tell us.” In this statement, ole Mbarnoit produces an argument that is inaccessible to both ole 
Parkipuny and Laltaika. Ole Mbarnoit questions the motivations, training, and credibility of the 
government and its scientific reports. By highlighting the tensions between the government’s 
focus on making money from parklands and the Maasai’s traditions of land conservation, ole 
Mbarnoit questions the validity of the government’s policies in Northern Tanzania. Ole 
                                                
126 Since the original publication, this quotation has been re-quoted in Raphael B.B. Mwalyosi, Human 
Ecology and Sustainable Development with Special Emphasis on Africa (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es 
Salaam Institute for Resource Assessment, 1993). Later quotation appeared in Julie Narimatsu, “Environmental 
Justice Case Study: Maasai Land Rights in Kenya and Tanzania,” University of Michigan, accessed October 27, 
2012, http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/Jones/maasai.htm. This quotation has also been paraphrased by Oziniel T. 
Kibwana and Richard C. Masandika, “Wildlife First, People Last: The Maasai Experience with Wildlife 
Conservation in Tanzania.” Paper presented at the Endogenous Development and Bio-Cultural Diversity Confrence, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 2006. These multiple quotations and rephrasings are referenced to indicate the way that Amin 
et al.’s text has been used to create a collective action frame by Maasai communities that confronts government 
arguments made with a frame of bounded land. Mohamed Amin, John Eames, and Duncan Willetts. The Last of the 
Maasai (London: Bodley Head Ltd, 1987). 
127 Amin et al., The Last of the Maasai, 181. 
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Parkipuny and Laltaika encourage equal-part deliberation between Maasai communities and 
other citizens of Tanzania. Yet ole Mbarnoit interprets these discourses differently, arguing that 
the Maasai are only included in one-way dialogues through which the Maasai are told what they 
may and may not do. 
Further, ole Mbarnoit argues that the Maasai are unable to obtain uhuru. The term uhuru, 
which in Swahili means freedom, was appropriated by President Nyerere to signify freedom for 
the East Africans through African Socialism. Ole Mbarnoit’s reference to uhuru is important to 
this analysis for two reasons. First, by using uhuru, a Swahili term in an English language 
interview by a traditional Maa speaker, ole Mbarnoit points to the way that Tanzanian policy 
making and language is swayed towards coastal communities who use Swahili as their first 
language. Second, ole Mbarnoit uses uhuru to place his argument in the government’s terms– if 
the Maasai were part of Tanzanian nationalism then they would be treated as humans, not 
animals. In his argument about uhuru, ole Mbarnoit points to the paternalism implicit in 
Tanzanian policy, one that declares freedom for all citizens while controlling some of its 
people’s actions, traditions, and lifestyles.  
Responding to, or arguing against the term uhuru places Maasai activists in a difficult 
position. Realzing that to resist uhuru can be interpreted as a resistance to freedom, Maasai 
community groups, such as the Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition (MERC), carefully 
crafted the Maasai definition of uhuru within the national conception of freedom from 
colonialists.128 In the May 2002 report, The Killing Fields of Loliondo, the Maasai 
Environmental Resource Council argued: 
                                                
128 MERC defines itself as a “a grassroots  network of Maasai organizations advocating for the protection 
of traditional land rights of the Maasai people, and for conservation, management, and sustainable use of  the great 
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The Maasai have been conservationists since time immemorial. They do not 
believe in commercial hunting, for it leads to greed, over-exploitation of wildlife 
resources, and often-irreversible damage to delicate ecosystems. What they do 
believe is that today's generation holds all natural resources in trust for future 
generations. Over the centuries they have developed a very special relationship 
with wild animals, so that they and their cattle can share water and grass with 
them…it is largely thanks to the Maasai way of life - pastoral and pacifist - that 
the Kenya/Tanzania cross-border region continues to have such an abundance of 
wild animals, not only helping to maintain one of the most important ecosystems 
in Africa, but also guaranteeing a future for the region's strongest industry, 
tourism.129  
 
MERC’s report is consistent with ole Mbarnoit’s identification of three enemies, 
commercial hunters, hotel keepers, and zoologists. Both MERC and ole Mbarnoit effectively 
argue that the Maasai are uninterested in, and do not consent to, modern conservation projects 
along the Kenyan/Tanzanian border. These explicit statements, made in English language 
publications produced by western presses, are easily available to western tourists and place 
pressure on tour operators to both sell their tours as superior to other operators and explain why 
their tours have been specifically approved by Maasai communities.  
The effects of Maasai community argumentation in response to the government’s frames 
of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance are apparent when considering 
status quo debates surrounding land leases. In this dissertation, I am most interested in leases 
issued for land in the Loliondo valley that borders both the Serengeti National Park and the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area. An analysis of these conflicts illuminates the clash between 
governmental acts of division and the effect of argumentative frames on our understanding of 
herder conflicts in northern Tanzania. 
                                                                                                                                                       
ecosystems of East Africa.” Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition, “MERC.” Maasai Environmental Resource 
Coalition, accessed October 12, 2012, http://www.maasaierc.org. 
129 Ted Botha, “Killing the Killing Fields of Loliondo,” Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition, 
accessed October 12, 2012, http://www.maasaierc.org/killingthekilling.html. 
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2.4 CASE STUDY: THE LOLIONDO VALLEY 
In 1984, 10,000 acres of land in the Loliondo valley were leased by the Tanzanian government to 
Tanzanian Breweries LTD (TBL), a governmental parastal.130 Only 700 acres were ever farmed 
by Tanzanian Breweries and it is unclear if Maasai communities living on the other 9,300 acres 
were aware of the land lease. However, the Tanzanian government allowed TBL to expand its 
lease to a 96 year holding of 12,617 acres. Then, in 2006 TBL was permitted to lease the land to 
Thomson Safaris.  
Thomson Safaris assumed control of this land and began evicting Maasai communities 
from its new holding to create a private conservation and hunting reserve. Maasai communities 
responded in protest, indicating that they had not been aware of the lease, did not accept the 
legitimacy of the lease, and had nowhere else to go if evicted from their traditional lands. These 
protests gained international attention, resulting in a Tanzanian governmental investigation in 
2010. In the report, government officials find that Thomson Safaris’ lease is legal, though there 
have been problems in the transmission of information about the lease to local communities.131 
In this statement, the government affirms the frame of bounded land, and uses that frame to 
justify the sale, transfer, and appropriation of land in the Loliondo valley. Maasai communities, 
however, reject this claim and have launched protests ranging from street marches to on-line 
discussion boards calling for international attention to their land loss. 
In response to Maasai protests, Thomson Safaris claim that they have consulted with 
                                                
130 Parastatal organizations and industries are common in Tanzania. They have limited political authority of 
their own and serve the state indirectly by providing goods or services. 
131 Thomson Safaris reviewed the 2010 report prepared by the Office of the Prime Minister of Tanzania 
which assessed the Sukenya Farm sale. Thomson’s summary is only a bulleted list of findings, the investigation and 
the report have not been made public. “Investigative Report Summary,” Thomson Safaris weblog, February 2, 2010, 
http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/02/23/investigative-report-summary/. 
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local Maasai elders, partnered with international conservationist organizations such as the Jane 
Goodall Institute, and won tourism awards from organizations such as the National Geographic. 
These credentials bolster Thomson Safaris’ international credibility.132 Amongst Maasai 
activists, however, these credentials increase suspicions about Thomson Safaris. In 2010, Maasai 
activist Navaya ole Ndaskoi reflected these suspicions on the Tanzanian message board 
Wanazuoni.  
Thomson Safaris will never stop to amaze me. The notorious Boston-based land 
grabber, posing as a tour operator company, will band together, like poisonous 
worms, with Jane Goodall Institute of the famous British primatologist in efforts 
to clean its image. This year marks the 50th anniversary of when Jane Goodall 
first began studies of chimpanzees at Gombe Stream National Park in Kigoma 
Western Tanzania. Why, in Africa, should these domains be dominated by the 
people of European stock? Welcome to racism; nothing else explains it. It is 
racism which is driving Rick Thomson and his wife Judith Wineland, the owners 
of Thomson Safaris, to band with Jane Goodall. In South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya and Tanzania wildlife conservation was and often still is 
dominated by descendants of white settlers who did not, and to some extent do 
not admit black Africans easily. As it was in the past, so it is now.133 
 
In this statement, ole Ndaskoi directly links Thomson Safaris and western conservation 
organizations with colonial projects, the very same colonial projects which the government of 
Tanzania has staked its reputation on opposing. 
In response to protests like ole Ndaskoi’s, Thomson Safaris re-appropriates the frames of 
bounded land and movement-as-wandering to argue that the Maasai are no longer moving 
between multiple spaces. Based on government arguments and policies, Thomson Safaris 
reasons that only those Maasai living on or near the land leased by Thomson Safaris needs to be 
consulted in conservation projects. Thomson Safaris then leverages this interpretation of Maasai 
                                                
132 I have not found any analysis or research indicating how tourists respond to these claims. However, 
Thomson has received lucrative contracts, including presidential visits, which indicate that they have a firmly 
established international reputation. 
133 Navaya ole Ndaskoi, “Jane Goodall Bands with Thomson Safaris against Maasai.” Wanazuoni: 
Tanzania’s Intellectuals weblog, May 4, 2010, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wanazuoni/message/6176. 
  68 
herding traditions to explain why ole Ndaskoi’s protest is either unwarranted and can therefore 
be ignored, or is an example of intra-Maasai colonialism that proves why an organization such as 
Thomson Safaris is necessary to free local Maasai communities. Thomson Safaris explains this 
position by narrating a meeting between owners Rick Thomson and Judi Wineland, and Maasai 
community members.  
Recent meetings with Rick and Judi and other Thomson representatives have only 
reaffirmed their support. In the following footage, a highly respected elder, Simat 
Loong’ung, speaks on behalf of the leaders and communities. Rick and Judi later 
met with more than 25 elders and leaders. Simat has also explained how, 
throughout greater Loliondo, the people of Sukenya happen to be a political 
minority and the least educated group. They have not received benefits from 
tourism. They do not have any NGOs representing them. Their voice is often 
undermined in local politics.134  
 
This quote uses the government’s maps and policies that divide land in northern Tanzania to 
justify Thomson Safaris’ projects and methodology. First, the reader is informed that 
consultation occurred with a highly respected Maasai elder who speaks for the community. 
Second, the frame of land is localized, zooming in on the greater Loliondo valley to focus on the 
Sukenya region. This specificity allows the reader to identify with a specific place and then 
understand the pressures faced by that community. Previously in this chapter I examined the 
ways that Maasai herding requires community members to cross wide swaths of land, 
encouraging identification with multiple locations. However, when we follow Thomson Safaris’ 
logic, Maasai from elsewhere might have moved into Sukenya to voice opposition to Thomson 
Safaris, but these acts of opposition are illegitimated because those Maasai protesters do not hold 
a government certified residence in Sukenya. 
                                                
134 “The People of Sukenya.” Thomson Safaris weblog, February 2, 2010,  
http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/the-people-of-sukenya/. 
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The hyper-specificity of Thomson Safaris’ claims caused much confusion amongst 
international reporters. While the Loliondo Valley is easily found on a map, Sukenya is difficult 
to locate. By specifying Sukenya, Thomson Safaris has moved beyond the government’s 
demarcation of land in Tanzania. If this argument were made by a Tanzanian official, the 
location of the Thomson Safari lease would be in the Arusha District, Ngorongoro Division, Soit 
Sambu Ward. In 2002, this ward had 13,147 residents. Thomson Safaris does not claim to have 
consulted with or gained support from all 13,147 Soit Sambu ward residents. Indeed, the 
company argues that it should not have to do so in the following 2010 statement.135 
The people of Sukenya have had their voice of support for Enashiva Nature 
Refuge undermined and ignored due to their status as a political minority. Four of 
the seven communities of Soit Sambu are not even relatively close to Sukenya 
and Enashiva. Throughout Loliondo, no other villages have as many sub-villages 
as Soit Sambu.”136  
 
Here, Thomson Safaris’ specificity of Enashiva Nature Refuge and Sukenya village works to 
eschew all other arguments by all other Maasai and local communities. Although the alliances 
and locations of those Maasai, such as ole Ndaskoi, are never provided, the reader is lead to 
believe that enough Maasai have been consulted by Thomson Safaris. Additionally, these 
consultations are more reliable than those by activists because Thomson Safaris engaged more 
local, more authentic, and more oppressed Maasai communities then the Maasai activists.137  
                                                
135 This quotation directly responds to resistance to the Enashiva Nature Refuge, Thomson Safaris’ name 
for its privately held land. 
136 “Sukenya Leaders Support TCL,” Thomson Safaris weblog, March 11, 2010, 
http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/sukenya_leaders_support_tcl/. 
137 In this way, Thomson identifies itself as part of the Loliondo machine, a critical apparatus that controls 
the region. In his 1992 Postscript on Societies of Control, Deleuze discusses this unique position; “In the societies of 
control…what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on 
the other hand disciplinary societies are recalculated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration 
as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information or 
reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become “individuals,” 
and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.” Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Societies of Control,” October no.59 
(1992): 6. 
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Thomson Safaris’ attention to Maasai oppression might seem in line with Maasai 
responses to the government’s frame of disappearance. However, Thomson Safaris provides a 
radically different narrative then that explored previously. Rather than label the government or 
colonists as oppressors, Thomson Safaris indicates that local communities have been oppressed 
by other Maasai communities. Then, building upon this history of oppression, Thomson Safaris 
explains that their actions, such as community development projects, education campaigns, 
establishment of women’s cooperatives, and conservation projects have worked to liberate and 
modernize local Maasai.138 In this way, Thomson Safaris is rearticulating the frame of 
disappearance expressed by President Kikwete – the Maasai must be modernized, and after 
modernization they will not be distinct from other Tanzanian citizens. 
This appropriation of the frame of disappearance prompted investigative reports by 
Tanzanian NGOs and international reporters. In her discussion of two international journalists’ 
visit to the Ngorongoro in 2009, blogger Susan Nordlund reports, 
In Soit Sambu they met the then Village Chairman James Lembikas who had 
expressed some support for Thomson [Safaris], which must be the reason that the 
company, that had never had a meeting with the Village Council, for a long time 
boasted about their excellent relations with the village government. Detractors of 
Lembikas say that he was paid by Thomson [Safaris] while he himself, according 
to people who know him, says he was intimidated by the District 
Commissioner…he was the chairman for some 20 years, but no longer.139 
 
This report indicates the layers of complexity in Thomson Safaris’ quest to consult with 
                                                
138 “Since purchasing the property, TCL has met regularly with the village council of Soit Sambu, which 
represents all of the villages that directly border Enashiva. The council has officially voiced its support for Thomson 
Safaris and TCL and actively collaborates with them on Enashiva initiatives. Working closely with the council, TCL 
has already helped develop numerous local projects for the benefit of the community. These projects have included 
drilling a borehole and water well on the property and establishing a controlled grazing program. TCL also provides 
ongoing support to several local schools and a women’s collaborative near the nature refuge. Future projects will 
include significant improvements to education and medical care, and increasing employment and entrepreneurship 
opportunities, especially among women.” “The Enashiva Nature Refuge,” Thomson Safaris weblog, August 21, 
2009, http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2009/08/21/ena_nat_ref/.  
139 Nordlund, “The Sukenya Farm Conflict.” 
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the most local Maasai, and by doing so not consult with the Village Council. It also raises 
questions regarding the nature of relationships with local Maasai elders. This report was posted 
in 2009, a year before the previously analyzed statements by Thomson Safaris. I have provided 
the quotation because it contextualizes the need for and questionability of Thomson Safaris’ later 
consultative success. On June 15, 2010 Thomson Safaris posted an article to its blog titled 
“Sukenya: Freedom at Last” narrating radical changes to local government in the Ngorongoro 
District. 
Supported by a decades-long grassroots effort, the recognition of Sukenya as a 
village is part of a government-led process to reorganize several villages and 
wards in Ngorongoro District and in other districts across Tanzania. Sukenya, Soit 
Sambu, and several other villages and wards will hold new elections later this 
year. The people of Sukenya are the largest population of Maasai around the 
Enashiva Nature Refuge, and they have lived in the area longer than any other 
Maasai clan or community. Tanzania Conservation Limited congratulates 
Sukenya on becoming a village and gaining its local freedom.140  
 
It is not my argument that this new district is illegitimate; rather, I am pointing to both the 
complexity of deliberations in this region, and to Thomson Safaris’ use the frame of bounded 
land to always hold a more local position than its retractors. Frequently, Thomson Safaris has 
preferred a frame of bounded land, supported by a frame of disappearance to respond to 
criticism.  
It is easy to understand how foreign NGOs and those who lack local language 
skills and long-term on-the-ground presence in Loliondo, could be misled by 
some groups with their own political agenda. Similarly, misinformation spreads 
easily in communities lacking education and infrastructure.141  
 
The exchange of hierarchies between the frames of bounded land and disappearance has driven a 
wedge between government and corporate rhetoric. The government is deeply invested in 
                                                
140 “Sukenya: Freedom at Last,” Thomson Safaris weblog, June 15, 2010, 
http://thomsonsafaris.wordpress.com/2010/06/15/sukenya_freedom/.  
141 “Sukenya Leaders Support,” Thomson Safaris. 
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modernizing Tanzania, which includes Maasai communities. Corporations like Thomson Safaris 
are interested in some of these modernizations, such as the lease of land to create private nature 
reserves. However, as evidenced by their projects with local Maasai communities, they are also 
interested in a presence of Maasai communities to authenticate or enrich tourists’ experiences in 
the Serengeti region. 
Maasai responses to these shifts in frame hierarchy demonstrate a complex understanding 
of government and corporate rhetoric, as well as the inability of those rhetorics to understand the 
Maasai perspective. In this case study I have assessed the arguments made by Thomson Safaris 
regarding the legitimacy of its lease and conservation projects as supported by the government’s 
frame of bounded land. It has always been Thomson Safaris’ position that they are more local 
than the national government, international conservation organizations, or other Maasai 
organizations. An extrapolation of this position might be that foreigners do not know enough to 
speak on the question of Thomson Safaris, and locals are too under educated to know what is 
actually happening. As such, Thomson Safaris might be the only credible participant in 
deliberations concerning the Loliondo Valley. 
The hyper-compartmentalization of land in northern Tanzania, juxtaposed to the broader 
body of arguments concerning the Maasai in Tanzania illustrates a corporate attempt to control 
public discourse. However, as the following section indicates, Thomson Safaris’ hyper-
compartmentalization opens new spaces for Maasai resistance. 
2.5 WE ARE NOT LYING: SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE NGORONGORO 
International NGOs such as the Kenyan Feminist Activist Coalition (FEMACT) have launched 
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fact-finding missions to Loliondo and the Ngorongoro to determine and document the “realness” 
of Maasai community accusations and protests. In their 2009 meetings with Arusha District 
Commissioner Elias Lali, FEMACT was assured that there were no conflicts between the 
Maasai, the government, and private corporations. Instead, Lali alleged that Maasai community 
members were misinforming both the media and their own communities in an attempt to create 
political turmoil and gain parliamentary seats in the next election. Further, Lali suggested that the 
Maasai community was burning its own homes to make more dramatic images and perpetuate 
their claims of turmoil.142  
What FEMACT found, however, was radically different from Lali’s allegations. 
FEMACT’s report indicates:  
The team came across women who had undergone miscarriages, rape, loss of 
children and other properties including food and shelter. Men who were chained 
beaten and humiliated in front of their families, those who had lost thousands of 
livestock among other properties and those who were imprisoned for no apparent 
reasons. Generally speaking, the Maasai communities in the Loliondo villages are 
internally displaced persons. They have no land to settle, no shelter, no food, no 
water for even their livestock, no clothing or any other form of social services.143 
  
FEMACT’s findings directly contradict the Tanzanian government’s report. The problem for 
both FEMACT and Maasai communities, however, is how to authenticate these claims in 
national and international deliberations. While visual images have had some affect on 
international reception of Maasai arguments, Lali’s allegation that Maasai communities are 
burning their own houses points to the limitation of images that must be narrated for outside 
audiences. 
The need to present both evidence to international audiences has been met by Maasai 
                                                
142 Feminist Action Coalition, “Tanzania: Loliondo Report of Findings,” Pambazuak News: Pan African 
Voices for Freedom and Justice, no. 449 (2009), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/58956/print. 
143 Feminist Action Coalition, “Tanzania” 
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protest strategies that have begun using social media to produce and distribute protest images. 
For example, Ngorongoro Conservation Area currently refuses to allow Maasai herders to tend 
subsistence crops that will be used to feed their children and herds. Finding that petitions and 
protests to the local government were not leading to changes in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
policy, Maasai activists turned to social media to record and distribute the 2012 NCA Endulen 
Residents Food Crisis protest on an international stage. During this protest, filmed and made 
accessible via YouTube, Maasai activist Noolasho Nakuta of the Endulen Village of Ngorongoro 
stated: 
We are treated as if we are not Tanzanians, this is why we are prohibited to 
cultivate. There is a foodstuff called bran, which is normally given to livestock. 
This is now what our children are eating. Even my children eat this bran; there is 
no need to hide the truth, when they eat it they can die. They are forced to eat it 
because of the drought in which our cattle died. We are not lying, we are telling 
the truth, let that woman from Sing’ida bring the bran for you to see.144  
 
As Nakuta makes this statement, another woman enters the screen carrying a plastic bag 
containing cooked bran from which she and her children have been eating during the protest. The 
video footage of this protest reflects the way that Maasai communities are simultaneously 
adapting to a Maasai audience (who presumably already knows about eating bran) and an 
extended social media audience, which is convinced of the realness of the bran through 
Sing’ida’s display. Additionally, Nakuta’s speech directly responds to government officials, such 
as District Commissioner Lali, who claim, “the pastoralists are lying” with a verbal statement 
“we are not lying,” and evidence of what her family is eating.  
 
                                                
144 “Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis 2012,” YouTube Video, 15:05, from a protest held in the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area on December 11, 2012, posted by “NCA Ncaresidents,” December 11, 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xJYP2-x_Uik. 
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Figure 3: 2012 NCA Endulen Residents Food Crisis 1.145 
 
The imagery in this video is striking. At the center of the screen is a Maasai woman, 
dressed in a manner that simultaneously indicates her position as a married Maasai woman and 
modern Tanzanian. She is not the Maasai conceptualized by President Kikwete as out of time 
and soon disappearing. Wearing a watch, holding multiple microphones, and speaking 
confidently to both present audience and camera, Nakuta is rooted in her location, in control of 
this image and its production. 
She is speaking with and to her community. In the background of this image are Maasai 
men of various ages dressed in a range of western business attire and traditional clothes. In the 
image, and in the title screen of the protest video, Ngorongoro and Loliondo are displayed as 
occupied spaces. There are people living here – many people who will be displaced and harmed 
                                                
145 NCA Ncaresidents, “Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis.” 
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by the proposed land sales. The title screen for the protest gives us an image of Nakuta’s 
audience, and allows the on-line viewer to place herself at the back of the audience.  
 
Figure 4: 2012 NCA Endulen Residents Food Crisis 2.146 
 
In these emergent protests, we see a multiple contextualization of Maasai situated 
arguments. Unlike the government’s compartmentalization of Maasai identity into elements of 
land ownership, herd movement, and community traditions, this video shows the ways that 
Maasai communities blend complex markers of identity by utilizing social media to respond to 
orthodox discourses. In this video, a Maasai woman speaks directly to her community. She also 
speaks to me, a member of the intended, international online audience. I am still gazing at a 
Maasai community, but Nakuta has responded to the government’s explanations of Maasai 
identity and through her speech and accompanying English translation, articulates the Maasai 
                                                
146 NCA Ncaresidents, “Ngorongoro Conservation Area Food Crisis.” 
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community’s rejection of the frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and 
disappearance. 
In this video, the viewer experiences the other as doing something – she is speaking, 
protesting, pleading for her children, and challenging the government’s reports. The FEMACT 
reports, actions by the Tanzanian government, and speech by Nakuta indicate mutual awareness 
of each stakeholder’s position and online presence. The 2012 Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
Food Crisis video displays the Maasai community’s attempt to argue in support of land, food 
security, and their children’s future.  
The choice of video medium to display Maasai argumentative processes allows for a 
contextualization through multiple images, words, and music that cannot be captured by a 
singular image. Future research is needed to investigate the persuasive effects of still 
photography as opposed to video imagery in online campaigns as well as the ways that herder 
communities such as the Maasai are intervening in online protests and conflicts to make their 
own positions heard and understood by outside audiences.  
In this chapter, I have assessed the arguments concerning Maasai identity through the 
frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance during both colonial and 
independence periods. Then, I analyzed Maasai juridical arguments and social media productions 
in an attempt to understand how Maasai communities have produced and responded to land 
conflicts. As a stand-alone analysis, this examination points to the ways that Maasai 
communities are opening space for new arguments about Maasai identity that embrace the 
complexities of tradition and modernity. As part of a multi-sited situated argumentative analysis, 
this examination points to potential quilting points between Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai who 
have used social media to find spaces which government frames of bounded land, movement-as-
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wandering, and disappearance cannot touch. These quilting points will be examined in the next 
chapter, regarding Maasai communities in Kenya. 
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3.0  KENYA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Maasai communities in Kenya have a long and complex history of interaction with the Maasai of 
Tanzania. Before the arrival of British colonists in 1888 these were a joined community that 
shared herding practices, languages, and traditions setting them apart from other herders, hunter-
gathers, and agriculturalists in the Great Rift Valley. The Maasai of Tanzania and Kenya were 
split between the late 1880’s, when modern Tanzania was held by German East Africa and 
Kenya by British East Africa, and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 when modern 
Tanzania came under British control. During this period, different argumentative strategies, 
development polices, and modern entailments emerged between the Maasai of Tanzania and 
Kenya. 
In this chapter I highlight the Kenyan government’s use of frames of bounded land, 
movement-as-wandering, and disappearance. Because the British invested more effort and 
funding into development projects in modern Kenya than Tanzania, I have found and will utilize 
a larger body of juridical documents to assess the division of Maasai lands and resulting court 
cases regarding both eviction and trespass. Then I analyze the ways that Maasai community 
members resisted colonial projects by redefining community terms, restructuring traditional age 
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groups, and producing arguments explaining the connections between Maasai identity and the 
ownership of large herds.  
To assess the argumentative clash between both the colonial and modern independent 
governments of Kenya and Maasai communities, I focus on allegations of hate speech which 
were made in 2012 when MP Ferdinand Waititu argued that the Maasai should be evicted from 
his district. My analysis of this incident examines the entailments of colonial frames of bounded 
land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance to understand both MP Waititu’s arguments 
and the Maasai response. Finally, I assess how this history of argumentation has influenced 
continuing conflicts regarding the establishment of the Maasai Mara, land grabs, demarcation of 
specific lands for humans and animals, and “human wildlife conflicts” between Maasai 
communities and lion prides. In this analysis I find that as divisions of lands increase, the frame 
of movement-as-wandering is used less frequently. Additionally, while the frame of bounded 
land is still used frequently in Kenyan discourse, it often takes a secondary position to the frame 
of disappearance which is used to explain how the Maasai will soon settle and give up their 
herding traditions 
3.2 A BLOODY, BEASTLY SYSTEM FOUNDED ON IMMORALITY 
The Imperial British East Africa Company claimed Kenya as a territory of the Imperial British 
Empire in 1888 following a long struggle between both British and German land claims. 
Immediately following this claim, work on the Kenya-Uganda railway began with the aim of 
connecting the British East African Empire. This railway displaced thousands of Maasai and 
other herder communities while encouraging the emigration of British colonists to East Africa. 
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By the 1930s railway development had encouraged approximately 30,000 white settlers to 
resettle in Kenya. This community soon began placing demands on the British colonial 
administration to provide security services that would protect colonial farms from local 
communities such as the Maasai. As a result, the railways gained a new function, they brought 
colonial troops to the East African interior. 
One area of contention was the Rift Valley, also known as the Maasai Highlands. 
European farmers were attracted to this region by the geographically protected valley and 
desirable climatic conditions that limited the number of malaria carrying mosquitoes. This is the 
traditional grazing land of a Maasai communities that moved with their herds over seven hundred 
miles of pasturelands from northern Kenya to Central Tanzania, and four hundred miles east to 
west including part of modern Nairobi. These Maasai communities were first moved in 1895 to 
make way for the railway. Then, they lost more land when the British established their capital in 
Nairobi, which today retains its Maa name that translates to “place of cool water,” signifying its 
importance to herding communities.147 According to the British, each of these relocations was 
made through agreement with community elders.  
Agreements were necessary as the British colonial law defined the Kenyan protectorates 
as a sovereign entities. Based on this definition, the British “imperial power [held] little more 
than political jurisdiction over the territory.”148 As a result, all land acquisitions had to be made 
by conquest, agreement, treaty, or sale between locals and colonial officials. Regarding 
communally held land, colonial officials were advised, “for treaties to be anything more than an 
                                                
147 Meitamei Olol-Dapash, Mary Poole, and Kaitlin Noss, “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok: A Century of 
Maasai Land Rights Denied,” (unpublished manuscript, May 2010) Microsoft Word file. 
http://maasaicpp.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/final-paper-mau-narok-may-2010.doc. 
148 Emphasis in the original document. A detailed study of these laws is found in legal scholar H.W.O. 
Okoth-Ogendo, Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 
1991): 12-13.  
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empty mockery, it [is] necessary that they should be signed by several thousand petty chiefs and 
headmen.”149 While the requirement for local agreement regarding occupied land was maintained 
throughout the colonial period, revisions were made in the 1890’s regarding empty spaces. Two 
decrees, the 1897 Indian Land Acquisition Act and 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act, allowed 
colonial officials to dispose of “waste and unoccupied land in protectorates where there was no 
settled form of government and where land had not been appropriated either to the local 
sovereign or to individuals.”150 Proof of appropriation was based on agricultural use, permanent 
settlements and roads. Because the Maasai did commonly tend agricultural crops, build 
permanent homes, or construct roads, the land on which they were living was frequently 
classified as terra nullius or empty land.  
Using terra nullius, the British Government claimed much of the Rift Valley without the 
need for consent of Maasai herders. As a result of these claims, in 1904 forty-eight Europeans 
were able to acquire land in the Rift Valley that was already occupied by approximately 11,200 
Maasai and their two million cattle. Later, the 1911 Agreement resulted in the eviction of 20,000 
Maasai and 2.5 million cattle from lands on which the Maasai had been able to substantiate a 
claim. The colonial government demarcated a specific piece of land, the “Southern Reserve,” for 
the resettlement of these displaced Maasai communities.  
The forced resettlement of Maasai communities to the Southern Reserve movement was 
justified by Charles Eliot, governor of the (British) East African Protectorate, when he wrote, 
I cannot admit that wandering tribes have a right to keep other and superior races 
out of large tracts merely because they have acquired the habit of straggling over 
far more land than they can utilize.151  
                                                
149 Okoth-Ogendo, Tenants of the Crown. 
150 Okoth-Ogendo, Tenants of the Crown. 
151 John Markakis, Pastoralism on the Margin (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004), 9, 
http://www.minorityrights.org/1054/reports/pastoralism-on-the-margin.html.  
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In Eliot’s texts, the description of the Maasai as wanderers is coupled with growing division 
between Kenyan ethnic groups. When he separates the Maasai from surrounding communities, 
Eliot refers to “other and superior” races. This includes the Maasai’s traditional neighbors such 
as the Kikuyu and Wakamba as well as recently arriving colonists that were establishing farms in 
the Maasai Highlands. This division integrates concepts from Social Darwinism that are not 
present in Tanzanian deliberations while simultaneously extracting the Maasai from historically 
complex exchanges with neighboring ethnic groups.152 Further, in addition to Eliot’s use of the 
frame of movement-as-wandering, early British documents demonstrate a frame of bounded land 
and disappearance.  
The political entailments of Eliot’s frame are explained in his letter to Lord Lansdowne 
where he explained his intention to quickly end the Maasai way of life.  
I have no desire to protect Masaidom. It is a beastly, bloody system, founded on 
raiding and immorality, disastrous to both the Masai and their neighbors. The 
sooner it disappears and is unknown, except in books of anthropology, the 
better.153 
 
In this letter, Eliot uses the frame of disappearance to legitimate his policies that will quickly end 
the Maasai way of life. Prompted by this and similar letters, the British East African 
administration began a program of settlement and Europeanization of Maasai communities. 
Children were sent to schools, herders were settled into smaller plots of land, and land was sold, 
granted, or appropriated by other communities.  
                                                
152 For example, Jomo Kenyatta’s family included members of the Maasai community and he speaks at 
length of the exchanges that occurred between Kikuyu and Maasai communities in Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount 
Kenya (New York: Vintage, 1962). 
153 A copy of the letter from Sir Charles Eliot to Lord Lansdowne, dated April 19, 1904, is found in Peter 
Rigby, “Ideology, Religion, and Ilparakuyo-Maasai Resistance to Capitalist Penetration,” Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 23, no. 3 (1989): 416-440. 
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While the 1904 and 1911 Agreements were considered by the British Colonial 
administration as legal and binding documents, Maasai activist Olol-Dapash Meitamei indicates 
that these moves were never agreed to by the Maasai, and many community members were 
evicted at gun point.154 In addition to protests against land evictions, the Maasai began legal 
proceedings in 1913 against the 1911 evictions.155 While these protests and proceedings did not 
result in the return of Maasai lands, they may have prompted the clarifying language found in the 
1911 agreement that allowed Maasai access to cultural sites. For example, 
Nothing in this agreement contained shall be deemed to deprive the Masai tribe of 
the rights reserved to it under the agreement of August ninth one thousand nine 
hundred and four aforesaid to the land on the slopes of Kinopop [sic] whereon the 
circumcision rites and ceremonies may be held.156 
 
Access to ceremonial grounds was welcomed by the Maasai community, but did not meet the full 
demand for residence or grazing on traditional lands. Additionally, even these small concessions 
were often overlooked by settlers who accused the Maasai traveling to ceremonial grounds of 
illegally trespassing on settler lands.  
Beyond the text of the 1904 and 1911 Agreements, the Maasai lost land when the 
boundaries of these agreements were adjudicated via colonial maps. For example, a British 
settler named Powys Cobb occupied part of the Maasai Highlands years before he was officially 
granted a land holding by the Colonial Administration. Then, once he was granted a land claim, 
he maintained two sets of maps, one shown to the Maasai and one shown to government 
officials. By showing a map with a small land holding to Maasai elders, Cobb was able to 
                                                
154 Olol-Dapash Meitamei, “Maasai Autonomy and Sovereignty in Kenya and Tanzania,” Cultural Survival 
Quarterly 25, no. 1 (Spring 2001), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/maasai-autonomy-
and-sovereignty-kenya-and-tanzania.  
155 For a discussion of the 1913 challenge, see Norman Maclean Leys, Kenya (London: Hogarth Press, 
1924). 
156 Copy of the 1911 Agreement is located in the Ukamba Province Report on the Boundary of the Masai 
and Kikuyu Reserves from 1912-1915, DC/MKS10A/5/1, Kenya National Archive.  
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prevent protests from herding communities while building his case for the larger land claim 
demarcated on the map shown to government officials.157 The conflicts sparked by Cobb’s dual 
map system are recorded in the 1916-1917 Narok District Annual Report: 
During the year the land on Mau Narok promised to Mr. Cobb was surveyed, and 
the Masai were again told that it was to be a farm and excluded from the reserve. 
This caused a good deal of dissatisfaction, Masikondi and other elders 
maintaining that they had been promised the whole of Mau Narok at the time of 
the move and making allegations against the government of a breach of faith.158 
 
An official survey was conducted of Cobb’s land claim, yet Olol-Dapash indicates that 
Cobb may have moved the survey markers to further expand his land holdings.159 While Cobb 
did admit in the 1920’s that part of the land he occupied was not legally his, he continued using 
his own maps to press trespassing charges against Maasai herders. One such charge resulted in 
the 1926 arrest of six Maasai herders. The accused Maasai were first convicted of trespass and 
then acquitted on the basis of “illegal and incompetent evidence.” At this time, colonial officials 
indicated that “the boundary is a purely artificial one – a demarcated line with beacons hidden by 
the grass – it is not surprising that trespass at least takes place.”160 Later, in 1953, colonial 
administrators stated “the boundary with the Masai Land Unit is badly overgrown and 
consequently not readily visible on the ground.”161 Additionally, Commissioner Hosking stated 
                                                
157 Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok.” 
158 Colonial spelling of Maasai as “Masai” has not been changed in this or the following historic 
documents. Quoted by Olol-Dapash, “Maasai Autonomy.” Original found in Narok District Annual Report, 1916-
1917, DC/NRK/1/1/1, Kenya National Archive. 
159 Even if Cobb was not involved in this survey, the accusation made by Olol-Dapash indicates the distrust 
between Maasai community members and the British administration. 
160 Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 10. Letter from the District 
Commissioner to the Officer in Charge, Masai October 12th 1950, PC/NKU/2/16/3, Kenya National Archive.  
161 Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 10. Letter from District 
Commissioner Hosking to the Director of Surveys, Nairobi and Provincial Commissioner, Ngong. November 23rd 
1953, PC/NKU/2/16/3, Kenya National Archive. 
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“here is nothing to indicate the exact position of the boundary.”162 Disputes concerning the 
legality of these borders, the location of borders, and questions of trespass continued until all 
Maasai herders were driven off of the Maasai Highlands. In this way, the British colonial 
government produced arguments using a frame of bounded land, which eventually resulted in the 
disappearance of Maasai herders from their traditional grazing lands. 
Between 1904 and 1913, Kenyan Maasai lost seventy percent of their land. Then, more 
land was lost with the creation of the Amboseli, Tsavo, Maasai Mara, Kitengela, and Samburu 
parks.163 The Maasai Mara National Park was created only two years before Kenya’s 
independence and was a point of contention during the decolonization meetings between the 
British and Kenyan African Democratic Union. The Maasai United Front (MUF), a constituent 
organization of the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) led by Justus ole Tipis, 
represented the Maasai in these negotiations.164 The MUF demanded that the British regard the 
1904 and 1911 Agreements as binding treaties between the Maasai and British. This 
interpretation, based on a frame of bounded land, would recognize Maasailand as a separate 
nation from Kenya, and allow the Maasai to bargain directly with the British government 
pursuant of an independent Maasai nation. The Maasai continually pressed this interpretation, 
including an attempt to bring the case to the UN International Court of Justice.165 However, 
MUF’s case was never accepted by the British who preferred to use a frame of disappearance, 
                                                
162 Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 10. Letter from District 
Commissioner Hosking. 
163 George M. Ogendi, Rose K. Morara, and Nicholas Olekaikai, “The Influence of Westernization on 
Water Resources Use and Conservation among the Maasai People of Kenya,” in Water, Cultural Diversity, and 
Global Environmental Change: Emerging Trends, Sustainable Futures?, eds. Barbara Rose Johnson, Lisa Hiwaski, 
Irene J. Klaver, Ameyali Ramos Castillo, and Veronia Strang, (New York: Springer, 2012), 137-47. 
164 The inclusion of MUF in these deliberations points to the radically different position of Maasai 
community leaders in Tanzanian and Kenyan politics.  
165 Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 12. “Masai ‘Let Down’ by British: 
Dismay at Governor’s Advise,” African, July 18, 1960, CO/822/1997, Kenya National Archive.  
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arguing that the Maasai were no longer a unique or important ethnic group that required separate 
negotiations.  
Maasai analysts such as George Ogendi have interpreted this refusal by the British and 
Kenyan governments to adhere to the 1904 and 1911 Agreements as extraction and tricks; 
“[T]hese two Governments have relentlessly pursued a policy of extraction towards what was 
left of the Masai lands through the parceling out of land and legal tricks.”166 According to Tipis, 
the governments of England and Kenya used a frame of bounded land to divide and rule Maasai 
communities until they became minorities in their own lands.  
The MUF introduced a new strategy in 1962 at the Kenyan Constitutional Congress. Still 
using a frame of bounded land, they presented evidence of land rights violations, fraudulent 
maps, agreements, and evictions to support their demands for independent Maasailand. Despite 
these petitions and protests, most of the land in question remained part of the Maasai Mara, or 
was given to Kikuyu farmers. The government emphasized that its decision, in accordance with 
the new constitution, was “non-racial and non-tribal,” yet the Maasai saw it as a preference for 
agricultural over herder communities.167 Statements made by the British government supporting 
the Kenyan government’s decision reflect Eliot’s earlier statements regarding Maasai under-use 
of their lands.  
[I]t would be contrary to public policy for the Masai, who have not developed 
their own land, to be given the right to carry their primitive agricultural practices 
to other land in Kenya, which is urgently required for re-settlement and which 
                                                
166 Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 13. Appendix A: A Memorandum on 
the Masai Treaties and the Masai Lands, Presented to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, at 
Government House, Nairobi, on Monday the 27th of November, 1961,” CO/822/2000, 115261, Kenya National 
Archive.  
167 Quoted by Olol Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 14. “Secretary of State’s Visit to 
Kenya, November, 1961: The Masai Problem,” CO/822/2000, 115261 Kenya National Archive. 
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ought in the general interest of Kenya to be utilized to the maximum possible 
extent.168 
 
Here the frame of disappearance re-emerges as the reader is informed what would be in the 
“general interest of Kenya,” a collectivist argument which assumes that the Maasai are already 
part of Kenya and should give up their ethnic distinctiveness. This statement is similar to that 
made by Tanzanian President Kikwete, “national unity is the unity among citizens, who like to 
consider themselves Tanzanians first, before identifying themselves by tribe, race, religion, 
gender or region of origin.”169 These arguments by the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments 
attempt to bring Maasai communities under the umbrella of national identity, which would 
discount arguments made by Maasai communities regarding the uniqueness of their herding 
traditions. 
Further complicating the relationship between the Kenyan government and Maasai 
communities is the Kenyan government’s support for wildlife migrations across the borders of 
Tanzania and Kenya. At the center of this conflict is the Maasai Mara, established in 1961 to 
connect to the Tanzanian Serengeti. The park’s name references the Maasai and their description 
for the land – mara – that describes the way grasses, bush, and scrub spot the landscape. Beyond 
naming the Maasai Mara after its traditional residents, the Kenyan government has experimented 
with multiple forms of park governance and boundary setting in an attempt to improve both 
community relations and conservation policy. These experiments have included the 1974 
reduction of the borders of the Maasai Mara from 1,821 square kilometers to 1,510 square 
kilometers, which allowed some land to be returned to the Maasai. In other experiments, 
governance of the park was transferred from the Narok County Council, to the TransMara 
                                                
168 Quoted by Olol-Dapash et al., “Historical Injustice at Mau Narok,” 16. “Brief No. 11, The Masai: 
Official Eyes Only,” Kenya Constitutional Conference 1962, CO/822/2000, 115261, Kenya National Archive. 
169 Kikwete, “Speech by the President.” 
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County Council to today’s Mara Conservancy.170 Today, as a result of these experiments, there is 
much confusion amongst local communities regarding the ownership of specific plots of land. 
 Kenya is the only nation analyzed in this dissertation without a socialist past, and the 
Kenyan government has never claimed to own all of the land in the nation. As such, the use of 
the frame of bounded land by the Kenyan government has produced both a richer body of 
documents and more frequent deliberations regarding specific land claims. For example, each of 
my interviewees outside of the Maasai Mara presented a significantly different narrative of land 
ownership, demarcation, and loss. These narratives were more personal than those in the other 
case studies, but also prevented the collective identity apparent in Tanzania, Mongolia, and 
China. 
Today, conflicts between the Maasai community and Kenyan government center around 
the management of land and revenue in the Maasai Mara region. For example, Maasai 
community members claim that government expenditures are so small that the road from Narok 
city to the Maasai Mara is in terrible disrepair and many tourists choose to fly into the Maasai 
Mara rather than make the short drive from Nairobi. As such the entire tourist industry, from gas 
stations to hotels to art shops in southern Kenya have fallen into depression. During my 
interviews in 2012, I met with Maasai shop owners, museum directors, and community leaders, 
all who indicated that while the government evidently cared greatly about the Maasai Mara, little 
attention was paid to surrounding communities or their livelihoods. 
 
 
                                                
170 Mara Triangle, “Ecosystem Sustainability in the Mara River Basin,” The Mara Conservancy, accessed 
June 2012, http://maratriangle.org/about-us/research/ecosystem-sustainability/. 
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Figure 5: Francis in his shop in the road to the Maasai Mara.171 
 
As a result of losing their grazing lands, and now their access to a second economy in road-side 
tourist economies, many Maasai men of the moran age group have moved to Nairobi where they 
work as night guards. Dressed in traditional attire and employed based on the ethos of Maasai 
warriors, these guards occupy a unique position of authority and otherness in the bustling 
metropolis of Nairobi. The intersectionality of Maasai warriors in the city was illuminated in 
2012 when a Maasai guard was accused of killing a street child that he had caught stealing a 
chicken in the Kayole suburb of Nairobi. In response to these charges, MP Waititu stated,  
From today I want all Maasais chased away from here. They should go back to 
where they came from. They are not welcome in Kayole. And [I want] all people 
who employed Maasai, to sack them with immediate effect.172  
                                                
171 I spent a full day with Francis in his shop alongside the road to the Maasai Mara. He told me that before 
the road fell into disrepair he could make several hundred dollars in one day. That money supported his family, as 
well as the family of Maasai craftswomen who made many of the goods that he sells in his shop. However, on the 
day that I sat with him there were no customers. Francis indicated that he now only expects one or two each day 
because tourists are paying to fly into the Maasai Mara rather than travel the bumpy road from Narok to the Maasai 
Mara. Allison Hahn, August 2012. 
172 Dominic Wabala, “Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu,” The Star (Nairobi), September 26 2012, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201209261353.html. 
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Only minutes after Waititu’s comments, one Maasai guard was killed and another seriously 
injured. Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta quickly responded, indicating that Waititu’s speech was 
divisive against national unity.173 He demanded an apology:  
If Waititu believes in the values and beliefs of TNA, I demand that he apologizes 
to the people of Kenya and the concerned community for the comments attributed 
to him yesterday.174 
 
At the same time, Heritage Minister William ole Ntimama called for MP Waititu to be arrested 
for inciting the murder and injury of Maasai guardsmen. MP Waititu did eventually apologize. 
Yet before in doing so, he defended himself in the Kenyan Parliament by claiming that he had 
been speaking about “foreigners who were threatening law and order in Embakasi.”175 Discourse 
surrounding MP Waititu’s statement illustrated the position of Maasai communities in modern 
Kenya. For MP Waititu, the Maasai living in Nairobi are foreigners, and should be returned to 
wherever they came from. While this statement might seem to make the frame of movement-as-
wandering primary, MP Waititu is only able to use a frame of movement-as-wandering because 
he believes in the disappearance of traditional Maasai near Nairobi. In these statements, MP 
Waititu mimics the statements made by Tanzanian PM Telele when in 2005 he called for the 
Maasai to be returned to wherever they have come from. PM Kenyatta’s response supported the 
Maasai victims, but he is careful not to name them as Maasai, instead referring to the “the people 
of Kenya” and “concerned community.” While this response builds upon the unity of Kenya, and 
allows many citizens to express grievances towards MP Waititu, it also utilizes the frame of 
                                                
173 Uhru Kenyatta is the son of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta and the great-grandson of a Maasai 
woman. Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 17. 
174 Wabala, “Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu.” 
175 Wabala, “Kenya: Uhuru Disowns Waititu.” 
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disappearance; the Maasai are equal citizens of Kenya, not the unique nation with whom the 
British signed the 1904 and 1911 Agreements. 
3.3 YOU HAVE TO KEEP CATTLE 
Maasai communities have developed a diverse body of violent and nonviolent tactics to resist 
British and Kenyan arguments and policies regarding Maasai culture and identity. For example, 
in 1918 men of the moran age group were conscripted into the British army and children were 
sent to boarding schools. While Maasai elders agreed to military and school enrollment, those of 
moran age protested and began a series of confrontations with the Kenyan African Rifles. The 
moran quickly burned and looted colonial offices, cut telegraph lines, killed fourteen people, and 
wounded sixty. By the end of the resistance not one Maasai moran reported for military 
service.176 While the British explained the moran’s protest as a refusal to serve in the military, 
the moran indicated that they were resisting the enrollment of Maasai children in boarding 
schools.  
They felt that if children went to school they would be lost forever to the Maasai 
society. The children involved were not moran, being of pre-circumcision age, but 
the moran felt compelled to protect them from what the regarded as exploitation 
by the state.177  
 
Later attempts by the British to conscript the moran were resisted by Maasai communities that 
radically redefined traditional age groups. These communities advanced the pace of age-based 
ceremonies so that young men that should have been moran became junior-elders, and those still 
                                                
176 Robert L. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya : The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 
to 1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).  
177 Tignor, Colonial Transformation of Kenya, 79. 
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regarded as children became moran. Because the British had conscripted the age-set of moran 
rather than a specific age-range, they had little recourse when groups of young boys reported for 
military service.178  
When military conscription failed, the British government shifted tactics by confining 
Maasai children to boarding schools and Maasai adults to group ranches. These policies 
restricted Maasai communities by demarcating the spaces where the Maasai could, and could not 
live. British reports indicate that Maasai children were eager to attend school. However, Maasai 
park ranger Tepilit ole Saitoti narrates his own boarding school enrollment as a product of 
coercion - his father warned that he must not run away from school otherwise his family would 
be fined five oxen by the colonial authority.179  
Today, Maasai children still attend boarding schools and communities are still confined 
to group ranches. While modern group ranches are designed to mimic traditional practices of 
communal grazing, conflicts have emerged as the government allows group ranches to privatize. 
During privatization, conflicts occur over which members have authenticated claims to 
communal lands, and if communal lands can be sold to non-Maasai purchasers, such as tour 
companies. Additional conflicts occur when tour companies drive through group ranches and 
individually held Maasai lands to avoid the poor roads en-route to the Maasai Mara. The Kenyan 
government has used a frame of bounded-land to justify both the establishment of group ranches 
and privatized land holdings. Then, when conflict occurs, the government refers to the frame of 
bounded land in its adjudications.  
                                                
178 Tignor, Colonial Transformation of Kenya, 80-85. Tignor indicates a series of resistances to British 
colonial polices which resulted in immediate success. However, he also notes the long-term effects of these 
resistances that upset age and gender dynamics and created the foundation for a Maasai class-based society. 
179 Tepilit ole Saitoti, The Worlds of a Maasai Warrior: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 
1986), 53 .  
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Maasai herder Salaon ole Parsinande reflected on the government’s preference for the 
frames of bounded land and disappearance, and the effects of the government’s 
compartmentalization on Maasai identity in his 2012 interview with Maasai journalist Michael 
ole Tiampati.  
As pastoralists, we get hit hardest when there is drought because unlike the olden 
days when our forefathers had vast grasslands and the [Osupuko] highlands, 
where they moved the herds during hard times, the highlands are long gone, not 
owned by the community but by individuals. This hinders our free movement to 
these important buffer zones and as a result, my son-in-law had to undergo the 
humiliating process of having to beg due to the loss of livestock, as we can no 
longer access the highlands.180 
 
Grazing in the highlands is critical to Maasai community members as they are able to find grass 
during the dry seasons, and by moving to a cooler temperate region, are able to avoid malarial 
mosquitoes. Ole Parsinande indicates that a lack of access to these lands has prevented 
traditional adaptations to climate change, such as herd migrations and cattle raiding which would 
have allowed his family to regain the minimum number of cattle necessary to begin a new herd. 
The holding of a herd of cattle and the number of cattle held is of critical importance to 
Maasai communities. It is these cattle that determine a family’s status, that insure food supplies, 
and that are traded or given as gifts during life events. Yet, the Kenyan government has had 
difficulty reconciling the importance that Maasai families place on cattle. As a result of shrinking 
landholdings, Maasai community members are faced with either holding smaller herds, or 
overgrazing their lands (which in the long run will also result in smaller herds). Noah ole Matiek, 
a Maasai farmer, explains his personal experience with these conditions: 
About 20 years ago I can describe how the Maasai are living in that time. At that 
time we had a lot of cattle, so many of them, and a lot of land. So when you have 
                                                
180 Michael ole Tiampati, “Hard Times Affect Vital Apsects of Maasai Culture,” Cultural Survival 
Quarterly 2, no. 1 (2012), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/voices/michael-ole-tiampati/hard-times-
affect-vital-aspects-maasai-culture?page=1. 
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a lot of cattle you graze in community land of which there is nobody who can stop 
you. So, and also in type of food they used to eat, our community because we are 
Maasai we use meat and milk only and our people they are so healthy. When you 
see the children growing, so you can see them, they are healthy.181  
 
Today, ole Matiek has turned from herding to small-scale agriculture, a transition that he narrates 
as “we do not have land, land has gone. So the small land you have it, just utilize it.” For ole 
Matiek, grazing on large community lands is not possible and his family is reliant on a small 
number of cattle and a small plot of crops. Many development workers have referenced these 
circumstances using a frame of disappearance, arguing that it is time for the Maasai to give up 
their cattle. Yet, herders respond to these arguments by claiming that even when land is scarce, 
Maasai families will keep the cattle which are integrally tied to their identity. 
In his AgFax interview, Jeremiah Atetei, a Maasai leader from Isinya indicated that it was 
the ability to keep and grow these herds that determined Maasai policy and identity. 
We just feel that we just want to own them [cattle] but we do not usually sell. 
Because if a Maasai has no cows you will never be recognized by your 
community. So you have to keep cattle even if it is one or more, you have to have 
them.182  
 
This intrinsic value of cattle advanced by Atetei is absent from most government deliberations. 
The only instances that I have found where the Kenyan government engages in discussions of 
Maasai cattle herding are from human wildlife conflicts, in which either the Maasai are accused 
of herding in park lands, or wildlife are accused of crossing into Maasai grazing lands.183 These 
                                                
181 Noah ole Matiek, Jeremiah Atetei, Margaret Noah, Benson Mwangi, and Peter Mula, interview by Noah 
Lusaka Agfax: Reporting Science in Africa: Climate Change Brings Cultural Change, June 2012. 
http://www.agfax.net/transcript/agfax503.pdf 
182 Matiek et al, Agfax: Reporting Science. 
183 These discourses echo the colonial accusations of trespass. However here it is elephants or lions that 
have trespassed on Maasai ground. This utilization of a historic claim structure reflects a living history of court 
proceedings where Maasai community members were persecuted for trespass and critically, the expectation that the 
state will prosecute the trespassing wild animals just as it prosecutes trespassing Maasai herders. 
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conflicts have become increasingly common as families, herds, and wildlife compete for 
increasingly small water and pasture resources.  
3.4 CASE STUDY: HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICTS 
 “Human-wildlife conflicts” have increased as the space between parks where the animals 
officially live, and Maasai land holdings where the animals are trespassing, are in no way 
marked. When reported by media and government agencies, the frame of bounded land is used to 
argue that park borders are clearly set, and seldom questioned by locals. While on paper this is 
an accurate description – the Maasai Mara practices fortress conservation – in reality the park’s 
wall consists only of a large gate complex and a short length of perimeter walls. Approaching 
tourists might be given the illusion that the entire park is encased, but a quick drive along the 
wall quickly indicates the opposite. Further, recalling the experimentation with the Maasai Mara 
park boundaries presented in the last subsection, and Maasai’s experience with colonial 
boundary shifting presented in the first subsection, it is understandable that for Maasai 
communities, the park’s boundaries might be difficult to discern. 
The borders between park land and grazing land are frequently crossed by both herds and 
wildlife. In my meetings with a local game commissioner in Narok I learned that many local 
herders continue to use the Maasai Mara for grazing. However, unlike traditional herding that 
occurs during the day, these Maasai Mara herders have become nocturnal, grazing cattle only at 
night.184 This new practice reconciles the spirit of tourism driven fortress conservation – do not 
                                                
184 This practice was presented to me as a secret community adaptation, unknown to conservationists. 
However, I was also told about Maasai practices of night grazing during interviews with local conservationists in 
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let the tourists see grazing in the park – with Maasai herder’s desires to use some of the best 
grazing land in the area. This ad-hoc resolution has prevented many debates between 
conservation groups that would press for less-porous park boundaries. By grazing in the Maasai 
Mara at night, Maasai communities have produced non-violent resistance to policies supported 
by the government’s frame of bounded land. However, this act of resistance has only percolated 
within Maasai communities. To Kenyans and international stakeholders, the Maasai Mara’s 
boundaries are very real, and crossing those boundaries is considered illegal trespass. These 
conflicting interpretations of Maasai Mara boundaries have resulted in continued conflict 
between Maasai communities, government officials, and conservation organizations.  
One point of conflict is between Maasai herders and lions. Traditional herders would 
frequent Maasai Mara pasturelands and as a result keep the grasses at a sustainable-but-short 
height. Because they would leave those pastures in the evening, and could see over the grasses 
during the day, unplanned encounters with lions were rare. Today, fewer herders utilize the 
Maasai Mara pasturelands, and those that do so must graze at night. As such, these herders are in 
tall grasses, in the dark, using the same spaces as nocturnal hunters such as lions. Because of the 
dark and tall grasses, it is very difficult for these herders to see approaching lions until conflict 
has become inevitable.  
When faced with a kill-or-be-killed decision, Maasai herders will injure or kill a lion. The 
Maasai community views this as an acceptable act of self-defense because if the herders did 
nothing they or their herds would be killed by the approaching lion. These communities maintain 
that they have no interest in hunting or killing lions except for self-defense. Journalists and 
conservation organizations, however, often describe exotic Maasai warriors who must kill a lion 
                                                                                                                                                       
Narok, Kenya. The practice seems to be an open secret, technically illegal, but accepted by herders and 
conservationists who recognize that the Maasai must herd their cattle and the best pastures are in the Maasai Mara. 
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to obtain community status as a warrior. Then, these organizations use a frame of disappearance, 
often disguised by development rhetoric, to call for steep fines or imprisonment for the offending 
Maasai. In this argument, organizations claim that the Maasai tradition of lion hunting is both a 
historic relic and a significant threat to future conservation efforts. Claims made by Maasai 
community members that they have no interest in hunting lions are not presented in these reports. 
Nor have Maasai complaints gained traction for their complaints that while Maasai herders are 
sued for killing or injuring lions, the government takes no action when a herder is killed by a 
lion.185  
The complex intersection of Maasai, conservationist, and government interpretations of 
human-wildlife conflicts is illustrated by reports from the summer of 2012 when six lions were 
killed outside of the Nairobi National Park.186 The initial reports indicate the lions' deaths, but 
places little blame on the Maasai community. Fredrick Nzwili, East Africa Correspondent for the 
Christian Science Monitor reported,  
Masai warriors speared to death six lions in Ilkeek-Lemedung'i village in 
Kitengela area on the southern side of the park. The predators had killed 13 goats 
and sheep, and mauled one person in an attack, according to members of the 
community. Three other lions were killed in December 2011 and January 2012 
near Nairobi Park. Although killing lions is illegal here and the Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS) has promised to arrest the killers, no one has been arrested or 
charged.187 
 
This report indicates that KWS has not pressed charges, and includes an interview with local 
NGO members who explain why the killings occurred. 
                                                
185 These tensions are exasperated by the division in management between the Maasai Mara (largely 
community run) and the surrounding lands which are under the purview of the Kenyan Wildlife Service. 
186 This park is different from the Maasai Mara, but those distinctions seldom enter public discourse. 
Distinctions between Maasai and other herder communities are similarly absent. 
187 Fredrick Nzwili, “Lions in Nairobi? A New Suburban Problem,” Christian Science Monitor, July 31, 
2012. 
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The killings are regrettable, but this was a reaction of the community which feels 
frustrated and threatened. The situation has gone from bad to worse,” says Sidney 
Quntai, the chairman of Kenya Coalition for Wildlife Conservation and 
Management, a civil society organization. “It is difficult to sleep peacefully at 
night, since one has to keep ears and eyes open. In case of noise one creeps out to 
see if the animals are safe”188  
 
Sidney Quntai’s interview points to the government’s frame of bounded land and conceptions of 
trespass of lions creeping into paddocks at night. The community’s actions are excused by fear, 
and by the inability of the park to confine or control wildlife. In this report, Nzwili indicates the 
increased exit of lions from local parks, and the Kenyan Wildlife Service’s inability or 
unwillingness to protect local communities.  
Nzwili’s metered report of these encounters did not, however, set a standard for 
international reporting on wildlife conflict. In mid-July, 12 elephants, 10 African buffalo, and a 
lion were attacked by Maasai herders in Amboseli National Park. The narration of these attacks 
by Brian Jackman’s report for The Telegraph (UK) and James Clarke’s report for the 
Independent Online (South Africa), demonstrate the international attempt to make sense of and 
respond to Maasai protests. Jackman reported, 
The trouble started last week when a Maasai boy was killed by a buffalo and an 
officer from the KWS blamed the killing on the Maasai. Outraged Maasai 
warriors vented their fury by spearing an elephant and a buffalo before order was 
restored and the officer in question departed...To make their feelings known, 
hundreds of warriors from villages around Amboseli were instructed to go and 
spear all elephants, buffaloes and lions they could find in the rangelands 
surrounding the park.189  
 
Three days later, James Clarke, a journalist for the South African Independent Online reported,  
Ten days ago, 200 Maasai “warriors”, in an act of vengeance, randomly speared a 
dozen elephants, 10 buffalo and a lion from Kenya’s Amboseli National Park – 
                                                
188 Nzwili, “Lions in Nairobi?.” 
189 Brian Jackman, “Elephants Killed by Maasai in Row with Wildlife Services,” Telegraph (UK), June 26, 
2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/9428438/Elephants-killed-by-Maasai-in-row-with-wildlife-
services.html. 
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East Africa’s second most popular reserve. They complained they received too 
little spin-off from the park, yet had to put up with elephants damaging their crops 
and taking lives. A month before, six lions from Nairobi National Park were 
speared to death by disgruntled locals.190 
 
The different tone of these reports indicates the authors’ predispositions towards Maasai 
communities. Jackman leads with the death of a Maasai boy, while Clarke presents the Maasai’s 
acts as vengeance without a specific prompt. Additionally, while Nzwili and Jackman both use 
“warrior” in reference to the age group of Maasai men, Clarke’s report begins with sarcasm 
regarding Maasai communities. His assertion that these attacks were random also supports the 
frame of disappearance, of a community so far out of touch that they sneak up and attack 
elephants. Clarke does note the causes of these tensions, spanning financial gains from park entry 
fees, to elephants that damage crops, to herder’s deaths, and contextualizes the attacks with the 
death of lions reported by Nzwili. However, while Nzwili and Jackman indicate that the lions 
were killed only after animals and humans were attacked, Clarke merely states that locals were 
disgruntled. Clarke’s report concludes with the statement, “African communities are becoming 
fed-up with wildlife – elephants in particular. And elephants are showing increasing signs of 
being fed-up with humans.”191 In this argument, Clarke references chronic stress experienced by 
elephants due to abuse, constraint, and translocation as legitimating factors in elephant attacks on 
human communities. Yet, he makes no mention of those same pressures experienced by Maasai 
herders. Instead, Clarke concludes that if human communities can simply learn to live alongside 
elephants, preferably through eco-tourism schemes, human-wildlife conflicts will end.  
                                                
190 James Clarke, “Elephants, Humans Die as Hostility Soars,” Independent Online, July 31, 2012, 
http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/environment/elephants-humans-die-as-hostility-soars-
1.1352961#.UyREof3fZuY 
191 Clarke, “Elephants, Humans Die.” 
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Maasai communities have a radically different proposal to end human-wildlife conflicts. 
They contend that these conflicts did not occur until the government began advancing arguments 
and policies through a frame of bounded land. During my interviews with Maasai community 
members, I was told about traditional grazing patterns, settlement cites, and herder patrols that 
kept human-wildlife conflicts at a minimum. These interviewees indicated that human-wildlife 
conflicts are increasing because humans, herds, and wildlife have been pressed into too small of 
spaces.  
 
Figure 6: Interview with Maasai herders, August 2012.192 
 
 
                                                
192 Oral History interviews in Narok, Kenya. Allison Hahn, 2012. 
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The juxtaposition of journalist and herder reports of human-wildlife conflicts illuminate 
critical points of conflict in southern Kenya. Clarke and Jackman interpret the killings as 
vengeance by Maasai men. Nzwili takes a different approach, suggesting that the kilings are an 
undesireable but understandable act of protest. Maasai community members reflect on these 
killings as acts of desperation. At play in these conflicts are questions of Maasai identity, the 
boundaries between human and wildlife communities, and concepts of wildlife conservation. 
Maasai communities contend that identity, human wildlife relationships, and 
conservation are all bound together. They insist that because Maasai communities do not eat the 
meat of wildlife, and the Maasai not celebrate random hunting, their communities have a long 
history of what the west would term “wildlife conservation.” They then extend this argument, 
contending that the Maasai Mara and Serengeti had to be established on Maasai lands because 
the Maasai were the only community that had protected and maintained wildlife. For example, 
my driver, who was born in the Maasai Mara suggested that I find Kikuyu community members 
and ask them where their wildlife where. The implied joke was that the Kikuyu don’t have 
wildlife, they had eaten all of theirs. 
While Maasai activists have frequently highlighted traditional connections between 
identity, wildlife, and conservation, these arguments have gained little traction among 
international analysts who maintain that wildlife can only be protected by divisions between 
conservation land and grazing land. Writing in Le Monde, Alain Zecchini, Administrateur de la 
Society de la Nature, responded to the Maasai community’s arguments by referencing the recent 
lion killings to prove that the Maasai cannot peacefully coexist with wild animals.  
There’s still a widely held romantic idea that the Maasai and other tribesmen live 
in perfect harmony with the animal world…The truth, of course, is rather 
different. This is not peaceful coexistence. The herdsmen simply lack the capital 
and know-how to change the status quo. In the past, when there were fewer 
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people, the herdsmen may have been able to overlook these natural intruders. But 
now, as populations expand, financial needs increase and the economic stakes 
rise, it’s absolutely essential to make the most of the land. Quite simply, the 
herdsman can no longer bear the additional costs associated with the presence of 
wildlife.193  
 
In this essay, Zecchini reflects on the government’s frame of bounded land which specifies and 
differentiates the spaces where humans and animals should live. Referring to lions and elephants 
as “natural intruders” he assumes that the Maasai have always thought of these animals as 
trespassers onto their lands. According to Zecchini, the position of Maasai herders in late modern 
capitalism is one of desperation – “they can no longer bear the additional costs associated with 
the presence of wildlife.” This argument reflects same desperation expressed to me by Maasai 
herders during my interviews in 2012. However, while Maasai interviewees told me that they 
would prefer better access to park lands and including interactions with wildlife, Zecchini 
assumes that Maasai communities would prefer an firm park border and absence of wildlife from 
their pasturelands.  
Zecchini also reproduces the government’s frame of disappearance when he presents the 
Maasai as people out of time – unable to adapt in the status quo. To be clear, Zeechini does not 
call for the disappearance of the Maasai, but he does reproduce a proleptic elegy that explains 
how the Maasai cannot live in this time. He continues his report, indicating how the Maasai feel 
about wild animals,  
From the point of view of the Maasai, these animals consume scarce resources, 
spread disease and may injure or even kill. So the men build protective fences 
round their cob houses and keep permanent watch over their fields and herds. All 
wildlife is owned by the state, however, and the Maasai are only allowed to 
eliminate this particular form of competition if they are under personal threat. So, 
rather than killing a few on the quiet, they take the more devious and ultimately 
more radical course of clearing land for cultivation, putting up fences, limiting 
                                                
193 Alain Zecchini, “Kenya's Battle for Biodiversity,” Le Monde Diplomatique, November 11, 2000, 
English Edition, http://mondediplo.com/2000/11/21masai.  
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access to water holes, and burning stubble. As a result, these animals are rapidly 
dying out, not just in the Mara but also in Kenya as a whole. Between 1977 and 
1994, the country lost 44% of its wildlife.194  
 
This essay emphasizes the increase in human-wildlife conflicts, and the Maasai’s desperate need, 
or perception of a need, to protect themselves.195 While Zecchini does not directly blame the 
Maasai for confronting wildlife, he does produce a compelling narrative of how the Maasai are 
endangering wildlife. The roots of these problems are not considered, nor does the Maasai 
community’s reframing of conservation enter the discussion.196 Indeed, the Maasai community’s 
arguments are silenced by writers such as Zecchini who relate the “Maasai point of view” to the 
reader with no indication of where or how he gained this information.  
Zecchini’s narration is very different from Sharon Looremeta, a member of the Maasai 
community and Umuro Godana, a conflict resolution program officer for Practical Action, who 
described the conflicts in southern Kenya. 
[Settlers] are buying land, cultivating, fencing them off, and therefore the 
pastoralist person cannot now move around with his animals. The new settlers, I 
would say, are coming to cultivate land that is not even suitable for cultivation. So 
the communities themselves who have sold the land cannot even be able to drive 
away their animals. You find them cutting other peoples fences, grazing in other 
people’s land, and this has always caused conflict between the two groups.197  
 
In this description, Godana describes situations opposing those narrated by Zecchini in Le 
Monde. Zecchini argued that the Maasai are creating confined spaces and destroying lands where 
that wildlife might live in an attempt to adapt to the pressures of modernity. Godana, however, 
argues that the Maasai are attempting to open spaces – literally cutting through fences to graze 
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197 Sharon Looremeta and Umuro Godana, interview by Winnie Onyimbo, Agfax: Reporting Science in 
Africa: Healing Pastoral Conflict, September, 2007, http://www.agfax.net/radio/detail.php?i=1&s=t. 
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their herds. The conflict, according to Godana, is created by new settlers who are restricting the 
herding patterns of Maasai communities, not by Maasai herders attempting to adapt pasturelands 
for agricultural cultivation. 
The final layer of differentiation concerns the Maasai and their willingness to live near 
wildlife. Zucchini indicates that historically the Maasai have tolerated wildlife because they 
“lack the know-how” to get rid of them. This argument is produces an expectation that the 
Maasai wish to modernize and gain the capabilities to change their environment. Zucchini’s 
arguments are called into question by Maasai community members who choose to live near wild 
animals. For example, Moses Kaleku, a Maasai herder who also works as a game keeper told 
journalist Kipchumba Kemei,  
“We are the ones who really know this habitat and the animals,” says Moses 
Kaleku one of the graduates of Koyaki Guiding School in Masai Mara Game 
Reserve, Kenya’s first school that is training the Maasai to become safari guides. 
“All through my life I have been with wild animals. I have survived the risks of 
living with them,” says Kaleku who now works as a tour guide at Encounter Mara 
Camp as a tour guide. Known for their red clothes and diet of milk and meat, the 
Maasai by tradition are cattle herders and their decision to become safari guides 
illustrates it now wants to move on.198  
 
It is important to note that the frame of disappearance entered Kemei’s text after the interview 
quotation ended. Moses Kaleku did not indicate that he is now a game keeper because he wanted 
to identify in a non-Maasai way, but because he had grown up with these animals. Following 
from the analysis provided in this chapter, it is possible to interpret Kaleku’s motivations to be a 
gamekeeper as a young man who both identifies as a traditional Maasai herder and works in the 
Maasai Mara. Yet, for a writer who is not privy to the complexities of Maasai argumentation and 
identity, division between traditional herd and wildlife keeper maybe too great and texts such as 
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Kemei’s produce an expectation amongst policy makers, international tourists, and development 
organizations that Maasai youth are moving away from herding towards westernized wildlife 
management careers.  
3.5 WE DO NOT HAVE LAND: BUREAUCRACY IN KENYA  
In response to the lack of progress gained by non-violent resistance, and limited acceptance of 
Maasai produced arguments, many Maasai community members in Kenya have turned to direct – 
at times violent – resistance. Many of these acts of resistance are prefaced on desperation, such 
as that expressed by Peter Mula a Maasai farmer from Isinya who stated, “We do not have land, 
land has gone. So the small land you have it, just utilize it.”199 In this description, Isinya seems to 
both claim that he has no land, and that he must use the land that he has. The reason for this 
inconsistency may be a reflection of land which is lost – Maasailand – and current land which is 
part of, but not fully recognized as Maasailand.  
Much of this recent land loss has occurred as group ranches are privatized to create 
individual land holdings. Conflict occurs when decedents of the original group ranch members 
make overlapping claims for pasturelands. The Kenyan land grants office is charged adjudicating 
these claims and providing certificates for individual land holdings. However, the land grants 
office does not always verify the ancestral ties of individuals to a group ranch, an oversight that 
allows almost anyone to claim group ranch lands. Additionally, while the specific borders of an 
individualized claim may be marked at the intersection between the claim and road, it is common 
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for no one – not the titleholder, or her neighbors, or the land office – to know the precise location 
of the other three boundaries.200 Finally, even when the land claims office is able to determine 
and ancestral connection to the group ranch, and mark all of the boundaries for the land claim, 
problems may occur because many large families have practiced home birth and their children do 
not have birth certificates to substantiate their ancestry. 
 The intricacies of substantiating an individual land claim were explained to me during an 
interview with Kiara, a Maasai man in his mid-forty’s with eighteen children and four wives. He 
told me that all of his children were born at home and only a few of them had birth certificates. 
He similarly lacked a certificate, which had created problems when he attempted to claim his 
family portion of a group ranch.  
My father died and I should have inherited the land, 110 acres, but it is also 
claimed by someone else. The problem is still in court, but I don't expect it to be 
resolved. Just this week I was supposed to be in court to discuss this but the 
lawyer from the other family said that they were bereaved and so asked for a 
delay in the court date…We have given up and have worked with the other people 
assigned the land to negotiate the subdivided between ourselves. We keep going 
to court but don't expect to have a result.201 
 
Later, when I interviewed the district commissioner of the local land grants office I was told that 
appeals processes were possible and that Kiara’s family could easily regain its traditional 
                                                
200 Mengi, interview by Allison Hahn, August 3, 2012.  
201 Kiara, interview by Allison Hahn August 2, 2012. The interview ended at this point, and in the car ride 
to the next family’s compound Professor Saitoti and I discussed the problem with this line of questioning. In the 
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his last name nor the names of his family members. 
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holding. The current landholders and the challengers simply need to meet in the office to 
deliberate over the land holding. Yet, I was also told that the office lacked enforcement 
mechanisms to compel the landholders to attend such a meeting, and the officer that I 
interviewed conceded that there was no reason for the current landholders to attend such a 
meeting. Additionally, while Kiara’s family is working to acquire the necessary documents to 
present their claim, the current landholders are building permanent structures which they can use 
in future deliberations to prove their merit as superior land owners.202 Recall the discussion of 
terra nullis presented at the beginning of this chapter by which Maasai communities were unable 
to prove their land use. Following the British standard of land use, which has been adopted by 
the modern Kenyan state, these permanent structures may very well count for more than a birth 
certificate in adjudicating a land claim.203  
Today, Maasai community members are still arguing against the government’s use of 
frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance. In each of my interviews 
in Kenya I was told that the Maasai are not going anywhere – they, their herds, and their children 
would continue to live in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania. Although conflicts are 
mounting between herders, development projects, conservationists, and government officials, 
                                                
202 This reflects a colonial method of land appropriation as poof of superior land use. Among the many 
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in Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 47-48. 
203 This skepticism regarding the lands office and land claims runs deep and throughout the community. 
New settlers are not only other Kenyans, but also international organizations seeking to develop massive farms or 
tourist complexes. As an outsider asking questions about land policy and tenure I was frequently regarded with a 
mixture of skepticism and desire to tell the family story of loss and injustice. Traveling with a Professor Saitoti from 
Narok College, who had grown up in this community gave a level of trust that would not otherwise have been 
possible. Even still, families refused to sign any paper for any reason. Often Professor Saitoti would read the Oral 
History agreement to the head of the household in Maa. He would tell me, yes, they agree, you may speak to them, 
but they will not sign this. Additionally, only Professor Saitoti’s family and their closest neighbors agreed to my 
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these community members are confident that their traditions and lands are both unique and 
lasting.  
In this chapter I have investigated the ways that colonial and modern governments of 
Kenya have used frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering and disappearance to put 
pressure on Maasai communities to settle and give up their herding traditions. I highlighted the 
ways that hate speech has become a feature in these deliberations by focusing on MP Waititu’s 
statement, “from today I want all Maasais chased away from here. They should go back to where 
they came from,” to illustrate the pressures faced by Maasai communities.204 And I assessed the 
entailments of these combined frames for Maasai communities determined to continue their 
herding traditions.  
While Kenyan Maasai communities have not turned to social media in the same way as 
communities in Tanzania, quilting points are still evident in cross-border identification and 
deliberation made possible by increased access to information and communication technologies. 
The pressures created by MP Waititu mimic those of PM Kikwete in Tanzania, indicating the 
shared stresses of Maasai communities as they confront government frames of disappearance. In 
the next two chapters I will examine the ways that Mongols in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia 
have faced similar pressures. Through this multi-sited analysis, I hope to better understand the 
ways that herders have confronted arguments such as those advanced by MP Waititu and PM 
Kikwete to negotiate their places in our quickly developing world. 
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4.0  MONGOLIA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapters Two and Three I looked at how the colonial and modern governments of Tanzania 
and Kenya have used frames of bounded land, movement-as-wandering, and disappearance in an 
attempt to define and compartmentalize herding communities. In this chapter I will turn my 
attention to Eurasia where I will examine how the historic and modern governments of Mongolia 
have used frames of bounded land and disappearance in similar ways to the governments of 
Tanzania and Kenya. Difference, however, emerges regarding the frame of movement that is 
articulated as “movement-as-wandering” in the Tanzanian and Kenyan chapters, but in this 
chapter emerges as “movement-as-otor,” and is used by herders in response to government 
frames of bounded land and disappearance. In chapters Two and Three “movement-as-
wandering” was assessed as a negative articulation of Maasai communities used by colonists to 
justify settlement and development projects. In this chapter “movement-as-otor” is a positive 
articulation, used by herders to describe their traditions of otor, or migrations to find the best 
pasturelands and while simultaneously avoid environmental pressures. 
This twist in the frame of movement takes on a new character because herders in 
Mongolia are in a more empowered position than Maasai herders and as such have more forums 
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to articulate the frame of movement-as-otor.205 As a result, this chapter will investigate the ways 
that the government’s frames of bounded land and disappearance compete with the herder’s 
frame of movement-as-otor.  
In what follows, I present a historical analysis of the government’s frames of bounded 
land and disappearance. Then, I examine the ways that herders have use the frame of movement-
as-otor to present their traditions as an ideal alternative to settlement, adaptation to modernity, 
and the best way to contend with climate change. Next I turn to an assessment of Eastern 
Mongolia and ask how international conservation organizations have attempted to incorporate 
the frame of movement-as-otor into their program planning. I assess clashes between 
government and herder argument frames and investigate the entailments of those clashes for the 
creation of conservation and mining policy. Finally I turn my attention to emergent deliberative 
forums. Focusing on the nationally televised Open Society Forum, I ask if public forum 
deliberations between herders and the government are possible, or if the government’s frames of 
bounded land and disappearance have become so dominant that herders are not included in 
policy deliberations.  
4.2 LAND OF CHINGHIS KHAN 
Mongolian herders use the Secret History of the Mongols to trace their history to a time before 
Chinghis Khan. Using this text as a quilting-point, the Mongolian people in general, and the 
                                                
205 My determination of empowerment is based on Mongolian herder’s ethnic connections to ruling parties 
in the Mongolian government and the history of herding shared by settled and herding communities in Mongolia. 
These relationships are radically different than those of the Maasai and their respective governments with whom 
they infrequently share ethnicity or histories of herding. 
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Khalk majority in particular, have a long history of herding, pastoral lifestyles, and relationships 
with other nomadic communities. Traditionally, Mongolians worked within “hierarchical 
pastoral networks,” groups associated by family or geographic ties that allowed access to land, 
water, and grazing spaces.206 Ecologist Dennis Ojima and biophysicist Togtohyn Chuluun have 
traced the basis of these relationships, focusing on three linguistic terms which reveal the way 
that Mongolian identity and social networks were understood by the early Mongolian state 
through a frame of bounded land.  
the hot ail (a network of households sharing resources within a particular region), 
neg golynhon (people from one river area), and neg nutgiinhan (people from one 
living place) existed in the traditional Mongolian nomadic pastoral system.207  
 
In these descriptions of Mongolian traditions, the frame of bounded land is used to describe 
community locations, based loosely on geographic features and community agreements. As far 
back as Chinghis Khan’s Empire, local communities regulated grazing on Mongolian 
pasturelands. It was not until 1644 when the Qing Dynasty claimed Mongolia as a colony that 
Mongolian herders were regulated by a central bureaucracy. At this time, the military advantage 
of mobile horsemen, which the Mongolians had enjoyed since the twelfth century, was 
threatened by radical changes in Russian and Chinese demography, technology, and military 
strategy.208 This shift in power signaled a rejection of Mongolian community-negotiated 
migrations to Qing bureaucratic migration policies presented by the frame of bounded land. For 
example, the Qing officiated their claim over Mongolia through a frame of bounded land 
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demarcated specific lands rather than ethnic communities. Laws were then created to further 
divide and maintain a complex system of eighty-six county-level administrative units, 
accompanied by land holding by nobles and Buddhist monasteries that held power over 
Mongolian herders. While many Mongolians continued to identify as herders, Qing policies 
encouraged single species herding and often transferred ownership of herds away from herders to 
land-based elites. The ownership of herds by land-based elites supported the frame of bounded 
land by tying herders and herds to specific lands rather than migration patterns. As a result of 
these policies, even if herders maintained traditional lifestyles, their migrations and herds were 
entrenched in the Qing’s bureaucracy.209 
Qing policies not only divided herds, they also divided the Eurasian steppe into Inner and 
Outer Mongolia. This chapter investigates “Outer Mongolia,” a region that the Qing considered 
to have less political and economic importance than “Inner Mongolia” which is considered in 
Chapter Five. The division of Outer and Inner Mongolia entrenched the Qing’s preference for 
specifically divided and owned land. Additionally, as I will explore in Chapter Five, the 
demarcation of “Outer Mongolia” encouraged rhetorics of barbarianism to describe communities 
controlled by, but not part of, the Qing Empire.  
The Qing Empire fell in 1912, resulting in fierce competition for power, lands, and 
control in Eurasia. A year before, Mongolian revolutionaries took advantage of the weakening 
Qing Empire to claim independence, preventing the Chinese Communist Party from claiming the 
region when it came to power in 1949. To further insure national independence, Mongolian 
revolutionaries sought the aid of Russian Bolsheviks and persuaded them that Mongolia was a 
strategic ally against Chinese and Japanese encroachment into Manchuria and Siberia. With the 
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help of the emergent Soviet Union, Mongolia declared itself a Socialist People’s Republic in 
1924.210 All of these political transitions were negotiated through a frame of bounded land 
bolstered by a frame of disappearance that proposed both Mongolian herders and lands were at 
risk of succumbing to the Chinese state. The independent government of Mongolia encouraged 
herding traditions as a mechanism to preserve the uniqueness of Mongolian identity as opposed 
to the quickly settling Chinese and Russian herding communities. These policies continued until 
the late 1920’s when the Mongolian socialist government first tried to collectivize herders.  
Today, the collective memory of Mongolia’s historic relationships with China and Russia 
tempers many international trade discussions and political engagements. Gregory Delaplace, an 
anthropologist at the Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre La Défense, argues that these memories 
“act as a border – a device that separates and connects at the same time, that is open to some 
relations and closed to others, that is programmed to let some things go, and to retain others.”211 
In his research, Delaplace indicates the prominence of the frame of bounded land in Mongolian 
political deliberation. He finds that in modern Mongolia, borders are used to control memories of 
freedom, reflecting the Qing’s frames of bounded land that have reappeared in modern 
Mongolian political deliberation. To understand what is included and excluded in these borders, 
it is necessary to understand how the independent government of Outer Mongolia, which 
supported traditional herding, became the Mongolian People’s Republic, which tried to 
collectivize herders. 
The Mongolian People’s Republic was never part of the USSR. However, Soviet 
influence is apparent in the influx of politicians and academics that argued in support of 
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modernizing and settling herding communities. Alongside ideological influences, Mongolia 
received large provisions of machinery and transportation equipment from the USSR and East 
Germany to carry out collectivization schemes. This technological aid had immediate effects on 
herders. For example, as haymaking machinery became available, herders were able to stay in 
winter pastures longer. Trucks became available and roads were paved making traditional 
migrations known as otor quicker and more precise. At this time of fast paced modernization, 
wells were dug, telephone lines connected, and schools built.212 Each of these modernizations 
supported the government polices made with the frame of bounded land by linking families to 
specific pastures, communities, and utilities in ways not previously experienced. Additionally, 
each modernization was accompanied by development rhetoric that used a frame of 
disappearance to encourage Mongolian herders to live in settled communities. 
Mongolia declared independence in 1911, yet it was not until the Yalta Conference of 
1945 that China and the USSR officially recognized Mongolia as an independent nation with set 
borders. Before these borders were internationally recognized, Mongolian academics and policy 
makers began differentiating the independent Outer Mongolia from the Chinese controlled Inner 
Mongolia. Historical narratives used during the socialist period illuminate the role of ethnicity 
and borders in establishing a history of herder impoverishment and need to settle herding 
communities. 
According to the Mongolian national narrative, the People’s Republic of China was 
absolved of any responsibility of harms inflicted on Mongolians during the colonization of 
Mongolia by the Qing Empire. Along with this absolution of guilt, Mongolia asserted that the 
People’s Republic of China had no claim to Mongolian lands. This claim was based on 
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Mongolia’s status as a colony of the Manchurian ethnicity’s Qing Empire, which Mongolians 
claimed was a distinct governing body from the Han ethnicity’s Chinese Communist Party that 
formed the People’s Republic of China.213 Having substantiated their independence through a 
combined frame of bounded land and fine-tuned division of ethnicities, the Mongolian 
government turned its attention to agents of the Qing Empire - Han Chinese merchants. 
The socialist government of Mongolia argued that Han Chinese merchants operating in 
Mongolia had utilized lines of credit at exorbitant rates to impoverish Mongolian herders.214 By 
focusing on trade between Han merchants and Mongolian herders during the Qing Empire, the 
socialist government of Mongolia established limits to deliberations about the future of herders 
living on the Eurasian steppe. The history of wealth and prosperity amongst Mongolian herders 
experienced during Chinghis Khan’s empire were regarded as historic events rather than possible 
futures. Using a frame of disappearance, the government highlighted the current poverty of 
herders and used that poverty to justify collectivization and settlement of herder communities. 
During this period, alternative narratives that recalled herder wealth and sustainability were 
regulated by censorship regimes that banned all discussion and images of Chinghis Khan.215 By 
creating and limiting this national narrative, the socialist government created a frame of 
disappearance that could be used to erode local narratives and replace multiple historic 
interpretations with a single narrative of socialist – settled prosperity. 
This narrative was met with resistance from religious communities and elites that had 
forged advantageous relationships with the Qing Empire. The resulting tensions between the 
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government and religious arguments lead to strict censorship. When this censorship also failed, 
and religious communities began to threaten state authority, the socialist government began the 
Great Purge. In the three years between 1937 and 1939, at least 22,000 Mongolians were killed 
by Mongolian and Soviet troops. Christopher Kaplonski, historian at Indiana University 
Bloomington, estimates that at the beginning of these purges the adult population of Mongolia 
was 800,000. This means that thirty-three percent of the Mongolian population was killed in 
three years.216 While these deaths did occur in all sectors of Mongolian society, they were 
disproportionally targeted at Buddhist Lamas who had served as key nodes in Mongolian 
information networks. As monasteries were destroyed, state sponsored media and informal 
networks became the primary sources of news for Mongolia’s herders.  
Mongolian media was controlled by the state, but informal networks were controlled by 
their group classification: familial, classmates or alumni, co-workers and neg nutgiinhan (people 
from the same homeland). These networks functioned similar to the Russian blat, enforcing 
personal obligations and the norms of informal networks in formal contexts.217 While scholars 
have highlighted the ways that these networks allowed information to travel across long spaces, 
it is important to note that the use of neg nutgiinhan partitioned communities and created the 
expectation that members would identify with a singular location, rather than set of locations 
visited during annual herd migrations. In this way, even though informal communication 
                                                
216 Kaplonski notes that these are low-ball figures, and that numbers as high as 100,000 have been reported, 
though it is unclear if those numbers indicate only deaths or deaths and missing persons including lamas who left 
monasteries but were not killed during the purge. Although this number rivals modern genocides, a rhetoric of 
genocide has not yet emerged in Mongolia. For a discussion of the effect of the Great Purge on Mongolian history 
and modern politics, see Christopher Kaplonski, “Thirty Thousand Bullets: Remembering Political Repression in 
Mongolia,” in Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe: Ghosts at the 
Table of Democracy, eds. Kenneth Christie and Robert Cribb (London: Rutledge Curzon, 2002) 155-168.  
217Alena Ledeneva, “Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 50, no. 1 (2008): 118-144. Also see Jargalsaikhan Mendee, “Civil Society in Non-Western 
Setting: Mongolian Civil Society” (master’s thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012), 
https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/42779/ubc_2012_fall_jargalsaikhan_mendee.pdf?sequence=1. 
  118 
networks were beyond, and at times opposed to, the socialist government, they reinforced the 
government’s preference for bounded land. 
By the late 1950s the government’s preference and use of arguments made from a frame 
of bounded land began to take a secondary position to settlement policies advanced through 
frames of disappearance. For example, in 1959 the Third General Assembly of the Central 
Committee of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party approved the Virgin Lands 
Campaign. This project, modeled after a similar initiative in Kazakhstan, aimed at “cultivating 
the uncultivated land in order to increase production of crops, especially cereals.”218 The 
conceptualization of Mongolia’s land as “virgin” eschewed traditional herding practices, evoking 
terra nullius by conceptualizing this land as empty and ready for development. The goal of 
producing cereal crops to feed Mongolia’s herds presumed that those herds did not yet have 
food, which is an obvious misnomer as the same herds were already eating grasses. However, 
dividing land into specific cultivation and livestock zones – as opposed to open grazing lands – 
allowed the government to regulate herder’s movements. Then once the state controlled the 
production of animal fodder, it could successfully implement the final regulation of movement, 
collectivization projects. 
In 1960, the collectivization campaign called negdel kolhoz began when animals were 
forcibly seized from herders. At this time, members of local communities – negdel, were joined 
together to create brigades –kolhoz. These negdel kolhoz were connected to specific locations 
and used bureaucratic mechanisms to control herds and grazing patterns. While negdel members 
might maintain herder lifestyles, they now received wages, holidays and pensions from the state. 
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These changes in herd ownership forced herders to accept a cash economy in place of traditional 
barter and trade. Payments in cash tied herders to the negdel kolhoz and other state systems such 
as banks and stores to provide goods previously gained from individually owned herds. Each of 
these changes reinforced the government’s preference for frames of bounded land.  
Herders were encouraged to identify as part of the negdel kolhoz while simultaneously 
imagining the modernized, settled Mongolian state. The government encouraged herders to 
desire settled communities through schemes such as setting pensions for herders at lower rates 
than urban factory workers to incentivize herder settlement.219 Damba Gantemur of the 
Mongolian Sustainable Tourism Development Center indicates that the socialist Mongolian 
government frequently produced policies and speeches that utilized proleptic elegies to 
encourage herder settlement. According to Gantemur’s review of archival documents and 
interviews with government officials, negdel kolhoz were designed to advance the idea of Homo 
Sovieticus. Articulated as a process of human development based on Social Darwinism, Homo 
Sovieticus was presented as the next evolutionary step for Mongolia’s herders.  
Mongolian mentality which a herdsmen can be a proprietor and decider of his 
own life, live in surrounded ger that always encourage a concession instead of 
tension, into a “Homo Sovieticus” thinking and a characteristics which is always 
subsidized by others, depended on others. However, during the socialist time, 
there were three well-organized cultural attacks on health and education. 
Especially skin and venereal diseases were eliminated, illiteracy was abolished 
and an urban way of life was introduced.220  
 
While the eradication of skin and venereal diseases during the negdel kolhoz campaigns 
benefited herder campaigns, the emphasis on this achievement indicates worrying connections 
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with the metaphors of disease and illness identified in Chapter One by government officials who 
are determined to settle or exterminate Roma communities. As a result of these “cultural attacks 
on health and education,” the socialist government further tied citizens to government units 
containing schools, hospitals, government offices, and veterinarian clinics.  
Bureaucratic controls of movement were refined at this time as the movements of negdel 
kolhoz members were regulated by the local soum (district) administration, resulting in a much 
closer bureaucracy than that experienced under the Qing Empire. Herders became increasingly 
attached to their soum during winter droughts, known as dzuds.221 Historically, herders faced 
with a dzud would have to migrate in the middle of winter hoping to find accessible pastures. 
Now, the socialist government encouraged herders to move towards soum centers to state 
stockpiles of wheat, barley, and bran. In this way, herder’s traditional migrations used to adapt to 
dzud were offset by a reliance on government facilities that encouraged herders to permanently 
settle.222  
The connections between herders, negdel kolhoz, and Mongolian bureaucracy established 
during the socialist period illuminates the strength and promotion of the Mongolian 
government’s frame of bounded land that tied herders to specific geographic locations. 
Additionally, tracking the history of Mongolian cooperatives reveals the process whereby the 
frame of bounded land took a secondary position to the frames of disappearance concerning 
Mongolian herders. As herders were assigned to negdel kolhoz and their pensions arrived via 
state banks, it became difficult for herders to resist state determined boundaries. Additionally, 
                                                
221	  A dzud is a winter storm in which snow or ice pack covers the grasses, preventing animals from eating. 
Additionally, it frequently arrives in a flash freeze or blizzard. While dzud has occurred historically in Mongolia, 
there is some debate if they are becoming more frequent due to climate change.	  
222 Yuki Konagaya and Ai Maekawa, “Characteristics and Transformation of the Pastoral System in 
Mongolia,” in The Mongolian Ecosystem Network, eds. Norio Yamamura, Norboru Fujita, and Ai Maekawa (Tokyo: 
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once they had joined a negdel kolhoz, herders were encouraged to identify as collective 
members, rather than members of traditional kinship networks and religious groups.223 The 
government, using a frame of bounded land and then disappearance utilized these the 
informational networks established amongst negdel kolhoz members to influence community 
decision making bodies and continually pressure herders to embrace sedentarization.224  
Encouragement that herders identify with a negdel kolhoz, soum (district), aimag 
(providence), and nation went so far as to ban the use of last names and thereby cut apart kinship 
networks that could be used to resist the state. Simultaneously, Soviet aid was directed at 
developing the Mongolian capital Ulaan Baatar into an urban mecca that would encourage 
settlement. The resulting influx of visitors to Ulaan Baatar resulted in new migration patterns 
that included herders and students spending time in both pasturelands and cities. Even herders 
that could not travel to Ulaan Baatar were encouraged by radio stories, school lessons, and 
printed images to accept the city as a symbol for Mongolia’s future.  
This symbol of modern Mongolia was prefaced on the settlement of herding 
communities. Yet geographers such as Alexander Diener argue that even though some 
Mongolian herders accepted settlement, it was herding lifestyles that continued to exemplify the 
ideal Mongolian lifestyle.  
Through this practice, much of the society’s “pastoralist” distinctiveness was 
retained. Despite large housing projects and the aforementioned industrialization  
 
                                                
223 For a history of the transition from traditional to Socialist networks, see Caroline Humphrey and David 
Sneath, The End of Nomadism? Society, State, and the Environment in Inner Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1999). Also see, Robin Mearns, “Horses for Courses: The Making and Remaking of Pastoral Land Policy in 
Mongolia,” Paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, March 2000.  
224 While some authors have argued that traditional decision-making completely disappeared at this time, 
Ojima and Chuluun make a persuasive argument that these customary institutions disappeared from the view of the 
state, as evidenced by their reappearance after the 1991 democratic revolution. Ojima and Chuluun, “Policy 
Changes,” 183. 
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of the urban centers, felt tents (known as gers or yurts) and large herds remained 
points of pride and clear markers of Mongolian uniqueness in northeast Asia.225  
 
The importance of the ideal Mongolian lifestyle was apparent after the 1991 democratic 
transition when herders were no longer bound by the state to negdel kolhoz. 
Mongolia’s transition from socialism to democracy was coupled with the emergence of 
capitalism and rapid privatization of state holdings. Problems quickly emerged as herds that had 
been seized in the 1960’s were redistributed to once-negdel kolhoz members. Some negdel 
kolhoz herders had specialized in single-species herding and were well prepared to own their 
own animals. Others had been members of collectives, but because they were assigned to non-
herding jobs, these members had little training or competency in herding. These families could 
have immediately moved to cities. However, following the ideal Mongolian lifestyle identified 
by Diener, many chose to stay in the countryside and became herders. These so called “new 
nomads,” lacked knowledge of grazing practices that could preserve grasslands and maintain 
herds during dzud. As a result, in a few years many “new nomads” had lost their entire herds.226 
Even experienced herders faced difficulties during this time as public services for migration, 
water access, and veterinarian care were discontinued. Families coped by moving closer to soum 
centers, which created even more land degradation.  
Herders that lost their herds during the democratic transition have been labeled as “idle 
herders,” by international development organizations. These Mongolians are no longer classified 
by outside organizations as herders because they do not own any animals. However, they also 
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lack the resources to gain employment and identity as non-herders.227 This cycle of increased 
environmental pressures and settlement near soums which creates idle herders continued until 
1993 when a culmination of improved weather and stabilized social services supported herders 
and the stabilization of their herds.228  
While herders moved towards soums to escape dzud, city dwellers moved to the 
countryside to find stable food supplies. These movements were a result of the discontinuation of 
food aid and favorable trade policies with the USSR. City dwellers did have some access to food 
aid and supplies from China, but often rejected this aid with arguments fueled by the 
government’s narrative of Mongolian oppression at the hands of Han Chinese merchants during 
the Qing Empire. These movements from city to countryside embodied a rejection of the 
government’s frame of disappearance. Settled communities were freely choosing to become 
herders.  
Mongolian herders, regardless of their connections to cities or negdel kolhoz during the 
socialist period, were driven in the 1990’s to find economically stable methods of herding. For 
many herders, this resulted in a preference to keep more goats to sheep. This preference is 
supported by biologist Ai Maekawa’s 2013 calculations that a herder can make 25 times more 
pre goat than per sheep when both animals are used for cashmere or wool fibers.229 Based on this 
transition to goat herding, Mongolia has become the second largest cashmere market in the 
                                                
227 B. Enkhtuvshin, “New Challenges for Nomadic Civilization and Pastoral Nomadism in Mongolia,” 
(unpublished manuscript), 9. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.112.488&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
228 Ojima and Chuluun, “Policy Changes,” 184. 
229 Focusing on wool vs. cashmere is critical as the differences in income fall dramatically when addressing 
the cost of meat. However, the western reader must remember that Mongolians, like many herder communities, only 
consume the meat of older animals that will not live through the winter. For more detail, see Maekawa, “The Cash in 
Cashmere,” 238-9.  
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world. However this market might be short lived because goats eat the full grass plant – both 
roots and leaves – and quickly destroy Mongolia’s steppe ecology.  
Traditionally herders limited the ecological impact of goats by moving diverse herds over 
large swaths of land. However today the number sheep, yaks, cattle, camels, and horses has 
dropped to half of 1990 numbers. Beyond a preference for goats, economist Dorjbugedaa 
Lkhagvadorj’s team attributes this shift in herd dynamics to herder’s limited migrations. Because 
these herders are moving across ever-smaller swaths of land, they need fewer pack animals.230 
As a result of preferring goats to other herd animals, moving towards soum centers, and 
migrating over smaller swaths of land, Mongolian herders have been accused by international 
conservation organizations of overgrazing and overcrowding. Wang Xiaoli and Ronnie Vernooy, 
policy specialists for Biodiversity International, find that although herders are technically free to 
move towards soum centers, soum residents often use a frame of bounded land to reject new-
arriving herders as trespassers.231 For example, during ecologist Maria Fernandez-Gimenez and 
B. Batbuyan’s interviews in Bayan-Ovoo, Mongolia, herders explained that while overgrazing 
was not caused by traditional residents, the arrival of new herders has resulted in overgrazing.  
In my opinion the space in Bayan-Ovoo is not enough for the current herds of 
over 100,000 animals and also the uncounted animals from other sums that graze 
here. Herdsmen want to be near the center of the aimag and the market. 
According to the Land Law, herdsmen can go anywhere. If there were a 
khoshuun, it would be easier to regulate. In one year 1,200 households came from 
other soum and the aimag center and all have their own livestock. This is the main 
reason for overgrazing.232 
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Gimenez and Batbuyan, “Law and Disorder,” 153.  
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The arrival of herders that believe they can migrate from anywhere to already-occupied soum 
lands has resulted in conflicts over the future of herding and movement in Mongolia. In 2010 the 
governor of Bayan O’njuul soum told Tokyo University Professor of Foreign Studies Akira 
Kamimura, that these pressures are a threat to national stability.  
If a new pastureland law, which provides for exclusionary pastureland possession, 
does not allow outsiders to use possessed pastures any more, it will cause “civil 
war.” They meant by “civil war” not only that it would increase disputes and 
conflicts between herders, but also that they would revolt to protest against the 
government.233 
 
The risk of herder’s revolt and protest against the government has been actualized several times 
since the 1991 democratic transition. At odds in these revolts is herder’s desires for government 
remedies that create the potential for improved herding, and the government’s preference for 
polices created through a frame of disappearance that encourage herder settlement.  
 The government’s preference for a frame of disappearance is frequently bolstered by 
programs and funding from western NGOs and aid organizations. Attracted by Mongolia’s 
humanitarian needs and democratic transition, western NGOs and aid agencies began operating 
in Mongolia and quickly advanced frames of disappearance through policy recommendations 
and programs that supported the settlement of herding communities.234 These international 
organizations supported the privatization of herds and pressured the Mongolian government to 
also privatize land holdings. However, the Mongolian government rejected land-privatization 
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and today all land in Mongolia is owned by the government.235 This rejection of land-
privatization does not mean that the Mongolian government has foregone the concept of bounded 
land. Instead, the Mongolian government has maintained the socialist standard of government 
land ownership and determination of local boundaries.  
As a result of government land ownership, all grazing, mining, and farming rights are 
determined by the central government. This means that herders are unable to negotiate directly 
with other land users, and the government often reassigns lands from one economic sector to 
another without consulting or informing current land users.236 As such, herders are frequently 
unaware that their lands have been ceded to mining companies until miners arrive to begin 
mineral extraction, or that conservation reserves have been established until they are charged 
with trespass.237  
Modern legislation, such as the national Law on Land, has been designed to grant herders 
the right to access specific lands and mediate conflicts between herders. Yet my interviews in 
Eastern Mongolia indicate that these mediations are seldom effective. For example, one of the 
families that I interviewed had petitioned the soum office for help when a new family arrived in 
the valley and moved into their winter stables. The soum sent an official to speak with the newly 
arriving family and gained a promise that the new family would soon leave the winter stables. 
                                                
235 Maria Fernandez-Gimenez and B. Batbuyan, “Law and Disorder: Local Implementation of Mongolia’s 
Land Law,” Development and Change 35, no. 1 (2004): 146.  
236 Article 19 of the Mineral Law of Mongolia does require that both soum and aimag assemblies approve 
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However, the soum official quickly left without enforcing the agreement and the new family 
continues to occupy the stable.238 Unfortunately, herder conflicts are not limited to determining 
family rights to winter pastures. Today, herders in Mongolia are also facing clashes with 
conservation organizations and mining companies. 
While mediations between herders are not always effective, they are at least addressed in 
national legislation. The law is much murkier regarding clashes between herders, 
conservationists, and mining companies.239 Mongolia’s gold, copper, coal, and uranium deposits 
are ranked among the largest untapped resources in the world and political deliberation 
frequently focuses on how to extract these minerals. Rarely do deliberations address the 
interaction between herders and miners.  
Conflict has emerged between herders and miners because mining companies often prefer 
to create open-pit mines that limit or prohibit herding. These open-pits are preferable to 
underground mining for both economic and worker safety reasons, but are also far more 
detrimental to the surrounding environment. While mining corporations are required to complete 
and file environmental impact assessments before mining begins, standards for those assessments 
are not always in alignment with the needs and practices of herding communities. Additionally, 
Yukio Suzuki of the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries reported in 2013 
that environmental restoration plans for Mongolian mines are not always implemented. For 
example, in his interview with the Ministry of Nature and Environment of Mongolia, Suzuki 
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learned that only twenty-six percent of open-pit mines have been filled, and only eight percent 
have had vegetation restored.240 The 2012 World Bank Complaint filed by Mongolian herders 
clarifies that while free, prior, and informed consent is no longer possible, plans for these open-
pit mines should not proceed until herder’s rights and compensation are assured.241 
 
Figure 7: Erdenet Copper Mine.242 
 
The Mongolian government’s response to these problems has been to emphasize the 
frame of disappearance, paying more attention to the settlement of herders than creating 
processes for informed consent regarding land use. This frame of disappearance was presented 
via proleptic elegy by President Nambariin Enkhbayar in 2001, “it is not my desire to destroy the 
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original Mongolian identity, but in order to survive we have to stop being nomads.”243 Diener 
notes that,  
This statement clearly establishes the belief that modernization is the key to 
Mongolia’s future. It also implies that modernization will ultimately marginalize 
nomadic values and by consequence propagate new patterns of immobility.244  
 
The (im)mobility and settlement of Mongolian herders apparent in Enkhbayar’s statement is 
echoed by international organizations that report it is no longer possible for herders to exist in 
today’s world and funding must be allocated to settlement projects.245 The resulting policies are 
similar to the socialist and Qing governments’ attempts to settle herders and break Mongolians 
away from nomadic traditions, heritage, and mentality.246 In the next section I will investigate 
the ways that herders in Mongolia have explored the complexity of the term “herder” while 
arguing using the frame of movement-as-otor to respond to the government’s frames of bounded 
land and disappearance. 
4.3 MOVEMENT-AS-OTOR 
The modernization of Mongolia through open-pit mining requires restriction of herders’ 
movements across the Eurasian steppe. In the previous section I examined the ways that the Qing 
Empire, independent, socialist, and democratic governments of Mongolia have used frames of 
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bounded land and disappearance to encourage herder settlement. While the modern Mongolian 
government no longer censors the history of Chinghis Khan’s Empire, the government still 
follows the socialist example of regulating those narratives to history rather than pathways to 
modern prosperity. 
 Mongolian herders and historians have challenged this view of modernization, arguing 
that Chinghis Khan’s Empire can be used as a quilting point that aligns and defines both historic 
and modern understanding of herder lifestyles. For example, modern Mongolian historians have 
used Mongolia’s 3000-year history of herding to argue against the government’s frames of 
bounded land and disappearance by demonstrating the adaptability and sustainability of herding. 
These arguments, presented here by Mashbat Sarlagtay, a lawyer and researcher for the Institute 
for Strategic Studies in the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, explain herder’s opposition to 
settlement.  
One reason for the Mongol Empire’s greatness was the absence of any 
understanding of ‘border,’ of land limits. The nomads were just traveling and 
looking for good pastureland. When they saw a settled town or cultivated area, 
they did not understand the different culture and lifestyle. In the same way, the 
settled cultures too, usually described nomads as barbarians. Thus, the leader of 
the town would say, ‘go away from our land’, and the Mongols would get angry 
and destroy them. It was the clash of civilizations of the day.247  
 
Sarlagtay’s analysis points to a critical division between nomadic and settled communities which 
effects not only Mongolian herders’ understanding of natural, geographical, and metrological 
features of the countryside, but also the creation of specifically nomadic technologies.248 
Similarly, Mongolian author G. Mend-Ovoo, quoted by Diener, argues that the Mongolian 
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government should encourage technological improvements to herder’s lifestyles rather than 
encouraging herder settlement.  
It is obvious that nomadic civilization cannot remain as it was in the past. Why 
can’t nomads have electricity thanks to wind generators? Why can’t they have 
mobile phones? Why can’t we improve the traditional ger, so it is comfortable in 
all seasons? Then nomads would not settle down. Rather, movement would flow 
from cities to the countryside and busy city life would stand in admiration of 
nomadic civilization.249  
 
The technologies indicated by G. Mend-Ovoo are already available to herders and are frequently 
used by communities bridging the gap between traditional and modern herding practices. To an 
outside observer, the adaptation of modern technologies by herders might appear to indicate a 
desire to settle. However, many technological advances have been welcomed by herders as a way 
to embrace both modernity and herding traditions. For example, Mongolian nationalist 
Tseveendorj Nyam-Osor argues that Mongolia can only survive if it becomes a fully nomadic 
and decentralized state that returns to the values of Chinghis Khan.250 This “pure Mongolian 
state” is not fundamentally opposed to the types of technology supported by Mend-Ovoo. 
Instead, the “pure Mongolian state” would reject settlements that encumber the ability of herders 
to adapt to ever changing environments.251  
 The use and use of new technologies to adapt to Mongolia’s harsh climate is frequently 
traced back to Chinghis Khan and his adaptation of mobile technologies to invade Eurasia. From 
this history, Mongolians developed rhetoric of temperament, of the nimble as quick moving and 
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the meek as slow moving across the steppe.252 Descriptions of Mongolian herder’s movement 
across the steppe, and arguments made in support of this lifestyle, are advanced through a frame 
that I call movement-as-otor. Arguments made in this frame highlight the adaptability of 
Mongolian herders – including their use of modern technologies. This juxtaposition of modernity 
and tradition creates a complex argument that responds to the government’s arguments that 
justify settlement based on access to modern conveniences.  
Mongolian herder’s frame of “movement-as-otor” is derived from the word otor, a 
modified form otorlokh, used to describe the traditional movement by herders from a frequently 
visited pasture to a new pasture with superior grasses. Traditionally, otor was used to fatten 
animals by grazing in the best pasturelands. Families would move between seven and eight times 
a year, covering a distance of thirty to forty kilometers.253 Today, otor has taken on the form of a 
survival instinct – otor is a movement of herds to escape from environmental dangers. The chief 
danger comes from dzud, or harsh winters, that strike unexpectedly and require herds to move 
quickly to find warmer, more plentiful pastures.  
The risks presented by dzud feature heavily in Mongolian deliberations about herders. 
Earlier in this chapter I discussed the ways that dzud inspired the movement toward soum centers 
and at times created idle herders. I also began to explore the ways that the government of 
Mongolia interprets dzud as a prominent symptom of climate change, separate from overgrazing 
but still evidence to support of settlement projects.  
Herders have a more difficult time than government officials in classifying the cause and 
affects of dzud. In her long term analysis of herder land assessment, Fernandez-Gimenez noted 
                                                
252 Enkhtuvshin, “New Challenges,” 14. 
253 Enkhtuvshin, “New Challenges,” 15-17. 
  133 
that in 1994 and 1995 herders perceived changes to the pastures as temporary, reversible, or an 
inevitably process of earthly ageing. When she returned to Mongolia in 1999, Fernandez-
Gimenez found that in addition to earthly ageing, herders had also began to attribute declining 
pasturelands to the dual increase in animal herds and declining mobility of herder families. 
Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan provide an excerpt from their interview in Jinst and Bayan-
Ovoo from 1999 to explain these changes.  
The number of animals has increased a lot, the pasture has been used repeatedly, 
so the yield has been diminishing, the carrying capacity has declined and is 
seriously insufficient. It was all right when the sum had about 70,000 animals, but 
now it has over 100,000, therefore the pasture has been used repeatedly. This 
happens because some herdsmen do not have the means of transportation and 
their animals are fed from the same place where they stay in all four seasons, thus 
the pasture is degraded. No pasture is reserved out. This is the situation. In the 
past, when there was the collective, herdsmen moved a lot, even far away to 
Arkhangai aimag by truck. After the 1990s land started to deteriorate, pasture has 
been used a lot and pasture condition has worsened.  
It is not correct for people to stay in one place for four seasons. The pasture 
is getting worse because of overgrazing, staying for all four seasons. Also in some 
places there is some desertification — sand. I think it is because of staying in one 
place. This problem of staying in one place for all four seasons is something the 
administration must regulate or organize.254  
 
In this interview, herders reference transportation services available during the socialist period 
that allowed negdel kohlz members to quickly move between pasturelands. Today, herders lack 
state transportation between pasturelands, and they also lack the pack animals necessary to make 
the moves by themselves.255 As such, even if they wanted to, poorer herders cannot practice 
traditional otor. Additionally, as discussed earlier in this chapter, traditional safety nets such as 
monasteries and kinship ties were destroyed during the socialist purges, leaving poorer herders 
without sufficient support during a dzud. Because of these limitations, Mongolian herders may 
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be utilizing arguments made from a frame of movement-as-otor, but not actually practicing otor. 
This difficult position becomes more egregious when the government’s arguments, made from 
frames of bounded land and disappearance, utilize evidence of modern herder’s difficulties – 
such as the inability to practice otor – to justify settlement projects.  
The clash between Mongolian identity and actualized Mongolian policy is apparent in 
modern discourse and resistance. Sarlagty anticipates these resistances when he explains that all 
attempts to regulate herders will eventually fail because herders will not accept privatized lands 
or state authorized boundaries. 
Nomadic liberty is fundamental. Mongolians as a nomadic nation do not like 
boundaries or limits. The mentality and lifestyle determined by animal husbandry 
cannot simply recognize any limits in any dimensions, including time and space. 
Liberty for Mongolians means ‘no limits’. Many Mongolian folk tales and myths 
conflate time and space as they ignore the artificial boundaries imposed by these 
constructs. Unlimited nomadic activity means that there can be no private 
ownership of land. Land in a nomadic society is like the air or the ocean, it is 
impossible to divide and possess. It is not even public property, but simply a 
limitless expanse where we live and move. Nomads want to travel everywhere 
and across everything, without any limit. Can you imagine their thoughts if a 
stranger appeared before them, saying ‘This piece of land is mine’ and prohibiting 
them to go across it? To own a little piece of landmass of the universe, saying ‘It 
is mine’, sounds to them like ‘this cubic meter of air is mine, so, you cannot 
breath it!’ It is impossible to imagine.256  
 
Herders that reject state sponsored boundaries are likely to come into clash with government 
agents intent on enforcing and protecting bounded lands. Deiner explains that these clashes are 
predicated by misunderstandings by both herders and settled communities.  
Pastoral nomadic heritage is seen by many within Mongolia as the prime bonding 
agent of this unique society. Projecting the identity of “felt-tent dwellers” (tuur- 
gatan) to the entire society and positioning that identity against the sedentary “rest 
of the world”, Ch. Sharavtseren contends that “the Mongols divide the world into 
those who live within earth walls and those who dwell within felt walls. From the 
nomads’ point of view the sedentary lifestyle still appears rather miserable.” … 
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Members of this faction often equate modernization with westernization and warn 
against an irreversible cultural concession to the ways of the “other” (that is, the 
sedentary – global – agricultural – industrial).257  
 
The divisions between the government’s preference for the frame of disappearance, international 
attention to the frame of bounded land, and herder communities’ preference for a frame of 
movement-as-otor are demonstrated through an analysis of the Specially Protected Zones of 
Mongolia. 
4.4 CASE STUDY: EASTERN MONGOLIA 
Mongolian herders argue that traditional migration strategies such as otor are sufficient to 
maintain and protect the Mongolian steppe ecology. However, international conservation 
organizations have argued that the combined pressures of herder overgrazing and government 
investment in open-pit mining necessitate the creation and expansion of conservation zones. 
Using a frame of bounded land, these organizations support the same type of fortress 
conservation that I discussed in the Tanzanian and Kenyan chapters of this dissertation. The 
Mongolian government has responded to these arguments with a diversity of plans.258 While the 
government commonly concedes that herders were able to protect natural resources in the past, it 
still argues that today natural resources are mismanaged and must be protected by policies 
                                                
257 Diener, “Will New Mobilities,” 633-4. 
258 These plans include the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) of 1996 updated in 2000, the State 
Environmental/Ecological Policy of 1997, the National Plan of Action to Combat Desertification (NPACD), the 
Biodiversity Conservation Action Plan (BAP), and the National Plan of Action for Protected Areas, all developed 
under MNE auspices, and Mongolian Action Program for the 21st Century (MAP-21), with subordinated aimag 
development plans, developed by the National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSD). This list was 
compiled by D. Batbold and P. Suvd, Conservation of the Great Gobi Ecosystem and Its Umbrella Species Project 
(Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Nature and Environment, 2007), 14.  
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advanced through a frame of bounded land.259 These arguments are rooted in establishment of 
the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area to protect populations of Bactrian camel, Gobi bears, 
snow leopards, argali wild sheep, and Asiatic wild ass.260 While herder communities are not 
allowed to live in the park Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area, they do herd at the borders and 
buffer zones and are frequently blamed for pressures on both land and water supplies of the park.  
In Mongolia, the protection of camels and horses is difficult as both wild and 
domesticated herds live in close proximity. Each herd requires access to pasturelands and as 
those pasturelands shrink, so do herds. Threats also emerge from groundwater polluted by 
arsenic runoff from mining projects creating water shortages that affect human, wildlife, and 
mining populations.261 Batbold and Suvd report that water reserves have decreased by as much 
as sixty percent in the last few decades.262 Conservation organizations have then used these 
findings to justify the expansion of park boundaries and eviction of herding communities. While 
Mongolian legislation does provide protections for herders holding land contracts or leases, 
compensation is not provided for those occupying or moving through the land without a 
contract.263 
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Figure 8: Parkland Border at Ikh Nart, June 2013.264  
 
Despite extensive legal precedents and on-the-ground advocacy for specially protected 
areas, many Mongolian conservation zones are either unmarked or disregarded by herders. 
Recall Sarlagtay’s discussion regarding herder movement. Herder communities don’t see or 
respect borders, they always prefer to move across unmarked, open spaces. Even when faced 
with border-based disputes like those seen in Mongolia, herder communities have refused to 
concede their ontological position. However, organizations determining and regulating the parks 
utilize a frame of bounded land and attempt to regulate herder communities living within the 
buffer zones around the parks. Oftentimes these communities have a history of grazing in the 
                                                
264 This sign demarcates entry and exit to the Ikh Nart parkland. While this is technically a fortress 
conservation park, there are not any fences, walls, or rangers regulating entry or exit of humans, herds, or wildlife to 
and from the park. Allison Hahn, June 2013. 
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parks, but were displaced when park boundaries were set. Today, they continue to traverse park 
boundaries or engage in other activities such as hunting or holding herds larger than those 
approved by conservationists.265 As the picture above indicates, these acts of trespass do not 
require the cutting of fences or transgression of marked boundaries that we saw the Maasai 
preforming in Chapters Two and Three. 
Even though they do not have to cross fences, Mongolian herders are engaging in 
deliberations concerning the conflicting interpretations of the frame of movement-as-otor and 
bounded land. Batbold and Suvd utilize a frame of disappearance to suggest that herder 
communities can be encouraged to participate in conservation if they are involved in decision 
making, are aware of the reasons for conservation, graze animals communally, develop new 
groups, and create small enterprises that move them away from dependence on herding.266 Many 
of these policies are reminiscent of the socialist era collectivization and modernization schemes, 
each prefaced by a frame of disappearance. 
The expectation that herders will settle is reflected by the policies proposed by 
international conservation organizations that aim to radically expand the borders of their projects 
in Mongolia. For example, in 2001 conservation organizations announced a goal that by 2030 
thirty percent of Mongolia would be classified as specially protected areas. Problematically, 
these classifications would result in displacement of many herding communities who without 
formal land contracts would not be compensated for their losses.267 As a result of the clash 
                                                
265 In the summer of 2013 I had lunch with and interviewed three Mongolian herders who engaged in 
frequent wolf hunting in an attempt to better protect their herds. These men indicated that they knew some of the 
land on which they grazed and hunted was considered conservation lands, but they were not concerned with those 
divisions. What would the conservationists do, they wondered, since there was not way for them to prove that these 
herders were the ones shooting wolves or crossing into the parklands to graze their herds. 
266 Batbold and Suvd, “Conservation of the Great Gobi,” 15.  
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between conservationist’s arguments through a frame of disappearance, and herder’s arguments 
through a frame of movement-as-otor, we can expect that herders will protest such a significant 
expansion of specially protected areas.  
Reports from 1975 when the Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area was established indicate 
that herders vacated park lands, but do not tell us if any resistance occurred during those 
evictions.268 Later reports from the 1990s, when the Khustain Nuruu Nature Reserve was 
established to reintroduction of Przewalskii horse, indicate that conflicts occurred as the total 
area available for herders in Altanbulag soum was restricted and herders lost access to traditional 
winter and spring camps. While Mongolian responses to eviction due to the expansion of 
conservation grounds appear tame in comparison to evictions in Tanzania, Kenya, and China, it 
is unclear if this is a reflection of herder tradition, of if Mongolian herders have simply ignored 
eviction orders. 
Conservationist’s reports indicate that they are engaging displaced communities, or 
communities living in buffer zones, through a complex set of community building initiatives and 
associated terminology. For example, the Swiss Development Corporation uses the term 
“pastoral user groups” (PUG), to describe multiple herders from a geographical area that are 
encouraged to engage with collective action to meet pasture management and livelihood goals.269 
This term has had some traction with western groups who claim PUGs result in female 
empowerment and promote better communication between herders270 However, it is important to 
note that while these development groups are keenly interested in the participation of local 
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herders, the national government is less equipped to or interested in gathering information 
regarding local responses to national policies. Additionally, while local herders are encouraged 
to participate, it is unclear what end is desired from that participation and if all members of the 
herding community are invited. PUGs are legitimated through a frame of bounded land – they 
are user groups of specific pieces of land, and recalling the justification for development 
projects, the frame of disappearance may be active as communities are encouraged to be 
empowered, and through that empowerment decide that their family should settle. Yet, 
Addison’s team from the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization of 
Australia has produced a body of interviews with PUG members that demonstrate the ways 
geographic boundaries, not family, community, or tradition, result in delayed in decision-making 
and unenforceable regulations.271 
Addison et al. have argued that programs such as PUG fail due to their 
compartmentalization of Mongolian identity that blinds policymakers to the complexity of 
Mongolian herding practices.272 One of the primary points of conflict is the herder’s frame of 
movement-as-otor. For Mongolian herders, otor addresses the physical, economic, and 
psychological need for movement across vast pastures as compared to international pressures for 
a transition from a herd based to economic based economy. 
Conflicts have become increasingly complex as conservationists and herder communities 
encounter mining corporations who have designed extraction policies for the same areas. Often 
times the desires of all three groups overlap, as they do in the Onon-Balji Say National 
                                                
271 For example, one herder reported, “I am the leader of [gobi-type PUG]. The group was founded in 2007 
but most herders have left since then and moved to [another aimag]. We plan to build a new well but we’re waiting 
until all herders are here.” (Gobi-type PUG herder #14, 30 years herding). Addison et al., “Do Pasture User 
Groups,” 41. 
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Conservation Park that ranges through Khentii and Dornod aimags over 400,000 hectares. This 
park is known both for its taiga and arid steppes and gold deposits. Reports from the World Bank 
in 2006 indicated that the Russian Federation has begun either investigation or extraction in its 
section of the parklands.273 It is expected that Mongolia will also begin investigation and 
extraction of these transnational gold deposits. 
The intermingling of conservation and mining in Mongolia has produced a complex set 
of policies and experiments that aim to maximize benefits from both industries. As demonstrated 
by the following statement, a good deal of effort has gone into designing programs around 
mining industries and potentials. For example, example, Evan Girvetz’s Nature Conservancy 
team argued in 2012 that,  
Although mining and oil and gas extraction constitute a real threat to the 
grassland ecosystems and the pastoralist herders, they also represent an 
opportunity. With a huge portion of Mongolia leased for exploration, these 
extractive activities will occur regardless of what conservation activities are 
established on the ground. The Nature Conservancy is applying a “Development 
by Design” approach that blends landscape conservation planning with the 
mitigation hierarchy (“avoid, minimize, restore, or offset”) to identify areas where 
mining should be avoided, and to design sites for compensatory mitigation, or 
offsets, for those mining and development projects that proceed.274  
 
While programs such as “Development by Design” are indeed better than open-pit mining, they 
still provide little space for herder input, let alone herding communities’ rejection of mining 
projects. Instead, most attention is turned to ensuring that Mongolia’s mineral wealth is well 
spent. International participants in these deliberations acknowledge that mining might be at odds 
with herding traditions, yet they also indicate that it is neither their place nor their desire to 
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determine the future of herding in Mongolia.  
 For example, in a 2010 exchange between Director of the United Nations Development 
Program, Helen Clark, and geographer Troy Sternberg, Clark stated: “Mongolia is not poor. How 
it decides to use its mineral wealth is the question. The decision as to whether to strengthen, and 
perhaps salvage, pastoralism or let it retreat is in appropriate hands – the elected representatives 
of the Mongolian people.”275 Clark’s statement embraces the democratic transition in Mongolia 
while implying that Mongolian herders are able to voice their opinions regarding the stability and 
future of herding. Problematically, many herders report that they are unable to participate in 
deliberative forums regarding the future of their communities. 
The question in response to statements such as Clark’s is if herding families have spoken 
in a democratic way indicating that they no longer wish to participate in herding, or if herding 
families lack the pathways to maintain their traditional lifestyles. A complaint filed in the 
European Parliament, indicates that herders are now settling for lack of any other alternatives. 
Ms. Ts. Tsetsegmaa, Chair of Shuteen Gaviluut NGO, said on behalf of the group 
of complainants, “companies do not recognize the fact that reducing the size of 
pastures, as well as fracturing and contaminating them with dust and noise, is 
having a negative impact on our livelihoods and health. Internal parts of animals 
we raise are no longer consumable, meaning we have lost a significant part of our 
traditional diet. Soon animals will completely lose their commercial value. Most 
herding families are forced to reduce the number of livestock bringing it down to 
less than the number needed for subsistence. We have nowhere to turn now… The 
grievances of the herders are a result of inadequate public consultations and 
impact assessments for the two projects: the Ukhaa Khudag Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) focused on the advantages of the railroad over 
the road infrastructure, while the Oyu Tolgoi assessment is retroactive, lacking 
operational plans, and focusing on mine construction at the time when 
construction is almost completed and production is beginning.276  
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Today, Mongolia is focused on ecological sustainability rather than land privatization. However, 
Kamimura argues that the underlying assumption of the tragedy of the commons still directs 
international policy making277 Scholars and development planners frequently cite threats against 
Mongolia from both climate and herding changes to justify inventive new strategies.278  
Some local communities have attempted to utilize national legislation to preserve 
traditional lifestyles. For example, Article 16 of the Land Law and Articles 17 and 24 of the 
Minerals Law allow for soums to designate “land for special needs.” After receiving this 
designation, good pasturelands, water reserves, and forests will be protected from both mining 
licenses and conservation restrictions. However, Suzuki’s 2013 report indicates that only one 
soum attempted to designate a “land for special needs,” and in the year following that 
designation the aimag assembly canceled the soum’s designation.279 Other attempts to protect 
land, such as upgrading reserves to National Park status have produced conflicts between 
officials, herders, and conservation workers. In their 2001 report for Landesa Rural Development 
Institute, legal scholars Tim Hanstad and Jennifer Duncan indicate that conflicts are occurring in 
central, southern, and northern Mongolian aimags.280 Part of the problem emerging in these 
conflicts is that citizen training in public deliberation has yet to catch up with Mongolia’s 
democratic transition. In the last section of this chapter, I examine an attempt to model and 
develop public deliberation in Mongolia by analyzing the Soros Foundation Forum, a nationally 
televised program that attempted to encourage public deliberation. 
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4.5 A LOT TO THINK ABOUT: DELIBERATION IN MONGOLIA 
The first Mongolian televised public deliberations were funded by the Soros Foundation’s Open 
Society Institute (OSI). Called the OSI Forum debates, these programs, filmed in 2005 and 2006, 
sought to establish a non-secular urban deliberation. This under-construction public sphere, 
imagined by the OSI and authenticated by participants, worked to incorporate rural participants 
who are labeled as by profession, advocacy organization, or location of their herds. The types of 
speech encouraged in these deliberations indicated a transition from socialist to democratic 
norms of public argument, and an absence of many of the hallmarks of Mongolian traditional 
speechmaking. For example, Mongolian Fulbright Fellow and Professor of English, J. 
Munkhbileg indicates that the hallmarks of a good Mongolian public speaker include the use of 
quotations from famous Mongolian poets and religious texts.281 Instead of quotations or religious 
texts, participants in the OSI debates present personal narratives, statistical findings, and policy 
analysis. The role and effect of these deliberations on Mongolian arguments regarding identity, 
conservation, and land, are apparent in the 2005 episode, Mongolian Gold. 
The OSI Forum Mongolian Gold begins with the moderator’s introduction:  
Today, at the “Forum” we’ll talk about Mongolian gold. We’ll talk about bright 
and dark sides of gold production and mining sector. We’ll be addressing the 
impact of development of this sector on Mongolia’s growth and our lives. As 
usual, before we begin let’s see what our editors have to say.282  
 
While the journalist has been tasked with presenting both the “bright and dark” sides of 
mining, the predominant images are of environmental destruction. The accompanying narration 
adheres to Nyam-Osor’s explanation that Mongolia is experiencing problems due to the 
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government’s emphasis on settlement. In this introduction, the Forum’s journalists compare 
Mongolian mining with a prolonged war. 
Now the sacred land looks like this. Watching this one might think of 
consequences of war and bombs. Local people say, now it looks like the surface 
of the moon. They say, before it was a land of stupas and green grass with a wind 
blowing cool through the valleys. Ten years ago, gold seekers arrived at the river 
valley with heavy machinery, just out of the blue.283  
 
While the use of deposit and placer mining are discussed, viewers of the televised Forum are told 
that both are dangerous and that these mining activities, not herders, are to blame for the drying 
up of Mongolian lakes and waterways. This discussion, presented using a frame of bounded land, 
invites community members to narrate the lack of water, mining companies’ refusal to follow 
rehabilitation plans, protests at mining sites, and complaints against company directors that have 
bought Hummers while exploiting local communities. Herders then narrate their protest activities 
in March 2002 against mining companies:  
We had a sit-in here when the gold miners came over from their diggings in 
Nahiatin in March, 2002. The miners poured earth on the heads of women. Men 
were beaten with truncheon on this very spot…Then we decided to put small gers 
and did so. Security personnel of the mining company equipped with guns and 
truncheons demolished our gers and were almost about to shoot people in case 
they resisted. We were fighting against digging here in this place the same way as 
we did before. They didn’t care about our resistance and kept digging until there 
were no ground squirrels and marmots left, at all. If you think about this it is 
really hard to believe. It’s a real disaster and it just tempts you into crying.284 
 
The inclusion of protest narratives without providing equal time to Mining companies 
indicates a bias amongst the journalistic team producing the introduction to the Mongolian Gold 
Forum. This introduction demonstrates one of many attempts to mold the debate surrounding 
Mongolian mining and environmental health, creating an expectation for deliberation about the 
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role of protest, environmental effects, or community deliberation concerning mining policy. Yet, 
the moderator’s response to this introduction illustrates the difficulties involved in creating 
deliberative forums. Instead of exploring the depiction of mining as war presented in the 
introduction, the moderator apologizes, “Our editor may have touched too much the dark side of 
the issue. Now, let’s start with the bright side of the matter.”285 At this point, discussion turns to 
the President and Vice President of Boroo Gold who are asked how gold mining will benefit 
Mongolians. The response, given by Paul Corpi, President of Boroo Gold, is that gold mining 
creates jobs and bolsters the Mongolian economy through an expected output of 7.5 tons of gold 
in one year. Further, Mr. Corpi indicates that his company has spent 32 billion tugrugs (23 
million USD) to exploit this gold deposit, he admits that his company has also not paid any taxes 
to the Mongolian State Budget as a result of their stability contract.286  
All of Mr. Corpi’s arguments are based on economic gain and only consider the role of 
urban Mongolians in decision-making processes. It is my argument that President Enkhbayar’s 
reliance on arguments made using a frame of disappearance have opened space for arguments 
such as Mr. Corpi’s. Recall that President Enkhbayar argues “in order to survive, we have to stop 
being nomads.” Mr. Corpi’s proposals give a warrant to this argument, demonstrating how 
Mongolians can survive after they have settled and are now welcomed mining projects. While 
some deliberation does occur around the validity of the mining contract, much of that is 
concerned with the payment of royalties to the Mongolian government – an argument that 
assumes that utilizes a frame of bounded land to deliberate on the proper payment for mineral 
extraction. The limitations created by these arguments are apparent when the moderator invites 
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countryside participants to join the deliberation. 
NGO representatives and citizens of local areas work quickly in an attempt to challenge 
the terms of the debate. For example, Ts. Munkhbayar, a member of an unnamed NGO 
introduces the need to highlight environmental over economic concerns in the mining debate.  
I am glad to be part of the Forum because I also have things to say. We heard 
repeatedly that incomes and profits from gold are very useful. I would like to 
approach the issue from another point of view. Why? Because we think we are 
taking much more losses then benefits - the consequences of which we are simply 
not aware of and not able to imagine. Don’t we see the bad consequences every 
day?287  
 
While Munkhbayar successfully calls for a more complex deliberation, he falls short of 
expanding the deliberation beyond alternatives already suggested by the moderator. Specifically, 
when asked how he would change the mining debate, Munkhbayar proposes changes in mining 
technology. In this response, Munkhbayar reaffirms the government’s use of arguments from a 
frame of bounded land, as well as a frame of disappearance, because he accepts and anticipates 
that mining will continue to occur in Mongolia. While the moderator does invite discussion of 
compensation from herders who have lost lands, water supplies, and herds due to mining 
exploration, all of these remedies are also predicated by the government’s arguments. Herder’s 
arguments, such as those made through a frame of movement-as-otor which were explored 
earlier in this chapter, are absent from this deliberation.  
Throughout the Mongolian Gold Forum attention is paid to the destruction of the 
environment. However, herders are not given space to make similar claims regarding their 
culture and traditions. While the Mongolian Gold Forum begins with an expectation that herder’s 
arguments are valuable to the debate regarding mining in Mongolia, their experiences and 
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arguments quickly give way to questions of jobs, revenue, and environmental management. 
We might better understand the way that environmental hazards are deliberated about in 
Mongolia by focusing on environmental risks in Mongolia. The Mongolian Gold Forum begins 
with a herder’s narration of environmental destruction, which is quickly forgotten by the 
moderator when he invites Paul Corpi to speak about the benefits of mining. However, when 
environmental damages are again addressed, this time by Deputy Chairman of the Mineral 
Resource and Oil Authority, D. Jargalsaikhan, the moderator encourages discussion about the 
environment. Jargalsaikhan begins this discussion when he stated,  
Today, we face many cases of ignoring environmental protection issues, entities 
that are not following their duties and feel no responsibility for damaging nature. 
This situation is likely to become a normal thing. Ironically, we have our own 
control and inspection system which no one cares about. In reality, inspectors go 
around and fine directors of those entities who neglect protection of nature but as 
soon as the inspectors leave the entities start their wrong doings as before. I hope 
the State Professional Inspection Department will join us in this effort and 
improve the system.288  
 
In this statement, Jargalsaikhan discusses the same environmental destruction as presented in 
the introduction narrative. However, his argument is made from a governmental frame of 
disappearance and does not address the effects on both herders and the environment. This 
division of human and environmental problems is similar to the division that I investigated in 
the Tanzanian and Kenyan chapters when government programs are produced to protect 
specific locations, but through a frame of bounded land, the human communities also living on 
those lands are absent from the deliberations. When herders are considered in these 
deliberations, it is from an expectation of poverty, which is then solved when the government 
or corporations such as Boro Gold promise to train and hire local community members to work 
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in their mines. Sociologist John Thomson explains this difference in attention and voice when 
he states, 
we are aware that individuals speak with differing degrees of authority, that words 
are loaded with unequal weights, depending on who utters them and how they are 
said, such that some words uttered in certain circumstances have a force and a 
conviction that they would not have elsewhere.289 
 
Following Thompson’s analysis of linguistic productions, the unequal weights apparent in the 
Mongolian Gold Forum are apparent when herder’s arguments about the environment are 
ignored, but Deputy Chairman of the Mineral Resource and Oil Authority is given airtime and 
deliberation. Herder’s difficulty participating in deliberative spaces such as the Mongolian Gold 
Forum reflect the dominance of the government’s argument based on a frame of disappearance. 
Instead of discussing a return to herding, these deliberations focus on the need for economic 
wealth and stability.  
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Figure 9: Mongolian Ger District.290 
 
Those arguments are bolstered by the appearance of “ger districts” around cities, in which 
recently settled herders live in traditional homes, without herds, while they attempt to find jobs 
and acquire social services. Diener argues that while ger district residents might return to the 
countryside in the summer, “true knowledge of mobile pastoralist ways is waning among the 
growing number of urban dwellers.”291 Based on the frame of disappearance, it is understandable 
that the OSI Forum moderator includes some herders in the deliberation but concludes the debate 
by focusing on economic gains for Mongolia. 
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Mining is, indeed, one of the most important sectors for Mongolian economy. 
Therefore, I don’t think we should limit ourselves with critiques only. There is a 
lot to think about. As we live in a civil society we have to come to a resolution, 
anyway. Otherwise, our next generation might say: our ancestors didn’t get things 
strait. I am sure, they would not say: this was right or that was wrong.292 
 
While the importance of deliberation is noted, and a future-based perspective encouraged, the 
inclusion of herder’s arguments, which was possible at the beginning of the deliberation, is 
absent at the end of the one-hour Forum.  
The limitation placed on arguments made from a frame of movement-as-otor points to 
serious limitations in Mongolian deliberation. Civic engagement has increased as Mongolian 
journalists harshly criticize international corporations, yet many Mongolians also allege that 
foreigners are interfering with parliamentary decisions over mineral policy. One of these many 
interferences is a solidification of the frame of bounded land which has moved to a prominent 
position in Mongolian deliberations as the frame of disappearance is not only accepted but 
assumed to have already occurred.  
Although the OSI Forums only aired from 2005 to 2006, the norms established in these 
deliberations have emerged in other public deliberation events. In 2009 The Citizen’s Hall 
(irgenii tanhim) was established with assistance from the German Embassy and the OSI. The 
resulting deliberations have focused on government policies and annual “town hall” meetings 
with the Mongolian president. Attendance is limited to a government-approved board of 
government officials and outside experts and the resulting decisions are transferred directly to 
the president.293 While the public is invited to participate by sending a letter or email to the 
coordinators, their direct participation is limited to open discussion meetings in Ulaan Baatar, 
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and therefor limited to only urban residents.  
Later, in 2010 the television program Bi Irgen (Citizen) began to air on an educational 
television channel. While the earliest episodes of Bi Irgen closely followed the OSI Forums by 
beginning with journalist reports and then moving to deliberation, they now move immediately 
into deliberation. The model of deliberation has also changed, from a large body of invited 
guests to the current Bi Irgen format where a presenter moderates questions from the audience to 
a panel of experts. While this audience includes a greater diversity of individuals than those 
attending the OSI Forums, it also reinforces a division between the expert and the audience. Bi 
Irgen audiences do include herders and monks, easily identified by dels (traditional clothing of 
Mongolian herders) or religious robes, yet none of the experts are monks or herders. Indeed, 
these visual markers of difference serve to reinforce the norm of expertise by allowing the 
viewer to identify the expert (in a suit) and the non-expert (in a del). This division between 
herder and expert further supports the government’s arguments from the frame of disappearance. 
We can see that herders still exist in Mongolia, but we are also informed that they are not experts 
or equal participants in deliberations about countryside policy. 
The development and modeling of deliberative forums in Mongolia has the potential to 
produce new arguments and equal part deliberation between herders and settled communities. 
The need for these deliberations has been examined in this chapter as I examined the historic 
divisions between herders and the Qing, socialist, independent and modern democratic 
government of Mongolia. From this examination, I have investigated the ways that modern 
Mongolians, who intend to continue living as herders, have used a frame of movement-as-otor to 
advance arguments about Mongolian herder identity. From this study, quilting points between 
the experiences of the Maasai and Mongolians become apparent. Each community is faced with 
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pressures from government, development, and conservation organizations to settle and 
modernize. These similar arguments, made from a frame of disappearance, argue that there is no 
place for herders in the modern world. However, as this chapter has illustrated, Mongolian 
herders intend to continue their traditional lifestyles. Today they are using tools ranging from 
illegal hunting to participation in televised deliberations to advance arguments from a frame of 
movement-as-otor. In the next chapter I will examine the cross-border efficacy of these 
rhetorical moves by examining the arguments and protests occurring in Inner Mongolia, China. 
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5.0  INNER MONGOLIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the frontier zone between China and Mongolia, the homeland of Chinghis Khan, and site the 
most northern fragments of the Great Wall, Inner Mongolia is both the most rural frontier and the 
most fought over grassland in Central Asia. Today, the historic and cultural narrative used by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) depicts a continual history of Han Chinese control of Inner 
Mongolia with two exceptions, when foreigners invaded China during the Yuan and Qing 
dynasties. In the previous chapter I discussed the Qing dynasty’s division of Mongolia and Inner 
Mongolia and how this legacy has worked to stabilize the frames of bounded land and 
disappearance. That same history is also relevant to this chapter’s analysis of Inner Mongolia. 
Additionally, in Inner Mongolia the Qing division of land produced a rhetoric of annexation, 
colonization, segregation, assimilation, and integration for Mongolian lands and peoples into the 
larger People’s Republic of China. 
In this chapter I investigate how the demarcation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Region in 1947 signaled the government’s preference for arguments made using a frame of 
bounded land. Then, tracing the path of argumentation during the Cultural Revolution, I assess 
how visual proleptic elegies in artifacts such as propaganda posters help illustrate the ways that 
the frame of disappearance has been articulated and presented to Mongolian herders in Inner 
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Mongolia. As in the previous chapter, I explore how the frame of movement-as-otor competes 
rhetorically with these official propaganda efforts, to explore Mongolian acts of resistance to 
People’s Republic of China programs, and examine how the government has so entrenched its 
frame of bounded land that government policy makers and environmental scientists have limited 
success reconciling their projects with herder’s arguments. Finally, I analyze the ways that Inner 
Mongolian herders have turned to social media to organize and report on their protests against 
the People’s Republic of China. By focusing on one such incident, the death of a herder named 
Mergen in 2011, I explore the ways that the government’s frames of bounded land and 
disappearance have influenced the development of new protest tactics that articulate and 
demonstrate the herder’s frame of movement-as-otor. 
5.2 MINZU 
According to Gabriel Lafitte, Australian academic and development policy consultant to the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the PRC holds a deep-seated mistrust of nomadic communities. 
[Governments of China have] long mistrusted the mobility of the nomads of its 
northern and western edges. The mobility of the nomads was always the core of 
imperial fears and strategies. Mobility was an ever-present problem for successive 
dynasties facing their nomadic neighbors so closely to the north, and so far away 
in the west. Centuries of managing the risks arising from mobility left a deep 
imprint on Chinese minds, and a major repertoire of governmentalities to deal 
with it.294 
 
According to this analysis, which connects the modern PRC with earlier Chinese governments, 
the mobility of herders prompted emperors to build walled palaces, raise armies, and attempt to 
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settle herder communities. One of the longest lasting monuments to these pressures, the Great 
Wall of China, demonstrates the historic clash between the government’s frame of bounded land 
and herder’s frame of movement-as-otor. This wall simultaneously divides and demarcates the 
space that herders continually breach by traversing pathways around, below, and in spite of the 
wall. In the past, Chinese courts paid tribute to herder and nomadic communities such as 
Mongolians and Tibetans in exchange for protection or regulation of herder and nomadic 
movements across state spaces.295 However, these networks of exchange that were developed in 
the Yuan dynasty in 1271 experienced radical revisions at the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912. 
Writing in 1935, Owen Lattimore, professor of Chinese Studies at Leeds, considered the 
popular characterizations of Inner Mongolian identity in his essay, On the Wickedness of Being 
Nomads:  
The Mongols live under a form of society that was established as a compromise 
between the political requirements of the Manchu empire, and the social and 
economic traditions of the Mongols themselves. Each Mongol tribal group 
occupies a territory with well-defined frontiers. Within this territory, all of the 
land belongs to all of the tribe. People move about freely, because in an arid 
climate it is not practical to keep animals grazing always on the same fields. Most 
families in Inner Mongolia have one summer camping-place, to which they return 
year after year, and one winter place, which is even more permanent, because it is 
convenient to accumulate a store of fuel for the winter. These two camps are often 
only a few miles apart. No individual holds any property in land. There being no 
‘capitalist’ monopoly of land, wealth and social advancement depend primarily on 
the energy and competence of the individual. If he manages his livestock with 
skill, the natural increase of every year is a clear increase in wealth; he does not 
have to lay out capital for the purchase of pastureland on which to feed his herds. 
Nor can the rich man, by asserting private ownership of land, prevent the poor 
man from grazing his flocks on it. Under such conditions a prince can be poor and 
ignorant (and often is) and a commoner can be rich and educated.296  
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The well-defined frontiers of Mongolians described by Lattimore in 1935 were officially named 
as the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), the first autonomous region of the 
People’s Republic of China. Anthropologist Uradyn Erden Bulag notes that as the first 
Autonomous Region, IMAR policy became a model for policies applied to other non-Han 
Chinese peoples in Tibet, Xinjiang, Guanxi, and Ningxia. Today, Tibetans and Uyghurs use 
Inner Mongolia as a reference point to predict future policies in their regions.297 The boundaries 
set for the IMAR in May 1947 marked a division from both the independent Mongolia and 
historical Qing policies. Prior to 1912, the Qing Empire encouraged migration and settlement in 
Mongolian regions and developed railways to move both colonists and supplies.298 This influx of 
non-Mongolian ethnicities resulted in ethnic tensions which were negotiated both at the 
emergence of the PRC and with the development of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.  
As an autonomous region of China, the IMAR is designed to grant specific decision-
making powers to local nationalities. As anthropologist Michael Zukosky indicates, “one of the 
last lines of the National Grassland Law states that, according to ‘local special characteristics,’ 
autonomous regions should create and implement by-laws.”299 These provisions enact a bounded 
land argument frame – it is the region that is autonomous, not the Mongolian people. As such, 
the local special characteristics of the IMAR are tied to locations, not ethnic traditions such as 
nomadic or seminomadic movement of herders. The resulting division of this land, coupled with 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution has produced multiple modern conflicts over identity, culture, 
and land tenure.  
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Modern conflicts are traced to the Cultural Revolutions’ Red Guards – Han Chinese 
youth sent from cities to learn from peasants – that arrived in the IMAR in August 1966 from 
Beijing and Shanghai and immediately began attacking Mongolian traditions. Clashes between 
Mongolians and the Red Guards on August 10, 1966 when in addition to violent protest, 
Mongolians began to secretly organize cultural and religious resistances. To ease mounting 
tensions, the Red Guards were ordered to assist in the Mongolians’ harvest. However, many left 
the harvests and instead turned their attention toward attacking Buddhist Lamas and the pre-
revolutionary leadership in an attempt to root out underground resistance organizations. Conflicts 
between the Red Guards and Mongolian nationalists continued as Mongolians were accused of 
supporting isolationism and aligning with both Mongolia and the USSR. Mongolians with higher 
education or positions of high status in Buddhist temples were specially targeted for persecution 
including forced confessions and public trials. At this time, all ties with international 
organizations, media, and publications to be considered capitalist were cut.300  
In April 1969, as a response to ethnic clashes and reorganization of the central 
government, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was sub-divided and land was distributed 
to Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Gansu, and Ningxia providences. These subdivisions made 
Mongolians ethnic minorities in their traditional lands. The result was not only an upset in the 
balance of power of local governments, but also the creation of an opportunity for the PRC to 
send national troops to Inner Mongolia under the auspices of building new government offices 
and networks.  
During this period of Cultural Revolution, between 350,000 and 790,000 Inner 
Mongolians were arrested. Anthropologist William Jankowiak contextualizes the effects of these 
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arrests in his interview with a Mongolian informant who noted, “there was not a single Mongol 
who did not lose a close relative or friend during the Cultural Revolution.”301 Based on his own 
survey, Jankowiak estimates that one out of every four Mongolians in IMAR was arrested during 
the Cultural Revolution. 
The Cultural Revolution officially ended in 1976 with the death of Chairman Mao. At 
that time, the PRC admitted to the deaths of 9.32 million citizens. Later, in 1995 President Jiang 
Zemin increased the official number of deaths during the Cultural Revolution to 35 million.302 
International estimates have maintained that the true number is closer to 100 million. Journalist 
Jasper Becker indicates that an investigation into the true number of deaths and related 
persecutions has not occurred because the numbers would be too embarrassing for the current 
PRC leadership. Embarrassment could occur because many members of the National People’s 
Congress served as Red Guards, and top officials began their careers as regional propaganda 
officers.303 While quantifying the number of deaths and arrests during this period may be 
impossible, artifacts such as propaganda posters can provide a lens into the ideology at play in 
IMAR during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Whereas the other chapters of this dissertation have focused on archival documents and 
historical narratives of the critical period of transition between herding communities and 
colonizing forces, to analyze the IMAR I will include a brief analysis of the role of propaganda 
posters in public deliberation. This discussion is necessary as many of the archival documents 
regarding the Cultural Revolution are still sealed. Photography of and foreign travel were 
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prohibited to Inner Mongolia so there are few independent accounts from this time. Additionally, 
as discussed previously in this chapter, many Mongolians either did not survive or still will not 
give interviews about this period of transition.304  
Propaganda posters were used during the Cultural Revolution to make long-term, 
complex arguments about the disappearance of Mongolian herder identity. In each poster, the 
PRC assumes that settlement is the best option for herder communities. These images map the 
progression of herder communities’ encounters with the PRC, unity of Inner Mongolian and 
Chinese territory, the influx of industrial and agricultural goods in to Inner Mongolia, the 
establishment of schools and militias, and finally Inner Mongolians living in modern, industrial 
cities. Reading these images as evidence of a planned trajectory of development and 
modernization identifies the ways the PRC used visual proleptic elegies to communicate 
expectations of settlement within Inner Mongolia, communicative practices that resulted in 
reinforcement of the frame of disappearance for structuring public argument surrounding the 
herder controversy. 
Propaganda posters have been used by the PRC as tools of political discourse that 
reproduce, deploy, and relay the expected power hierarchies, political representations, and new 
social norms. These posters served as weather vanes for illiterate audiences who interpreted 
pictorial spaces to measure political climates and trends. Although posters can be used to 
represent the desires of the state, viewers can also use these images to understand both dominant 
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and suppressed narratives. Or as sociologist Xing-Hua Lu suggests, viewers read these posters as 
a double agency that betrays itself as attempting to hide behind an ideological screen.305 
While much work has been done on the role of political posters during the Cultural 
Revolution, little attention has been turned to the ways herding communities were portrayed, 
affected, or persuaded by these posters.306 Visual productions from the Cultural Revolution 
provide information not only about a specific period in history, but also contextualize clashes in 
modern China. While the PRC contends that Inner Mongolia and Tibet have always been a part 
of China, these propaganda posters indicate that Mongolians and Tibetans have not always 
identified with Han Chinese culture and traditions. By mapping the subtle changes in symbols 
and framing in these images it is possible to understand how the PRC has wanted to persuade 
Mongolians to identify as ethnicities of the PRC. 
To further explore this issue, the following analysis considers one illustrative propaganda 
poster, the 1975 image “Let Good News Spread Across the Grassland.” This poster was 
produced by the Inner Mongolian Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, a 
subsidiary branch of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party in 
Beijing. The Central Propaganda Department oversees both propaganda and education and is 
divided into internal (domestic) and external (foreign) branches. Within each branch, propaganda 
productions are further divided into political, economic, cultural, and social propaganda. Staff 
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are selected from academic party members trained in the newest political ideology.307 In 1975 
the division of the Central Propaganda Department insured that the poster “Let Good News 
Spread Over the Grassland” was out of view from foreigners. However, Internet and 
international archives such as the Institute for Social History and the Ann Tompkins and Lincoln 
Cushing China Poster Archive at the University of California Berkeley have made these images 
available to international researchers and promise to provide a rich body of primary 
documents.308 
This poster is one of the few artifacts remaining from the Inner Mongolian Cultural 
Revolution and a critical hallmark for mapping the changes and negotiations occurring in state 
sponsored and outsider Mongolian culture. The viewer’s gaze is drawn to the young Mongolian 
woman in the poster foreground. Dressed in a pink del (Mongolian traditional robe), she is riding 
a Chinese Post Office motorcycle and displaying a copy of a Mandarin language newspaper. In 
the background power cables cut across the once smooth steppe and lead in the same direction of 
the path she is traveling with the motorcycle. In the distance are two herders on horseback and 
beyond them a herd of white animals. The image is captioned, in small print, using both 
Mandarin characters and Mongolian classical script, both translating in English as “Let the Good 
News Spread Over the Grasslands,” the title of this poster. The inclusion of both Mandarin 
characters and Mongolian text follows PRC policy of including both the national and local 
languages in propaganda publications. However, the use of Mandarin characters, without 
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accompanying Mongolian script, on the newspaper may indicate the states’ preference for 
monolingual communication. 
For Inner Mongolian audiences in 1975 this image endorses the use of modernized 
Mongolian traditional clothing, a puzzling style choice given living conditions in the Mongolian 
steppe. A Mongolian woman, tasked with milking cows, cleaning, cooking, caring for children, 
and collecting dung for cooking fires, would never select a pink del. The garment would be 
instantly damaged and impossible to return to the desired color. Additionally, a woman riding 
motorcycle through the steppe would risk being covered in dust, equally difficult to clean from 
pink clothing. Finally, traditional Mongolian colors include red, blue, green, and yellow, but not 
pink. Nevertheless, pink, the color commonly worn by Han and Manchu women during the Qing 
Dynasty, is the color that early PRC artists selected for the character of this poster and almost 
every other poster featuring a Mongolian woman. Further inquiry, beyond the scope of the 
present study, may well be warranted to determine whether these portrayals indeed reflect 
changing fashion trends in Inner Mongolia or instead constitute an attempt by poster producers to 
map their own cultural norms onto Mongolian herder communities. 
In either case, the poster clearly enacts the frame of disappearance, depicting as the new 
normal a Mongolian woman leaving the home, being able to travel further than her herds, and 
returning with Chinese language publications. This woman’s attire, luggage, motorcycle, and 
path all point to the dramatic transition from herder to settled life ways – yielding a visual 
proleptic elegy. 
This visual proleptic elegy sheds light on the ways the Chinese Communist Party worked 
to standardize Mongolian race, culture, and gender. The information conveyed in these images 
pertained to both Mongolians, who were informed of state approved Mongolian norms, and non-
  164 
Mongolians who could define themselves in opposition to the image. Posters such as “Let the 
Good News Spread Over the Grasslands” provide a window into one of the most contentious 
questions during this time, the identity of Mongols within the Chinese nation state. These 
conflicts centered on the emergence of Marxist and Maoist literature in China. Marxist and 
Maoist scholars have had difficulty classifying Mongols as pastoralists, peasants, or land-owners 
while simultaneously deliberating on questions of ownership of land by individuals, 
communities, and the state. To contend with the ethnic complexities of the modern Chinese state, 
the central government developed a concept of minzu or ethnicity.309 Uradyn Bulag, professor of 
Social Anthropology at Cambridge, argues that minzu has been used to construct Chinese ethnic 
policy through a hierarchy of minority and majority ethnicity. When the Chinese Communist 
Party came to power, more than 400 minzu where identified, but that number was quickly 
reduced to fifty-five recognized ethnic groups. The process of identifying, grouping, and 
reducing ethnicities has a long history and criticism extends beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. In this text, I am primarily concerned with the way in which minzu were identified 
and tied to specific pieces of land, and then associated with a specific cultural composition. This 
predication of culture to landedness highlights the government’s tendency to refract Mongolian 
identity through a frame of bounded land. These arguments eschew traditional ties to migration 
patterns, herding patterns, or cross-cultural networks by tying communities to specific locations 
and then crafting policies based on those locations. This construction is similar to that used when 
creating the IMAR, however it is more surprising as the IMAR was a division of land into 
provinces, and this is a division of ethnicities by lands into ethnic groups.  
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The implications of minzu policy are apparent in modern PRC where minority ethnicities 
qualify for special privileges. Article 4 of the PRC constitution explains the interworking of 
these privileges alongside guaranteed equality amongst all nationalities; 
All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal. The state protects 
the lawful rights and interests of the minority ethnic groups and upholds and 
develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of 
China's ethnic groups. Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group 
are prohibited; any act that undermines the unity of the ethnic groups or instigates 
division is prohibited. 
The state assists areas inhabited by minority ethnic groups in accelerating their 
economic and cultural development according to the characteristics and needs of 
the various minority ethnic groups. 
Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority ethnic groups 
live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are 
established to exercise the power of autonomy. All ethnic autonomous areas are 
integral parts of the People's Republic of China. 
All ethnic groups have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and 
written languages and to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs.310 
 
Ostensibly, the constitution permits Mongolian herders to continue practicing herding 
lifestyles, use Mongolian languages, and live in Mongolian style homes. However, activists in 
IMAR indicate that few of these rights are enforced. This disconnection between rights and 
reality led to student protests in 1980 that responded to the emergence of Han control in local 
government. As Jankowiak reports, at this time only fifty percent of high ranking officials in 
IMAR were Mongolian. In local offices, eighty percent of middle level officials, and ninety 
percent of junior level officials, were Han.311 A student protester reflects on this period of 
troubled relations between Mongolians and Hans: 
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Inner Mongolia was given a lot of promises by the Han. We were told we would 
have power and rights over natural resources. We have never received them. 
Before liberation there were a lot of Mongol leaders in Inner Mongolia. Now 
there are only a few. Most leaders in Huhhot are Han; all the leaders in every 
county are Han; Mongols simply have no power.312 
 
Today, Bulag argues that this disconnection between constitutional rights and modern 
reality is rooted in the Chinese conception of minzu policies that emphasize Han-specific 
knowledge. The history, traditions, skills, and sciences of non-Han communities, such as 
Mongolians, were either not recognized or given a lower status. Lafitte has argued that while 
outside of China local knowledge is deemed important for policy making decisions and 
biodiversity conservation, within China, local knowledge is commonly excluded from 
deliberations.313 Similarly, Human Rights International has reported that groups that fall under 
multiple categories of minority face increased separation and risk of conflict. For example, 
Mongolian communities that are an ethnic minority, a religious minority, and do not live in 
settled communities are often excluded from political participation, socioeconomic development, 
and cultural expression.314 In this way we can see that while the government is utilizing a frame 
of bounded land to discuss the ways ethnicity is rooted to specific spaces, policy statements also 
enact a frame of disappearance, elevating Han cultures and silencing Mongolian identities and 
arguments. 
The lack of Mongolian participation is most prominent in deliberations concerning land 
and grazing. China has the second largest useable rangeland in the world, with 363 million 
hectares, representing twelve percent of the world’s rangelands. Many of these lands are highly 
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degraded and the PRC blames that degradation on overgrazing by herders and climate change.315 
While accounts differ, Chad Futrell, PhD Candidate at Cornell University, presents compelling 
evidence that by 2008 more than seventy percent of Chinese grasslands had turned to desert, with 
projected losses continuing at an annual rate of 3,900 square kilometers.316 This encroachment of 
the desert puts a heavy burden on herders attempting to continue grazing herds in smaller spaces. 
Additionally, as the Gobi spreads south through the IMAR, dust storms and soil erosion have 
increased in China and the North-Pacific region.317 Anthropologist Dee Mack Williams suggests 
that the best way to understand the complexity of this land degradation in China is within the 
context of marginality as “both a cause and effect of ongoing geographic, cultural, political, and 
economic marginalization process in a national boundary setting.”318 She notes that before the 
People’s Republic of China collectivized herders and grasslands, herders were free to graze their 
animals across the open steppe. While lands were technically under the control of feudal lords, 
customary law gave herders unlimited rights to graze wherever they pleased with the exception 
of special pastures reserved for nobility. Williams argues that the juxtaposition of technical 
divisions and customary law has disrupted these local lands. She notes,  
recent policy initiatives, explicitly implemented to increase productivity and to 
promote contact with an expanding world economy, have become the vehicle by 
which land is selectively degraded and residents are selectively exploited in a race 
to control community resources.319 
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As the previous chapter explored, similar arguments are made regarding land in Mongolia where 
herders are accused of overgrazing. However, due to political splits between Mongolia and 
China, it is uncommon for cross-border scientific research to occur.320 Additionally, the 
differences in scientific methodologies and operative ideologies affect scientific and scholarly 
understanding of the severity of land degradation, culprits, causes, and public interpretation of 
findings.321 Zukosky argues that in this way, the Han Chinese majority of the PRC and 
international scientific elite prefer technologies that monitor and surveil the grassland – 
recording both environmental and human data.322 Following this line of analysis, grassland 
science is presented as a state control over minority communities.  
This use of science as surveillance has created deep divisions between IMAR herders and 
scientists. When residents are included in these reports, passive participation usually comes in 
the form of being counted in statistical analyses of herd size and consumption levels.323 As a 
result, western and Mongolian scholars have argued that these reports strengthen social control 
of Mongolian communities. My analysis here elucidates a specific rhetorical mechanism through 
which this takes place — reinforcement of the bounded land frame for public argument.  
The PRC government and conservationist responses to land degradation also deploy the 
frame disappearance in these discussions. A primary tactic is “grazing exclusion” policies, which 
prohibit grazing in degraded grassland areas. These programs aim at increasing conservation by 
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removing herbivores from the environment.324 While policy disputes in this area are technically 
about herding, government justifications for the policy are premised on demarcated geography, 
with official stipulations of what should and should not occur in specifically bounded spaces. 
Programs designed to regulate activities in specific spaces have targeted not only herds, but also 
herding communities under the title of “ecological migration.” In use since the early 1980’s 
ecological migration is a government-initiated method to permanently resettle herders away from 
fragile environments, thus protecting and rehabilitating degraded ecosystems.325 By 1996 
ecological migration had become one of the primary conservation measures in the IMAR. 
Ecological migration is commonly supported by arguments utilizing a frame of bounded 
land in response to the tragedy of the commons.326 Furtrell’s 2008 report indicates that all 
supporting evidence for ecological migration depicts herders as the cause of desertification rather 
than victims of desertification that threatens their herds, families, and lifestyles.327 It is my 
argument that the presentation of Mongolian herders as perpetual villains that destroy fragile 
environments has legitimated the use of a frame of disappearance resulting in a proleptic elegy 
that attempts to replace traditional herding lifestyles with farming and livestock grazing.328  
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Today, ecological migration policies call for 650,000 herders to move away from their 
grazing lands and replace traditional herding with state controlled grasslands management. These 
migrations have been accompanied by housing schemes, infrastructure development, and 
vocational training. Yet Inner Mongolian activists continue to resist ecological migrations. Some 
protesters are opposed to any movement of herders from traditional pastures. Other protesters 
and international human rights organizations argue that ecological migration is unacceptable 
because herders are not consulted prior to their migration.329 As Enghebatu Togochog, director 
of the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center told Human Rights International, 
There is solid evidence of the involuntary nature of the Ecological Migration 
Project – that it is a highly coercive displacement process, evident in the human 
rights violations against the local Mongolian herders in Southern Mongolia. 
During relocation, thousands of local herders lost their livestock, homes, and 
other property without adequate compensation. Further, the government has 
arrested, detained, and imprisoned those who resist. At issue is not whether 
traditional pastoralism is detrimental to the environment; rather, to ‘[ensure] that 
the Mongols have meaningful voice in the nature of the modernization of their 
own communities.330  
 
Due to ecological migration, many Inner Mongolian herders have settled in government-
designed apartment complexes. To many western viewers, this act seemingly embraces 
modernity. According to The Guardian (Canada),  
what had defined Mongolian culture for outsiders have long been swapped for 
leather outfits, motorbikes, cellphones and tourism…The old storybook nomad 
life has dwindled, with most nomads now farming, living in compact brick huts, 
tending to tourists, or working in nearby cities.331  
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However, to IMAR residents, these encroachments on traditional ways of life are fodder for 
increased protests. The following subsections examine the ways that IMAR communities resist 
ecological migration and enact a frame of movement-as-otor when presenting arguments to the 
PRC. 
5.3 THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE ON THE BACKS OF CAMELS 
The Chinese government argues that environmental degradation in IMAR is the direct result of 
herding and climate change. However, Inner Mongolian herders have continually produced a 
more nuanced narrative. Zhang encapsulates this narrative by highlighting how it frames herding 
practices as calculated, communal decisions by herders to grow, diversify, or shrink their herds 
to adapt to changing environmental conditions. This frame of movement-as-otor is apparent in 
IMAR community members, who refer to themselves as “the people who live on the backs of 
camels,” or those that are always moving.332 
Arguments based on the frame of movement-as-otor are not only confined to Mongolian 
communities. While the PRC has used minzu to classify ethnicities, Mongolian activists have 
rejected these classifications of foreigner and native to broaden discussions of migrations by both 
Mongolian and Han ethnicities. Then, activists such as Enghebatu Togochog have emphasized 
the migration of Han Chinese to IMAR as the root of conflicts in IMAR.  
Chinese migration has always been, is still being, and will continue to be the root 
cause of all sorts of violence and human rights violations in Southern Mongolia. 
The very foundation of the Chinese colonial regime in Southern Mongolia is 
based on and supported by Chinese migration…Togochog said the CCP supported 
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migration of Chinese into Southern Mongolia as the foundation of a colonial 
regime that encourages the confiscation and development of Mongolian herders’ 
lands. 333 
 
In this argument, Togochog Enkhebatu clearly differentiates between negative Han Chinese 
migrations and positive movements of Mongolian herders. These arguments are advanced 
through a frame of movement-as-otor, which functions in a similar manner to arguments made in 
Mongolia. 
Just as in Mongolia, herders in IMAR use otor to respond to climate changes and 
environmental pressures. Xie and Li note that before land privatization, otor was easily used by 
all Mongolian herding communities. These movements continued in the 1980’s when migration 
routes were negotiated between village leaders. However, after the 1996 privatizations, otor was 
only organized by individuals and met with limited success.334 The diminished capacity to 
arrange otor has had dramatic effects not only on land, but also on networks and relationships 
amongst herding communities. Traditionally, otor strengthened reciprocal networks of support. 
Herders expected that they could migrate over long distances when faced with environmental 
pressures. And in turn, they expected to host herders who had migrated when their own lands 
were experiencing difficulties.335 This created a self-sustaining network that operated beyond 
state control or view.336  
Yet, as otor was constrained, herders began specializing their herds to adapt to smaller 
parcels of land. These radical changes in traditional adaptive strategies not only affected modern 
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herd dynamics, but also inscribe these changes on herder communities that no longer have the 
pack animals needed for otor. Herders are well aware of the risks involved in these changes to 
the environment and herds.  
20 years ago, grasses were so tall that you could not see a calf, but now they 
barely cover the soil. Animals cannot get enough grass to gain fat against the 
harsh winter. That makes livestock more vulnerable when heavy snow comes. 
The other reason is that they eat up all the short grasses during the dry summer. 
Then when winter comes, there is not enough grass left. Stuck in the heavy snow, 
many animals die.337 
 
When faced with environmental pressures, herders have had to adopt high-cost strategies such as 
buying fodder or selling their herds.338 The remaining herds are therefore smaller in number, but 
also genetically isolated as cross-breeding that occurred during otor is no longer possible.339 
These adaptations have entrenched Mongolian herders into the larger Chinese economy through 
systems of credit and exchange. Yet, as herder advocates advance arguments through a frame of 
movement-as-otor – which highlights both the practice and loss of otor – herders are forming 
new arguments about land rights. The continued preference of herders to use arguments made 
through a frame of movement-as-otor, despite access to other argumentative frames, reflects the 
importance of spatially and socially flexible adaptation to climate changes.340  
As in Mongolia, today it is not possible for all IMAR herders to practice otor. Beyond 
governmental regulations, public works, open-pit mines, and infrastructure projects have divided 
the once open steppe. However, herders maintain that locations still exist where they can practice 
herding and migration. Using protest techniques such as road blockades, herders are working to 
express both their rejection of state projects and a demand that traditional practices be revised. 
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5.4 CASE STUDY: RETURNING HERDS TO XILINGOL GRASSLANDS 
The Chinese government has tried multiple strategies aimed at meeting community demands and 
expectations for herd and land (de)regulation. In the early 1980’s animals and lands which had 
been collectivized were returned to herders.341 This move reflected the government’s 
understanding of Mongolian demands for privatized ownership of livestock, and a 
compartmentalized interpretation of the Mongolian herders’ argument that herds and herding 
practices should be determined by herding communities. It is my argument that these projects 
failed because the PRC returned animals to herders while viewing deliberations from a frame of 
bounded land – which was demarcated and controlled by the state. Herders, who preferred to 
present arguments using a frame of movement-as-otor, were only more frustrated after the return 
of herds which they could now own but could not graze in the pasturelands that were still 
controlled by the government. In this misalignment of policy we see that the Chinese 
government attempted to respond to the Mongolian herder’s arguments by accepting that 
Mongolian identity is always intrinsically linked to the owning of herds. However, because these 
policies were based in a frame of bounded land, which eschewed movement as critical to 
successful herding, the policies failed. 
Later, in 1994 China signed the UN Convention to Combat Desertification which 
included plans for replanting ninety-five million acres of land. This legislation aimed at restoring 
grassland ecology and putting fewer controls on herding communities that lived in the same 
regions. These policies again originated from a frame of bounded land. However, we see 
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evidence that the government tried again to adapt to Mongolian arguments by replanting 
grasslands so that herders could graze and move their herds.  
Problems began to occur when the government fenced off test-grasslands in preparation 
for these plantings. The exclusion of herds from these fenced projects enraged herders who were 
already contending with shrinking pasturelands. Additionally, government scientists used the 
frame of bounded land when crafting replanting schemes. These scientists viewed the steppe as 
terra nullius and then created plans that worked well in empty spaces but failed when the fences 
were brought down and herds entered the replanted areas.342 Again, the government’s reliance on 
a frame of bounded land and herder’s preference for a frame of movement-as-otor prevented the 
creation of mutually acceptable policies.  
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Figure 10: Herder in the Xilingol Grasslands.343 
 
Today, the effect of these misaligned arguments is apparent as herders are accused of 
overgrazing. While the harm in these discussions – overgrazed land – has remained the same, the 
evidence and challenges made by the state in modern overgrazing debates are different than 
those made during collectivization campaigns. Recall that earlier in this chapter I considered the 
ways that overgrazing is used to legitimate the creation of “grazing exclusion” zones. When 
grazing exclusion zones were first established, herders were accused of being unaware of the 
effects of their herds on fragile environments. Herding groups were quick to protest, and express 
arguments using a frame of movement-as-otor. As a reflection of this process, today the Chinese 
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government and conservation organizations accuse herders of being aware of the effects of their 
herding practices and making calculated decisions to maintain their herds anyway. 
Despite this clear evidence herders seem to knowingly continue the pattern of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ by grazing rangelands at stocking rates well above 
those considered to be sustainable. In a sense herders are responding rationally to 
the combination of economic and political incentives by choosing the 
management system that generates the most benefit at least risk for themselves 
and their families… overgrazing is inevitable unless the income generating 
opportunities are improved.344  
 
This analysis avoids the pitfalls of historic texts which suppose that herders are too illiterate, 
rural, or backwards to understand the implications of their actions. Yet, it signals the 
government’s continual attempts to respond to Mongolian arguments while missing the mark by 
not considering the complex interplay between ethnicity, policy making, and civic participation 
in IMAR. As such, the recommendation that income-generating opportunities be developed for 
herders is still constructed to support government arguments based on a frame of bounded land. 
Herders have reflected that these types of policy revisions are ineffective. For example, when 
discussing policy changes regarding land allocation aimed at income generating opportunities, a 
herder from IMAR indicated: 
The “real change” from the collective period until the contemporary moment was; 
“on paper. It was a kind of writing. The reality of land use did not change.” This 
was particularly interesting as the paper certificates issued to each household at 
decollectivization were supposed to index the household allocations of pasture 
that were provided to them. As he referred directly to the land use contract in his 
hand, another resident chimed in, “It has absolutely no use. It is only a kind of 
form.” 345 
 
A plethora of recommendations have been submitted in international and domestic 
forums to produce change that is visible and accepted by herders. Many recommendations 
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include predicating all policies with a more nuanced understanding of herder’s needs, 
technologies and finances before creating new policies.346 For example, Meipong argues that 
policymakers must understand how,  
traditional herding exploits natural processes rather than attempting to control 
them, as is the case in cropping or intensive animal husbandry it favors flexible 
and communal land rights rather than private land tenure and it requires some 
“fuzzy logic” and site-specific investigation and planning.347  
 
These policies misunderstand herders’ needs to access specific grasslands at specific times of the 
year. As Zhang’s team from the College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at Peking 
University indicates, herder access to grasslands is a type of natural capital, one that is critical to 
herders and the ability of herders to move freely.348 The government has spent much time 
grappling with privatizing, collectivizing, and decentralizing the ownership of herds and lands in 
Inner Mongolia. Yet, all of these programs are based on the government’s establishment of 
borders and boundaries, the types of legislation that Mongolians are attempting to avoid. As a 
result of these frequently misaligned policies, protests have continued to occur in IMAR. 
5.5 GRAB ON AND NOT LET GO IN INNER MONGOLIA 
Conflicts have been increasing amongst and between Mongolian and Han Chinese residents in 
Inner Mongolia. While these protests are less violent, vocal, or militant than those in Xinjiang or 
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Tibet, evidence exists that they are increasing.349 Yet, much of the information received about 
these protests is regulated by the PRC government that controls the movement of foreigners, 
operation of international NGOS and reporting via social media. Minority Rights Group 
International reports that  
although minorities enjoy the right to assembly stipulated in both the Constitution 
and the LREA, the realization of this right is virtually non-existent due to the lack 
of respect for individuals’ civil and political rights.350  
 
Because of a lack of results from constitutional methods of deliberation, complaint, and protests, 
herders in IMAR have been moving toward new protest tactics. 
The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center reports that protesters are in 
a process of changing tactics, shifting away from petitions to protests.351 This transition matches 
University of Hong Kong Science and Technology scholar David Zewig’s research regarding 
rural protests in China. In his interviews, protesters stated; 
We knew that petitioning was of no use, but we also knew that we had to go 
through that process or else we could not justify using other tactics. So we went to 
the Administrative Litigation office of the city government. But we also knew that 
we needed to “grab on and not let go” or else they would not give in.352 
 
The petitions and protests used in IMAR target three complaints, (1) illegal land 
expropriation and land sale by local government officials to the Chinese, (2) destruction of 
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grazing land by Chinese miners and military bases, and (3) the government’s failure to provide 
adequate redress and compensation to the affected herders.353 Many of these protests are couched 
in Mongolian herders’ preference for the frame of movement-as-otor - the frame that the Chinese 
government has so much difficulty grappling with. In these arguments, Mongolians claim that 
Han Chinese are both others and outsiders. Yet, in official documents, it is Mongolians who are 
now considered “other” in IMAR. A herder, Mr. Gansukh, explained to SMHRIC in 2013, 
This is our land. We have lived here for generations and generations as herders. 
Now all of sudden, our ancestral lands are taken away by outsiders…What is most 
outrageous is that many of our herders have been changed to “others” on their 
household registration cards, becoming neither urban nor rural population, but 
outsiders on our own lands.354 
 
The rhetorical construction of Han Chinese as both other and a threat to Mongolian livelihood 
has increased conflicts throughout IMAR. For example, in 2010 a herder who protested against 
grazing restrictions was stabbed to death by Han Chinese officials from the “Livestock Grazing 
Prohibition Team.” Then, in May 2011 a herder named Mergen set up a roadblock protest to 
prohibit the transportation of coal across his grazing lands. Mergen was run over by a Han 
Chinese truck driver who drove through the roadblock, crushing Mergen’s skull beneath his tires. 
Similarly, in October 2011 a herder named Zorigt constructed a roadblock and was run over by 
an oil transport truck. More recently, in July 2013, a herder committed suicide after stabbing and 
killing the head of the Livestock Grazing Prohibition Team and seriously injuring another 
official while defending his right to graze his livestock on his grazing land.355  
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Reports of these deaths and images of the resulting protests have been distributed through 
multiple social networking sites. Among the most popular sites, Boljoo uses the traditional 
Mongolian script, reaching tens of thousands of users who must have an education in Mongolian 
language and script to participate in deliberations. SHMRIC reports that these deliberations are 
not bounded by China’s borders, but instead include Mongolian speakers from Mongolia, Russia, 
and diaspora communities.356 Protesters also used Chinese bulletin board systems such as QQ 
and Renren. Through these mediums, protesters have been able to organize simultaneous protests 
in IMAR as well as in Europe, North America, and Australia.357 Then, during protests, social 
media has been used to record and distribute images of police carriers, riot police, and 
confrontations between herders and PRC officials.358 
In my analysis of these protests, I will pay particular attention to the use of roadblocks as 
a protest methodology by IMAR herders, and role of social media in both reporting and 
moderating the resulting deliberations. Specifically, I am interested in Mergen’s protest and 
death, both of which have served as rallying points for IMAR protest and social media reporting. 
Mergen’s death under the tires of a coal truck was immediately recorded and reported through 
global social media. The bloody images of Mergen’s death called attention to both the brutality 
and senselessness of his death.359 In these images, the path that Mergen was blocking is difficult 
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to see because the surrounding steppe is just as smooth. It is clear from these images that the 
driver intentionally hit Mergen because ample space to swerve around Mergen was available yet 
not used. Reporting on Mergen’s death, Zorigt, an Inner Mongolian blogger, connects the use of 
herders’ lands and coal transport roads with these protests. 
In order to take a shortcut, these coal hauling trucks have randomly run over local 
herders’ grazing lands, not only killing numerous heads of livestock but also 
further damaging the already-weakened fragile grassland…after exhaustively 
petitioning various levels of local governments, helpless Mongolian herders of 
Bayanbulag, Saruul, Davshilt and Hongor Gachaa organized themselves since 
April 26, 2011 to block the coal haulers from trespassing on their grazing lands.360 
 
Due to the increases in social media access, including digital recording devices, Mergen’s death 
was immediately photographed and the driver interviewed. Reporters and bloggers reflecting on 
Mergen's death were quick to quote the truck driver, who stated “my truck is fully insured, and 
the life of a smelly Mongolian herder costs me no more than 40,000 Yuan (approx. 8,000 
USD).”361 Although the driver was eventually tried and executed for his part in Mergen’s death, 
his arrest only occurred after weeks of protest in Inner Mongolia. In press statements prior to his 
execution he continually emphasized that his victim was both a Mongolian and a herder. To the 
driver, this ethnic and lifestyle classification legitimized his dehumanizing rhetoric. This 
example illustrates the need to understand how Han Chinese living in IMAR have come to see 
herders as “smelly” and quantify their lives as worth less than a truck repair. Further, why did 
this “traffic accident” as it was labeled by the Chinese media spark months of protest against the 
presence of Han Chinese workers and families in Inner Mongolia?  
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In Chapter Three I analyzed the Kenyan government’s response to MP Waitatu’s hate 
speech, including the immediate arrests and censor of the speaker. In the example of hate speech 
directed at herding communities in IMAR, we see that the PRC first attempted to silence 
Mergen’s family. As SMHRIC reports, the local government attempted to prevent Mergen’s 
death from inspiring future protests by providing a payment to his family. However, this strategy 
backfired, as reported by SMHRIC,  
The Chinese authorities’ bribery-like handling of the case not only failed to calm 
the Mongolian herders but also further angered them, inciting them to take to the 
streets to demand their rights and dignity be respected.362  
 
When payments to the family failed, and online attention to Mergen’s death increased, 
Mongolian students were confined to university campuses, herders were prohibited from 
traveling to urban areas, and Internet access was controlled. However, despite these efforts, 
protests were organized in Hohhot, the capital of IMAR. Photos sent by protesters to SMHRIC 
indicate that armed vehicles and riot police were brought into Hohhot to control crowds and 
police were assigned to follow known activists.363 
The Coordinating Committee for the May 29/30 [2011] Protest indicate the roots of these 
protests are found in a distrust of the Chinese government. 
Mongols have good reasons to doubt the intentions of the government. For the 
past six decades, the destruction of the grassland ecology, cultural assimilation, 
political oppression and economic exploitation have characterized the policies of 
the Chinese government in Southern Mongolia. More recently, “protection” of the 
ecology has been turned into a pretext to further eliminate the last remaining areas 
where the traditional Mongolian nomadic lifestyle and culture are practiced 
because vast deposits of natural resources have been found...Those herders who 
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are still allowed to practice animal husbandry are faced with numerous obstacles 
and challenges such as the truckers and corporations who have little regard for 
their lands or lifestyle.364 
 
Similarly, the Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands, which was both 
published and banned on May 29, 2011, called forth a broad audience of Mongolians, even those 
that had settled and primarily communicate in Mandarin. In this song, the author identifies as 
Mongolian, focusing on bloodlines rather than the government’s use of bounded land and special 
ethnic characteristics such as language. The implications of this identify is to explode the 
definition of “Mongolian” and link with communities living as, and identifying as, herders. 
I am a Mongol even if I sing my rap in Chinese 
No matter what you say I am a Mongol 
Mongol blood flows in my veins 
The vast Mongolian steppe is my homeland.365 
 
Across the Mongolian steppe, herders and settled Mongolians rallied together in online 
and in-street protests. SMHRIC reported that at least one hundred protesters were arrested, 
detained, and beaten, and social media cites such as Boljoo and QQ were closed by the 
government. Yet, these government controls were not fast enough to prevent circulation of 
media, such as the Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands, which was picked up by 
websites such as SMHRIC, which the PRC cannot censor. This process of publication and 
censorship was predicted in the song’s text: 
No single word is mentioned in CCAV[1] 
“Social harmony” (he xie in Chinese) flooded the Internet, but no one knows what 
the exact situation is 
Internet sites in China are damn shit 
Mother f**king Ren Ren Site (www.renren.com) deletes all Mongolians posts 
Mother f**king micro blog (www.weibo.com) removes my blog 
                                                
364 Coordinating Committee for May 29/30 Protest, “Worldwide Call.” 
365 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Rap Song Dedicated to Mergen Banned,” 
Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center Website, June 13, 2011, 
http://www.smhric.org/news_390.htm. 
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Mother f**king the State Security, mother f**king “tea invitation” (meaning 
detention, “bei he cha” in Chinese) 
Mother f**kers, I will say whatever I want to say 
I want freedom, yeah, return my freedom.366 
 
As the PRC scrambled to censor the Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands, 
Internet police and government paid bloggers attempted to repair the state’s reputation. SMHRIC 
reported that  
Internet police or a possible member of the “50 Cent Party,” a group of Chinese 
netizens who get paid 50 Chinese cents for posting a message on the Internet in 
favor of the authorities, have been sending out the following statement via a 
popular Mongolian QQ instant messenger group with a fake name of “a 
Mongolian brother who worked in Uushin Banner and is familiar with the 
situation.367 
 
These netziens tell readers that Mergen’s death was “just a traffic accident. Some people who 
have hidden intentions are interpreting it as an ethnic problem or a conflict with the oil and 
natural gas development.”368 In response, the PRC again utilizes the frame of bounded land by 
referencing a traffic accident. Both traffic and roads are predicated on the production of 
boundaries and regulation of herders to specific, confined spaces. 
In an attempt to better control the 2011 protest and prevent future conflicts, the PRC has 
confiscated herder’s new media equipment, as well as tightened government control of micro 
blogs. In its statements regarding these protests, the Public Security Bureau indicates a 
preference for officially sanctioned petitions as opposed to protests.  
Although declining to give out the details of the case, the Ongniud Banner Public 
Security Bureau stated on its Tengxun Weibo official micro blog that “the case is 
under review in accordance with the law.” The facts are clear and the evidence is 
ample. Whoever has a disagreement can express his or her opinion through 
                                                
366 Spelling and emphasis added by SMHRIC which translated the Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the 
Grassland. Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Rap Song Dedicated.” 
367 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Protests Continued.”  
368 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “Protests Continued.”  
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acceptable means. Whoever spread information inconsistent with the facts must 
be held accountable for the consequences.369 
 
In this statement from the Public Security Bureau, it is critical to note that not only are 
petitions preferred, but the government also threatens legal action against anyone spreading false 
information regarding the situation in Inner Mongolia. Yet, Inner Mongolian activists have 
identified the use of social media and micro blogging as a critical feature in gaining international 
attention. For example, in 2013 when Mr. Bayanbaatar was beaten to death by a Chinese 
Railway worker, images of his death and assailant spread quickly via sites such as Renren, QQ, 
Tencent Webo, Webchat, and Sina Weibo before they were deleted or censored by the 
government.370 Writing in 2008, Zukosky outlined this method of censorship as the “Strike 
Hard” campaign, aimed at suppressing Internet rumors and surveilling Inner Mongolians through 
the auspices of conservation.371 Yet, herders have not given up their attempts to defend 
Mongolian herder identity. As one herder told SMHRIC,  
The herders are not afraid of the police, and ready to continue the protest 
anytime… they will see if the Ongniud Banner Public Security Detention Center 
is large enough to detain all of the hundreds of herders.372 
 
As I write this dissertation, protests continue in Inner Mongolia. In April 2013 new 
clashes erupted in the Shuang He Forestry when herders attempted to dismantle forestry 
company tents. Three hundred herders began the protest, aiming to petition the local government, 
and the government responded by arresting the protest leaders, and their lawyer. This protest 
reemerged again a month later resulting in the police confiscation of protesters’ cars, 
motorcycles and cell phones. While their equipment was confiscated, the herders were not 
                                                
369 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “100 Days.” 
370 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “One More.”  
371 Zukosky, “Reconsidering Governmental,” 45.  
372 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “100 Days.”. 
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arrested and continued their protest by walking the last 15 miles to the government offices. Upon 
arrival, they were rounded up and transported by the police back to their homes.373  
As demonstrated in this chapter, Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, China are engaged in a 
complex set of violent and non-violent arguments aiming to maintain Mongolian herder identity. 
Their protests, which include roadblocks, street protest, and social media organizing, are 
designed to both confront the Chinese government’s attempts to define herder identity and gain 
international attention and collaboration. Quilting points have emerged from these protests as 
international organizations such as the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center 
(SMHRIC) have joined with Inner Mongolian protesters to produce continual updates regarding 
herders’ lives. Yet, divisions are still present as state sponsored conservation science is used to 
surveil the Inner Mongolian grasslands, prevent connections between Mongolian and Inner 
Mongolian herders, and settle herders in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.   
In the final chapter of this dissertation I will investigate the ways that Maasai and 
Mongolian herders’ arguments complicate our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of 
the nomad and the application of nomadology as a metaphor to understand the space for both 
herders and settled communities in late-modern capitalism. 
                                                
373 Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, “100 Days.” 
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6.0  NOMADOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter connects the intrinsic study of Maasai and Mongolian communities to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s metaphor of nomadology. In doing so, I argue that the double function of education 
and reality construction is critical to understanding the use and utility of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari's text A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. I begin by considering the 
common threads emerging from the case studies of herding communities in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Mongolia, and China, and comparing these findings to Deleuze and Guattari’s portrayal of 
“nomads.” Then I introduce the concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization, and 
reterritorialization to understand the ways that herders and governments interact and create new 
forms of argument and protest. This analysis provides a gateway to understand Deleuze and 
Guattari’s metaphor of nomadology, which they argue is a “line of flight” marking avenues for 
escape from the hierarchical structure of the state. 
To contextualize my study of nomadology, I consult scholarship pertaining to metaphors, 
focusing on the ways that metaphors are understood to have meaning and create new realities, 
and differ from other linguistic structures such as metonymies. Then, I examine the ways that 
Deleuze and Guattari have entered this body of scholarship, via their metaphor of nomadology 
that differentiates between “smooth” and “striated” space. I examine the ways that they extract 
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narratives from ethnographic studies of herder and nomadic communities to construct their 
understanding of nomadology and the ways that herders prefer the smooth space of the steppe as 
opposed to the striated space of a city. I ask if this metaphor has functioned as a mechanism to 
silence or exclude nomadic communities, or if the metaphor illustrates rhetorical tools that 
nomadic communities can leverage in resistance to the state. I argue that because the Maasai and 
Mongolian herders are among the people that Deleuze and Guattari cite specifically in their 
work, modern Maasai and Mongolian experiences offer fruitful reference points from which to 
explore nomadology. I conclude by asking how modern herding communities, such as the 
Maasai and Mongolians examined in this dissertation, might inform our understanding of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of nomadology and the lines of flight used by modern herding 
communities. 
6.2 INTERSECTIONS OF HERDERS AND NOMADOLOGY 
The preceding case studies of Maasai and Mongolian herders have examined the ways that 
modern herders are producing arguments and engaging in protest activity that contests dominant 
argument frames. These communities are determined to both participate in the modern world and 
technologies – as demonstrated by the Maasais' use of YouTube to publicize their protests and 
the Inner Mongolians’ use of online message boards to coordinate and distribute information 
across national borders. Yet, they are also determined to continue their traditions of owning and 
migrating with herds across wide swaths of land. The interaction of these desires has resulted in 
an unsettling and (re)staging of modern identity, yielding new and complex patterns of 
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identification – today, herders can become global citizens, and according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, members of modern, settled communities can become nomads.  
The dissertation’s opening chapter examined the use of multiple terms to refer to 
communities such the Maasai and Mongolians, and I argued that it was best to maintain those 
communities’ term of identification – herder – throughout the study. I still maintain that this is 
the best way to speak of Maasai and Mongolian communities. However, a murkiness appears at 
this stage because when Deleuze and Guattari address Maasai and Mongolian herders, they use 
the terms “nomad” and nomadology. To point to both the connections between these terms, and 
the problems entailed in using the term nomad to describe Maasai and Mongolian communities, I 
have used herder/nomad throughout this chapter. 
To understand and analyze this process of articulation, Deleuze and Guattari have 
proposed the metaphor of nomadology, best explained in 1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The 
War Machine.374 In this text, nomads are distinguished by their nomos of pastoral flock 
distribution, an occupation held on a smooth space that allows nomad societies to avoid the 
coding of territorial assemblages and striated space of the state. To support this differentiation, 
Deleuze and Guattari draw from ethnographic texts with special attention given to nomads that 
have overturned and/or opposed the state. In several of these instances, Deleuze and Guattari 
directly cite Mongolia, often gesturing toward Genghis [Chinghis] Khan. This representation of 
Mongolian herder/nomads as intentionally living alongside but opposed to the state cuts against 
the narrative of salvation presented by the governments and development workers whereby 
nomadic populations have lived outside of the state because they were too impoverished, under-
educated, or oppressed by class to create their own cities or complex civilizations. 
                                                
374 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor, nomadology, has been used by scholars to explain the 
complex terrain of political struggle in hyper-globalized, internetworked society. The importance 
of this metaphor, and the significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvre, was indicated by 
Foucault’s statement in 1970 that, “one day, perhaps, this century will be called Deleuzian.”375 
While Foucault did not live to verify his statement, his prediction has been supported by Ronald 
Bogue who writes that Deleuze and Guattari’s “notion of the ‘nomadic’… has been emerging as 
the concept of choice for theorists of various stripes.”376 Emory psychologist James Williams 
calls Deleuze’s work “one of the key reference points in Continental philosophy, literary theory, 
film theory, aesthetics and politics.”377 Today, a plethora of scholars ranging from Jean 
Baudriallard to Rosi Braidotti, Manuel De Landa to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, to 
Edward Said, use nomadism and nomadology as critical figures to assess critical consciousness, 
post-colonialism, and resistance movements.378 As a result, a rich, vibrant, and significant body 
of academic and political work has arisen about and around nomadology.  
However, Deleuze and Guattari’s work has also drawn criticism. Anthropologists have 
argued that that Deleuze and Guattari’s production of the metaphor of nomadology to resist late 
modern capitalism has misappropriated ethnographic texts. For example, professor of French and 
African studies, Christopher Miller, argues that nomadology is prefaced on sanitized 
                                                
375 Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” Critique 282 (1970): 888-908. Accessed on March 3, 
2014 via Generation Online, http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault5.htm. 
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ethnographic representations that have produced a romanticized and subjugated depiction of real 
nomadic communities: 
The persistence of representation and ethnographic authority within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s nomadology is not shocking, nor does it invalidate the entire project of 
A Thousand Plateaus. But it should serve as a caution to those that would turn to 
nomadology as a wholly “free” and new perspective on cultural construction, as a 
description for moving “beyond identity.”379  
 
According to Miller, a better approach would be to produce a “less utopian, less 
contradictory, less arrogant, and less messianic theorization of movement, a positive 
cosmopolitanism that remains meticulously aware of localities and differences.”380 While 
anthropologists and cultural studies scholars have embraced this call, many of their works 
investigate ethnographic depictions of people not discussed by Deleuze and Guattari. For 
example, Stephen Muecke, professor of writing at the University of New South Wales, 
contributes an excellent study of representational clash between Aboriginal tradition and 
Australian policymakers.381 Although Muecke proves that the Aboriginal experience provides a 
single exception to nomadology, that exception is found by mixing sources and drawing between 
types of nomadic lifestyles. It is my argument that a more complete study would investigate the 
nomadic communities used by Deleuze and Guattari as the vehicle in the metaphor of 
nomadology to address the complexity of nomadic experience, and to investigate the 
transformation of those complexities into a sign of nomadology. 
From this metaphorical analysis, it is possible to understand both the current application 
of nomadology, and Miller’s call to move away from “smooth space, flow, and negotiated 
                                                
379 Christopher L. Miller, “The Posidentitarian Predicament in the Footnotes of a Thousand Plateaus: 
Nomadology, Anthology, and Authority,” Diacritics 23, no. 3 (1993): 32. 
380 Miller, “The Posidentitarian Predicament,” 33. 
381 Stephen Muecke, “The Discourse of Nomadology: Phylums in Flux,” in Deleuze and Guattari Critical 
Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Gary Genosko (London: Routledge, 2001): 1164-1182. 
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assemblage that remains based on fantasies of the non-Western world as a realm beyond 
representation and division.”382 Miller accuses Deleuze and Guattari of moving too quickly 
through heavy-handed cultural representations. What happens then, if we slow down and dwell 
more carefully on the experiences of Mongolian and Maasai people in their struggles with the 
state? 
To pursue this question, I couple my reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology with 
texts from communication and philosophy regarding the ways that metaphors produce both 
reality and truth. This cross-reading seeks to better understand how nomadology may have 
produced a new reality for nomads, one perhaps at odds with the textured and layered experience 
emerging from earlier chapters of this dissertation, but instead restricted to only the 
characteristics outlined by Deleuze and Guattari.  
This analysis includes philosopher Michel Foucault’s linguistic determinism, which I will 
use to examine the dominant tropes (such as metaphors) that regulate what can be known during 
a specific period of time, creating the episteme of an age. Foucault argues that what can be 
discussed is regulated by anonymous historical rules specific to social, economic, geographic, or 
linguistic conditions.383 While it is appealing to use Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology as a 
method for academics to encounter this process of rhizome-as-metaphor; I am concerned about 
what this strategy might leave behind, in terms of meaning and understanding, and what it might 
foretell, especially in terms of implications for living nomad/herder communities. In short, 
perhaps one of the best ways to explore the nomadology metaphor is to return to its primary 
ground, the complex lived experience of Maasai and Mongolian herders. 
                                                
382 Miller, Nationalists and Nomads. 
383 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Modern Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin, 1977). 
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6.3 DEFINITIONAL ARGUMENTS 
As this dissertation’s analysis progressed through case studies of Maasai and Mongolian herders, 
we saw the push and pull of the relative primacy of four frames of argument, bounded land, 
movement-as-wandering or movement-as-otor, and disappearance. There is a connection 
between the application and utility of these frames with the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
regarding the concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. In this 
subsection I investigate the relationship of these concepts — territorialization, 
deterritorialization, and reterritorialization to this dissertation’s case studies and the field of 
communication writ large. I begin with an assessment of scholarship pertaining to definitional 
arguments. Then, I assess how the process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and 
reterritorialization functions to illuminate the modern position of Maasai and Mongolian herders 
as they confront the state. Deleuze and Guattari propose that we must always find “lines of 
flight” to escape attempts of hierarchical structures, such as governments, to over code our 
experiences and lives. By analyzing the process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and 
reterritorialization, this subsection links Deleuze and Guattari’s primary line – nomadology – 
with Maasai and Mongolian herder protests. 
Definitional argument has been widely discussed in the field of communication by 
scholars such as Edward Schiappa and David Zarefsky, who examine the use of persuasive 
definitions and the dramatic implications of those definitions in regard to argumentative 
analysis.384 Pragmatically, these studies have been used by legal communication scholars such as 
                                                
384 Edward Schiappa, “Arguing About Definitions,” Argumentation, no. 7 (1993): 403-417, David 
Zarefsky, “Strategic Maneuvering in Political Argumentation,” in Examining Argumentation in Context: Fifteen 
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Kenneth Broda-Bahm to understand environmental security and land development.385 In each 
instance, definitional scholarship has been used to mark tangible spaces – territories – that create 
authoritative terminologies that bind deliberations by inclusion and exclusion.  
The resulting territorialization-by-definition supports coherent argumentative analysis, 
yet it stops short of explaining those communities, spaces, and arguments that transcend or resist 
demarcated territory. The figure of “nomad,” commonly employed by development and 
conservation programs, is one such metaphor that moves between demarcated spaces, between 
both the “is” and “is not.” Yet, to approach the figure of the “nomad” requires a disturbance in 
the process of definition, resulting in the creation of definitions that I will call “disturbing 
definitions.” These are definitions that open space for multiple possible understandings, 
embodiments and entailments. Disturbing definitions have much in common with the process of 
deterritorialization introduced by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guarttari in Anti-Oedipus.386 Here, 
deterritorialization is used to describe processes of de-contextualizing sets of relationships, 
creating origami-like folds in the paper of meaning, by finding new points of meeting and 
departure – distant actualizations – that previously eluded perception.  
Many deliberations are premised on territorialization, the process of definition that uses a 
key word to mark territory and to understand contexts that inform argumentative possibilities and 
deliberative analysis. These demarcations function to limit deliberation, but also limit the 
connections that deliberators can draw between multiple views and theories. The process of 
argumentative territorialization-by-definition excludes many perspectives, including those of 
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herders who reject such boundaries. A process of deterritorialization recontextualizes and resists 
these argumentative territories and boundaries. In these moments, connections and positions that 
had previously been considered beyond the scope of a deliberation, labeled as “is not” and 
“ought not,” again become possible. The new connections uncovered by deterritorialization may 
then lead to reterritorialization, the marking of territory in new ways where the argumentative 
definition is radically expanded or rearticulated. Or, the definition may remain permanently 
deterritorialized, resulting in an expectation of multiple competing understandings in 
deliberation.  
This process is illustrated by the case studies presented in this dissertation. In each case 
study I have demonstrated the process whereby herders have participated in a process of 
territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization as they navigate the complex 
terrain of political struggle in hyper-globalized, internetworked society. For example, in 
Tanzania the colonial administration attempted to territorialize Maasai identity by using a frame 
of movement-as-wandering and then formed settlement projects that responded to this 
compartmentalized – or territorialized definition. Maasai activists such as Parkipuny respond to 
this territorialization with a complex blend of ethnographic terminology and Maasai community 
history to deterritorialize Maasai identity, revealing in the process the complexities of herding, 
migration, semi-permanent dwellings, and sacred spaces. In this way, Parkipuny reflects Maasai 
traditions, but he also folds colonial texts and vocabulary into his discourse, resulting in an 
articulation of Maasai identity that includes both historical and modern narratives. In doing so, 
Parkipuny transgresses the colonial, territorialized, definition of “Maasai” to create new – 
deterritorialized – definitions. Finally, in contemporary acts of protest, such as the 2012 NCA 
Resident’s protest in the Ngorongoro, we see a reterritorialization of Maasai identity. In this 
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maneuver, Maasai community members build on deterritorialized elements of Maasai identity to 
create new articulations – reterritorialized definitions that Deleuze and Guattari would call “new 
assemblages.”  
This process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization of Maasai 
identity occurs through a process of negotiation, deliberation, and refinement that at first glance 
may seem rather murky. Let’s look at a second example from Inner Mongolia and Mongolia to 
clarify Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology. In Chapter Five I examined the work of the 
Mongolian government to territorialize herding lands. In this analysis I examined the concept of 
empty land, terra nullis, which government officials use to justify new development projects. 
This is a process that could be articulated as territorialization (government parcels land and 
defines it as terra nullis), deterritorialization (herders articulate land use in response to terra 
nullis by using a frame of movement-as-otor), and reterritorialization (herders produce new 
assemblages to participate in public forums while maintaining herding traditions). Today, foreign 
mining companies are attracted to the “open spaces” of the Eurasian Steppe that they are told can 
be easily strip-mined. Yet, by exploring this land through Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual 
triptych of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization, we can better 
understand both how this land came to be known as empty and why protests are occurring. The 
concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization help us to understand the ways in which 
this land can be understood as neither empty nor full, but instead a “rhizomatic mechanic 
assemblage.” Thinking about the Mongolian steppe as a mechanic assemblage incorporates the 
complex body of interpretations, connections, and dimensions that can be joined together in 
multiplicitious ways to create new understandings of the Mongolian steppe. These new 
connections create a realm of multiplicities that herders can use to resist the attempts of states 
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and governments to “over code” herder identity or privilege a singular, government authored, 
definition of what it is to be a herder. 
The concept of multiplicities was demonstrated in Chapter Five’s treatment of protests in 
Inner Mongolia. In that analysis it was impossible for me to identity one single speaker, 
organization, or protest on which to base my analysis. Instead, many points of resistance 
emerged. The protests that I focused on surrounding Mergen’s death in 2011 were but one entry 
point to understand the assemblage of multiplicities in Inner Mongolia. What Mergen’s death 
does for this analysis is provide a quilting point that binds together both Inner Mongolian herders 
and Chinese modernization. When we analyze these events we see the emergence of new forms 
of protest and identity. For example, the Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands 
articulates neither traditional herding culture nor the Han Chinese idealized Mongolian culture 
portrayed in the propaganda posters examined in Chapter Five. Instead, the Song Dedicated to 
Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands exemplifies reterritorialization in a realm of multiplicities 
where the song’s author has provided a connection between two completely different 
multiplicities. This connection forms a parallel evolution – or deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization – so that the protesters deterritorialize the Chinese definition of Mongolian 
identity by making that definition part of their own. This process demonstrates the way that 
Deleuze and Guattari think of many connections producing multiplicities, which then connect 
together to create rhizomatic mechanic assemblage.  
Rhizomatic mechanic assemblages are critical to this study because Deleuze and Guattari 
identify them as “lines of flight.” Lines of flight are the pathways that Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest we follow to escape the hierarchical modes of control and emphasis on a center and 
  199 
periphery that characterize modern governments. According to Deleuze and Guattari, one of the 
primary lines of flight is nomadology. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor – nomadology – was created by drawing from the lived 
and historical experiences of herder communities. While Deleuze and Guattari suggest that 
nomadology is a useful line of flight for settled communities, my study asks if nomadology is 
also useful to understand lines of flight utilized by Maasai and Mongolian herders. Through this 
study, I aim to integrate the case studies of herders in Tanzania, Kenya, Mongolia, and China 
with academic dialogue about Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology as a mode of critical inquiry. 
In what follows, I ask if this juxtaposition can create a quilting point of herder/nomad and 
nomadology in ways that awaken new understandings of both specific definitions of “nomad” 
and argumentative scholarship. This juxtaposition is foregrounded with a contextualization of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of nomadology within the larger body of communicative study 
of metaphors as meaning making, differentiated from metonymies, and utilized to create 
nomadology. Then I examine the ways that Deleuze and Guattari have constructed a rhetoric of 
smooth and striated space and used of ethnographic definitions to produce nomadology. Finally, 
I assess the juxtaposition of herder/nomads and nomadology. 
6.4 METAPHOR 
Scholars who have attempted to reject or critique the factual accuracy of nomadology have been 
frustrated by Deleuze and Guattari’s reminder that their text is largely metaphorical and therefore 
not subject to strict evaluative standards that often flow from the distinction between fact and 
fiction. As such, it will be useful to preface my engagement with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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nomadology project with an excursus on the rhetorical dynamics of metaphors, beginning with a 
survey of how metaphors have been understood variously as educational tools, parlor tricks, 
truth-producing vehicles, and meaning making devices.387 This conceptual scaffolding will then 
support my reflection on how findings from the earlier content chapters reflect on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s suggestions regarding nomadology. 
While study and production of metaphors can be traced through history to the earliest 
myths, legends, and oral histories, my sample begins with Plato’s Republic and Phaedrus. Plato 
cautions that while metaphors are instructional tools, as demonstrated by the metaphor of the sun 
in the Allegory of the Cave, metaphors should be used with caution and only by those that 
understand both their origins and application. The hazard in the uncritical appropriation of 
metaphor by uneducated poets is outlined in the Phaedrus as making trifles seem important and 
important points seem to be trifles through their force of language. Aristotle praises those that 
create metaphors, indicating that metaphors are signs of genius that imply an eye for 
resemblance. He expands the study of metaphor in the Poetics, defining metaphor as “the 
application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to 
genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion.”388 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle 
is clear that while metaphors are useful for learning, to be effective, the metaphor must pinpoint 
a commonality between the speaker and audience.389 This audience adaptation hones the 
metaphor as a heuristic tool, while simultaneously risking an over adaptation to the audience that 
                                                
387 Specifically, this sample has been organized to highlight the double-bind in metaphorical studies. If a 
scholar is to follow the approach to metaphors as decoration, then metaphors can be beautiful, but have little 
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but also for their implications on the bounds of though, the ways of knowing, the ‘truth’, and reality. 
388 Aristotle, Poetics 21, 1457 b9-16. 
389 Aristotle, Rhetoric III. 10, 1410b14f. 
  201 
reduces the attributes of the metaphor and produces unknowable or misrepresented arguments. 
Cicero continues this study of metaphor, tracking its use from a time of necessity to one of 
entertainment. As such, Cicero warns students away from borrowing complex metaphors as they 
suggest a poverty of individual thought. By pointing to the ethical considerations of metaphor, 
Cicero both attempts to shape civic discourse and inspire Quintilian’s study of the metaphor via 
tropes.  
Quintilian approaches the study of metaphor by classifying it as one of many tropes, 
placing metaphor on the same level as metonymy and figures such as repetitions, antithesis, and 
periphrasis. While Quintilian’s study highlights the educational possibilities of metaphor, he 
does not match the excitement found in Aristotle’s statement, “the greatest thing by far is to be a 
master of metaphor.”390 Quintilian thus sets the stage for scholars in the middle ages to utilize 
Aristotle’s work while downplaying the importance of metaphor to the creation of meaning or 
education. While exceptions to this trend did occur, such as St. Thomas Aquinas’s position that 
metaphors were useful for interpreting sacred doctrine, his studies were limited to understanding 
divine texts.391 According to philosopher Mark Johnson, metaphorical analysis reached an all-
time-low when Thomas Hobbes argued in the Leviathan, “metaphors, and senseless and 
ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst 
innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.”392  
 Johnson interprets Hobbes’ concern regarding metaphors through three assumptions, (1) 
that metaphors are essentially literal, (2) metaphors are deviant, and (3) the meaning and truth of 
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a metaphor, if it exists at all, is only that of literal paraphrasing.393 Modern scholars might be 
more apt to accept linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson’s study of metaphor 
presented in Metaphors We Live By over Hobbes’ analysis. However, Hobbes’ concern regarding 
the use of metaphors in a “common-wealth” helps us to understand the arguments made against 
Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of nomadology. Many retractors of nomadology voice concerns 
similar to Hobbes - that to be a useful tool, nomadology must be a literal paraphrasing nomadic 
communities’ experiences. Then, finding that Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology is not a literal 
paraphrasing, these retractors argue that nomadology is deviant or deceptive. 
It is my argument that Hobbes and retractors of nomadology have a sound argument 
regarding the application of metaphors, particularly those drawn from the lived experiences of 
communities with long histories of resistance and oppression with the state. However, I am also 
concerned that nomadology has already become a term of art in critical and cultural studies. I 
find it difficult to declare nomadology an invalid tool and as such ignore the many studies 
regarding the application of nomadology. Therefore, in the next section I analyze the intellectual 
split between Hobbes and modern study of metaphor to understand the ways that metaphors such 
as nomadology may have meaning and create new realities. Then, I ask if and what space exists 
for Maasai and Mongolian herders in these new rhetorical and terrestrial worlds. 
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6.5 METAPHORS HAVE MEANING 
The modern break from Hobbes’ rejection of metaphor was made by literary critic I.A. Richards 
during a lecture series at Bryn Mawr College in February and March 1936. These lectures were 
premised on the position that 18th and 19th century rhetorical study was useless. The fifth and 
sixth lectures in the series assess the history of metaphor and the incoherent, contradictory terms 
used for metaphorical analysis. Richards believes that a standard set of terms is necessary to 
spark interest and study of the metaphor and proposed a trinity of metaphorical terms: tenor, 
vehicle, and ground. Tenor and vehicle are defined as meaningless when presented alone, but 
when in “co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either.”394 
This co-operation, however, is not zero-sum. Metaphors may be tenor heavy, where the vehicle 
is only used to color the tenor. Or, they may be vehicle heavy, where the tenor is only an excuse 
for the introduction of the vehicle. In this case, the vehicle ceases being the principle subject and 
as attention is focused on the tenor, the accuracy, portrayal or appropriateness of the tenor is 
significantly diminished. Tenor and vehicle can be analyzed through ground or tensions. Ground 
is used to highlight the similarities or resemblances between the tenor and vehicle. When the 
vehicle does not relate to the tenor, the resulting metaphor if judged to have tension or 
dissimilarities. 
While Richards’s terminology (tenor, vehicle, and ground) structures modern rhetorical 
study of metaphor, his lectures also make the influential argument, reflecting back to Aristotle, 
that metaphors have meaning which effects our understanding of philosophy. This statement 
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exploded the field of metaphor analysis, leading to additions, retractions, and alterations of 
Richard’s proposal. One of the earliest respondents was philosopher Max Black who expands 
Richards’s study by arguing that metaphors are a screen on which we can organize our thoughts. 
To facilitate the understanding of this screen, Black encourages an interaction view of metaphor 
that we can use to look for indirect messages conveyed by the vehicle of a metaphor. Using an 
interaction view the vehicle acquires a new meaning, which is similar, but not the same as the 
literal meaning. This means that academics studying a metaphor need to attend to both the 
vehicle and the literal meaning of metaphors.395 For my study of nomadology, Black’s argument 
is critical because it indicates that to understand nomadology we must study both nomad/herders 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor. 
6.6 METAPHORS CREATE (NEW) REALITY 
Following Black’s methodology, a study of nomadology which integrates both lived experiences 
of herder/nomads and nomadology, has the potential to create either new ways of seeing reality, 
or all together new realities. These new potentials appear because metaphors resonate with the 
human experiences encountered in the flesh. As political scientist Michael Marks suggests in his 
study of metaphors in international relations, it is not enough that a metaphor provides an 
internal logic to furnish a coherent set of understandings. To have their greatest impact, these 
understanding must accord with the experiences of real people.396  
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Regarding herder/nomads, these understandings empower or disempower fact, truth, and 
experiences of communities such as the Maasai and Mongolian herders studied in this 
dissertation. Studies of the metaphor of nomadology are therefore complicated by scholars that 
do not interaction with, or even acknowledge the existence of, modern herder/nomads. This 
complication is expounded by the attempt to understand the metaphor nomadology because 
Deleuze and Guattari frequently reference and build upon Nietzsche. According to philologist 
Friedrich Nietzsche, all facts and truth are metaphorical, and any truth is simply a new 
interpretation of an old metaphor. Nietzsche explains:  
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies and 
anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which have been 
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and when after 
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions 
about which one has forgotten that this is what they are, metaphors which are 
worn out and without sensuous power, coins which have lost their pictures and 
now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.397 
 
I am concerned that while Deleuze and Guattari have defended nomadology as a “mere 
metaphor,” Nietzsche makes a compelling argument that metaphors – even mere metaphors –
produce both reality and the truth. If Nietzsche is correct, Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of 
nomadology has produced a new reality and truth of herder/nomads, one which renders the ways 
of being herder/nomad as not among the many characteristics outlined in the ethnographic texts 
cited in A Thousand Plateaus but restricted to only the characteristics highlighted by Deleuze 
and Guattari. The implication of this new reality for herder/nomads like the Maasai and 
Mongolians may include the acceptance of the proleptic elegy advanced by Deleuze and Guattari 
when they indicate that Mongolians have already succumbed to the state. The implication here is 
that while nomadology might help me to escape the confines of late-modern capitalism, the same 
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metaphor might simultaneously inscribe the herder/nomads who illuminate my line of flight into 
the same striations from which I am escaping. 
 The potential of a metaphor such as nomadology is in the illumination of new ways of 
understanding both herder/nomad communities such as Maasai and Mongolian herders, and 
understanding the position of settled communities in late modern capitalism. The multitude that 
emerges from this potential breaks apart the historic dualism of nomad/herders vs. settled 
communities to find new ways of living in the modern world. Following this line of thought, 
Lakoff and Johnson argue that:  
new metaphors have the power to create a new reality…[and] alter that conceptual 
system and the perception and actions that the system gives rise to. Much cultural 
change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of 
old ones.398  
 
In this argument, Lakoff and Johnson go a step beyond Nietzsche by arguing that these new 
metaphors arise and are used not only by academics, but all humans in everyday communication.  
When focusing on the production and experimentation involved in the creation of new 
metaphors, such as nomadology, Lakoff and Johnson differentiate between metaphors and 
metonymies. They define metaphors as sign generators and argue that those signs are then 
transferred to new metaphors via enlightenment linkages. This definition makes sense when we 
think of the production of nomadology as an act of extraction. Extraction is the type of process 
and resulting criticism introduced by media scholars such as Lauren Fenton who writes, 
“Deleuze’s and Guattari’s nomadology subtracts the historical and economic substance of the 
nomad to extract an elegant and poetic ontology of postmodern society as a utopia structured by 
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no-structure or freedom of movement.” 399 According to Fenton, the production of the metaphor 
of nomadology demonstrates the production of new meanings and possibilities while ignoring, 
and eventually silencing, the source domain by creating and giving new meanings to signs. Is 
there an alternative to Fenton’s criticism? In the next section I will consider the differentiation 
between metaphor and metonym and the entailments of holding nomadology more closely to the 
lived experiences of herder/nomads such as Maasai and Mongolian communities examined in 
this dissertation. 
6.7 NOMADOLOGY: METAPHOR OR METONYMY? 
The essential caveat to the juxtaposition of nomadology and herder/nomads is that while 
nomadology is a metaphor, the comparison between nomad and nomadology might be a 
metonymy. Metonymies are described by Lakoff and Johnson as more closely related to the 
subject, more grounded in our experience than metaphors and driven by direct associations.400 
Because they are so grounded, metonymies do not require transposition (or imaginative leaps) 
from one domain to another in the way that metaphors do. Linguists Roman Jakobson and Morris 
Halle make an interesting, and possible comparison, “whilst metonymy is associated with 
realism, metaphor is associated with romanticism and surrealism.”401 From this reasoning, it 
would seem that the articulations of governments about herder/nomads such as Maasai and 
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Mongolians, who are grounded in the real world and do not require imaginative leaps, are 
metonymies and fundamentally excluded from nomadology. However, I argue that this 
classification is inherently reductionist, focusing on the definitions provided by Eurocentric 
anthropologists and policy makers who have established definitions of who is and who is not a 
nomad, without the input, analysis, or capability of rejection by those defined. While this study 
leaves open the possibility that nomads are metonymies within Deleuze and Guattari’s text, it 
also accepts the possibility that they are vehicles in a metaphor and by applying Richards’s 
interaction view it is possible to understand the indirect messages and values conveyed by the 
vehicle. 
The location, or possibility of the location, of herder/nomads as a vehicle in the metaphor 
of nomadology is best understood through sociologist Jean Baudrillard’s discussions of signs. 
Baudrillard writes that society, knowledge, and discourse have been replaced by symbols and 
signs: human reality is now a simulation of reality. These signs exist on four vertical planes of 
simulacra. On the first level is the closest copy to reality (it might even be reality, though we 
have no way of knowing). The second level is a perversion of reality, a flawed copy that attempts 
to present itself as the first level, but gives clues of its deception. On the third level, the sign 
again pretends to be the first level, but it is a new creation, nothing has been copied and no 
representation is occurring. This is the “order of sorcery” or a conjuring of images out of thin air. 
The last level is the pure simulation; here the sign bares no relationship to reality. Signs can only 
reflect and relate to other signs (which also show no relation to reality). The fourth level is, 
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according to Baudrillard, the contemporary, post-modern condition.402 This study of simulacra 
orders is complicated in Baudrillard’s Transparency of Evil where he states: 
[for] there to be metaphor, differential fields and distinct objects must 
exist…perhaps our melancholy stems from this, for metaphor still had its beauty, 
it was aesthetic, playing as it did upon difference, and upon the illusion of 
difference. Today, metonymy – replacing the whole as well as the components, 
and occasioning a general communality of terms – has built its house upon the 
dis-illusion of metaphor.403  
 
While Baudrillard bemoans the end of metaphor, this dissertation takes a more hopeful 
stance, arguing that metaphor is possible within levels of the simulacra but complicated by intra-
level metaphor production. At first, it may seem that I am arguing against Deleuze and Guattari’s 
position that the levels of simulacra are irrelevant to their metaphor of nomadology. Yet, a brief 
review of this interaction of theory and reading of herder/nomad as the vehicle will clarify my 
argument.  
Deleuze and Guattari contend that nomadology is a plane of consistency, rhizomatic 
thought that is non-linear, anarchic, and nomadic. This thought is horizontal, as opposed to 
Baudrillard’s vertical. Rhizomes create smooth spaces that are able to cut across boundaries of 
hierarchy and order by producing multiplicities thinking, acting and being. “A rhizome 
ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and 
circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggle.”404 This multiplicity of being and 
definition encourages the breaking of dichotomies by making new connections between layers of 
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meaning, and producing strands that cannot be broken or re-inscribed into old lines, it can only 
produce “nomadic thought.”405 The appropriation of nomadic thought, and thereby nomadology 
and the war machine, by academics is where the metaphorical review finds unique utility. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s translator, Brian Massumi indicates that  
the space of nomad thought is qualitatively different from State space. Air against 
earth. State space is “striated,” or gridded. Movement in it is confined as by 
gravity to a horizontal plane, and limited by the order of that plane to present 
paths between fixed and identifiable points. Nomad space is “smooth,” or open 
ended.406  
 
This call for nomadic thought is what allows Deleuze and Guattari to produce a text that 
moves freely through history, formulating plateaus of meaning. To Deleuze and Guattari, 
metaphor is produced via a reality principle that is no longer under production. “All that consists 
is Real…the plane knows nothing of difference of level, orders of magnitude or distances. It 
knows nothing of the distinction between artificial and natural.”407 
This transition away from planes to rhizomatic/nomadic thought and the 
(mis)appropriation of this process fuels my analysis at two levels. First, I read Deleuze and 
Guattari’s out-casting of metaphor as occurring at the moment when nomadic thought is 
achieved. This is possible for herder/nomads as defined by Deleuze and Guattari, but impossible 
and/or dangerous for herder/nomads inscribed within the power of the state. Second, while this 
process of rhizome-as-metaphor is appealing for those inscribed in the state, such as students, 
feminists, and bus drivers; I am concerned with the reading of nomad as exclusively or even 
primarily metaphor on real-world herder/nomads. As Burke would ask, when nomads become a 
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metaphor, what is the process and entailments of rendering their identity through metonymy and 
synecdoche? Is the process one that produces a war-machine for the students, feminist, and bus 
drivers at the expense of an irony or dialectic of herder/nomads? If so, what are the real and 
rhetorical implications of using the metaphor of nomadology? First this concern should be 
evaluated by considering herder/nomads who are inscribed through metaphor, metonymy, and 
synecdoche. But second, it should also be considered that once herder/nomads are reduced to 
irony, and if the student has become the new nomad, is she too at risk of inscription into the 
process of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony? Would this not be an instance of the 
nomad’s inscription (back) into the state?  
Put another way, international relations scholar Nicholas Onuf warns that this reduction 
of signs is at work in metaphors: “metaphors are representational, yet they misrepresent. They 
always want us to construct something in doubt as partaking of the reality of something that we 
are confident about.”408 Onuf’s warning is strikingly similar to those made by Aristotle and Plato 
presented earlier in this chapter - metaphors are dangerous, used to hide facts, and distort reality. 
This concern points to the questions at heart of my analysis: does modern academic scholarship 
hide facts and distort the reality of modern-day herder/nomads? If so, what is the effect of this 
action? Even if this distortion has been avoided, does the potential still exist and what warnings 
should be headed to avoid such pitfalls? Finally, but most importantly, how have herder/nomad 
communities responded to metaphors and the resulting synecdoche of themselves? In what 
follows, I look for the answers of these questions through Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding 
of nomadology as premised on the division between smooth and striated space. 
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6.8 NOMADOLOGY IN SMOOTH AND STRIATED SPACE 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, herder/nomad societies occupy smooth spaces that are 
organized by counter-signifying regimes of signs and/or intensive numeration. Such organization 
prevents coding of territorial assemblages as well as over coding of the state by maintaining 
internal tensions and power struggles.409 These societies are based on ethnographic studies from 
which Deleuze and Guattari extract narratives of nomadic communities in Eurasia, the Sahara, 
and the Americas. From these examples, Deleuze and Guattari propose that herder/nomads are 
able to overturn and/or oppose Western settlement. This theory opposes evolutionary theories 
that map humans from primal to nomadic to settled communities (nomads always lived alongside 
the state). Further, nomads are distinguished from migrants, transhumants, and interants.  
Striated space is the location of the settled population, marked by metrics or measured 
space.410 Deleuze and Guattari indicate that striation “results from stratification, the over coding, 
centralization, hierarchization, binarization, and segmentation of the free movement of signs, 
particles, bodies.”411 Striation is critical to state control as is imparts a  
“truth” that “place” is an immobile point, and that immobility (dwelling) is 
always better than ‘aimless’ voyaging, wandering, itinerancy, and of course 
nomadism, which at best are either temporary vacations, but if insisted upon, pose 
grave threats to striated space.412  
 
Working from the concept of striation, Deleuze and Guattari map the progression of striation 
from the forest to agriculture to modern settled societies. 
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Deleuze and Guattari call striation one of the “fundamental tasks” of the state, a 
transformation of the earth as understood by primitive societies to the land as understood by the 
settled.413 When or if the state fails to striate a space, that space returns to smoothness that 
inhibits state communication and transportation of capitalist war machines. Resistance to the 
state occurs through a decentered multiplicity – a rhizome or a war-machine – creates a 
counterforce to the state’s striation.  
The war machine’s form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its on 
metamorphoses; it exits in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological 
innovation, in a commercial circuit as well in a religious creation, in all flows and 
currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State.414 
  
It is critical to remember Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine is used to effectuate change, not to 
pillage and burn. Deleuze and Guattari note the worst war machine is that which becomes a state 
apparatus only capable of destruction, such as the Nazi regime.415  
As with nomadology, the war machine is brought into being when Deleuze and Guattari 
consider herder/nomads in Eurasia, such as the Mongolians.  
These invading forces brought to near ‘perfection’ by the almost entirely anti-
state, counter-signifying destruction of the Mongol hordes, burning, raping, and 
looting their way across striated spaces. The nomadic war machines were 
captured by states and one way or another many settled down.416  
 
The impact of a war machine is often the identification of a suite of weapons/tools that allow the 
machine to maintain speed, occupying a smooth space and moving in an ever-quickening speed. 
War machines are formed in a connection of flows, which “has as its object not war but the 
drawing of creative line of flight…and aims at a revolutionary moment, becoming-minoritarian 
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of everybody/ everything.”417 Thinking back to the case studies presented in this dissertation, 
war machines can be seen when Maasai and Mongolian communities find new lines of flight as 
they embrace new communicative technologies to create new argumentative pathways. 
The smooth space, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is inhabited by nomad societ(ies) 
organized by counter-signifying regimes of signs and/or intensive numeration, an organization 
that prevents coding of territorial assemblages as well as over coding of the state by maintaining 
internal tension and power struggles.418 Following the Tanzanian Maasai example presented in 
Chapter Two, the 2012 Maasai protest transmitted via YouTube prevents the coding of territorial 
assemblages by using a media that cannot be controlled by the Tanzanian government, and 
combining a complexity of languages, argumentative structures, visual and verbal articulations 
that cannot be misconstrued by state translators or interpreters.  
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the ways that herder/nomads 
have overturned and/or opposed Western settlement by retelling the history of Chinghis 
[Genghis] Khan and the Mongol horde.  
Genghis Khan and his followers were able to hold out for a long time by partially 
integrating themselves into the conquered empires, while at the same time 
maintaining a smooth space on the steppes to which the imperial centers were 
subordinated. That was their genius, the Pax Mongolica. It remains the case that 
the integration of the nomads into the conquered empires was one of the most 
powerful factors of appropriation of the war machine by the State apparatus: the 
inevitable danger to which the nomads succumbed.419  
 
The construction of this representation of herder/nomads such as Mongolians always living 
alongside but opposed to the state radically opposes evolutionary ethnographic representations of 
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herder/nomads as a lower class of humans that have not yet evolved to civilized existence. Recall 
the Eliot’s descriptions of Maasai as a “lesser race” in Chapter Three, and the Soviet movement 
to create Homo Sovieticus in Chapter Four. Deleuze and Guattari challenge these articulations of 
herders/nomads as less civilized and instead praise herder/nomads as always already challengers 
to the state. Further, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the risk taken by the state in attempting to 
settle nomadic peoples; “turning the war machine back against the nomads may constitute for the 
state a danger as great as that presented by nomads directing the war machine against the 
States.”420 In my analysis, Chapter Five examined Inner Mongolian protests against the Peoples’ 
Republic of China and the ways Inner Mongolians affect policy in Tibet and Xinjiang. This 
affect, in which we see Inner Mongolia producing new connections and flows, such as spreading 
songs throughout multiple media that escape state censorship, demonstrate the potential inscribed 
by the war machine. 
Yet, my analysis of Kenyan deliberation, specifically regarding Alain Zecchini’s 
description of Maasai herder communities as always already at odds with wildlife populations, 
identifies the difficulty of the state in finding alternatives to the state / nomad binary. Even when 
Zecchini attempts to relate the positions and arguments of Maasai communities, he is only able 
to do so using the terminology and ideology of late modern capitalism – “the herdsman can no 
longer bear the additional costs associated with the presence of wildlife.”421 In this misconstrued 
representation of Maasai community arguments, Zecchini attempts to articulate the striation of 
Maasai space, and through that striation, views wildlife as trespassers on Maasai lands. 
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The discussion of smooth and striated spaces affects this analysis in two ways. First, it 
provides a delineating criteria, packed full of second and third-order signs for adaptation and 
replication by academics appropriating the metaphor of nomadology. Second, the discussion of 
smooth and striated space creates the foundation for the entailment linkage between nomadology 
and the war machine. Nomadology is defined as the geography, geohistory, or logos of the 
rhizome and war machine, as opposed to the history and logos of the state. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, “nomads have no history; they only have geography.”422 We saw the illumination 
of herder/nomad history in Chapter Three when Kenyan Maasai were unable to substantiate their 
land claims because they had not established permanent dwellings. The resulting anti-
historicization of herder/nomads blinds both state and academic analysts to the sites of resistance 
of herder/nomads. 
Resistance to the state by these herder/nomads occurs through a decentered multiplicity 
of a war-machine. The war machine is the counterforce to the state’s striation,  
it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exits in an industrial innovation as well 
as in a technological innovation, in a commercial circuit as well in a religious 
creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be 
appropriated by the State.423  
While some scholars indicate that the war machine is only another metaphor, Deleuze and 
Guattari point to the potentials of this metaphor, “the more mechanisms of projection a tool has, 
the more it behaves like a weapon, potentially or simply metaphorically.”424 Here it is apparent 
that while Deleuze and Guattari are calling for a metaphorical reading, they are also indicating 
the potentially for literal reading of the war machine via nomadology.  
                                                
422 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 393. 
423 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 360. 
424 Deleuze and Guattari, Nomadology 65. 
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In my analysis of social media, I have examined the potential for Maasai and Mongolian 
herders to form war machines and challenge the state. Examples such as the Maasai use of 
YouTube highlight the literal reading of this metaphor as Maasai communities sidestep the 
Tanzanian state’s network of power. Instead of presenting petitions directly to government 
officers, a method that has never succeeded, the Maasai have begun using social media to record 
and present their arguments on a global platform. Then, utilizing the dual force of visual and 
verbal argumentation, they have joined with international organizations, protesters, and potential 
tourists to place pressure on the Tanzanian government to revise and humanize its policies 
towards the Maasai. 
This resistance by the Maasai fits well into the first level of the simulacra through which 
Deleuze and Guattari seem to be calling for herder/nomads to utilize the war machine as a tool 
encountering resistance. Yet, the outside observer might question why the Maasai utilize 
primarily non-violent tactics in their protests. By interpreting Deleuze and Guattari’s 
nomadology through the third and fourth levels of the simulacra – the production of appearances 
that creates illusions of reality and/or the virtual which invents reality – we are reminded that 
Deleuze and Guattari are not literally calling for war, and might not even be calling for violence 
but rather symbolic resistance to the state. Instead, they call for war machines as suites of 
weapons/tools that allows mechanic assemblages to maintain speed, occupying a smooth space 
and yet moving in a flash.425 These war machines are formed in the connection of flows, which 
“has as its object not war but the drawing of creative line of flight, and aims at a revolutionary 
moment, becoming-minoritarian of everybody/everything.”426 Such lines of flight are identified 
                                                
425 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 381. 
426 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 422, 72-3. 
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in Maasai and Mongolian herder communities’ use of social media, a set of tools that like the 
war-machine occupy the holey space between the smooth and striated. This holey space is 
necessary for Deleuze and Guattari because they fear that state surveillance will destroy the 
capabilities and potentials found in smooth space. As Deleuze and Guattari remind the reader, 
“never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us.”427 We see the same fear in Inner 
Mongolia as the state develops dual conservation / surveillance programs. 
Just as the genius of Pax Mongolica was a partial integration into the state while 
maintaining the smooth space of the steppe, today, herder/nomads such as the Maasai and 
Mongolians are attempting to deliberately negotiate and regulate their positions in both smooth 
and striated space. These new articulations of Maasai and Mongolian identities – 
deterritorializations that have produced mechanic assemblages, are very different from the 
ethnographic texts from which Deleuze and Guattari created nomadology. This is a fascinating 
result, but also points to the potential for academic disconnections and retractions by scholars 
who claim that Deleuze and Guattari have misrepresented herder/nomad communities. 
6.9 ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROPRIATION OF NOMADOLOGY 
Anthropologists entered debates about nomadology via a fact-checking methodology concerned 
with the application of nomads as a vehicle in the metaphor of nomadology. These scholars claim 
that while Deleuze and Guattari attempt to represent ethnographic texts as proof of a metaphor 
from the first level of the simulacra, what they have actually created is a synecdoche of nomads 
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that operates at the second and sometimes third level of the simulacra. As such, these 
anthropologists argue that nomadology must be reconsidered or discarded due to its 
(mis)appropriation of ethnographic texts. These arguments are led by Christopher Miller’s 
question “does Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine actually kill people?”428 Miller notes that 
this death is not supposed to be of any importance because nomadology is a metaphor. However, 
he argues that Deleuze and Guattari have not provided an honest discussion of the ethics of 
nomadology.  
He confronts the violence and death that “the” nomad war machine causes in a 
way that Deleuze and Guattari fail to do…Deleuze and Guattari want to keep their 
concept pure; they want us to believe in one kind of war machine that has not 
been appropriated by the State…the source material as it enters A Thousand 
Plateaus is at once evacuated for its representational force and, in effect, sanitized 
for the benefit of Deleuze and Guattari’s “happy” nomadology.429  
 
The resulting argument is that Deleuze and Guattari have romanticized, and thereby 
subjugated, nomadic communities. This is a serious claim and I will argue that it limits the 
applicability of both philosophical and anthropological depictions of nomadic communities, 
thereby necessitating future investigation of identity construction and argument from identity 
used by modern nomads. While Miller does not completely reject nomadology, he calls for “a 
less utopian, less contradictory, less arrogant, and less messianic theorization of movement, a 
positive cosmopolitanism that remains meticulously aware of localities and differences.”430 In 
this analysis, I have investigated the production of the metaphor of nomadology by attending to 
the communities used by Deleuze and Guattari as the vehicle which includes Maasai and 
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Mongolian herder/nomads to address the complexity of nomadic experience, and to investigate 
the transformation of those complexities into a sign of nomadology. 
My analysis agrees with comparative literature scholar Ronald Bogue’s argument that 
Deleuze and Guattari have not erred in their appropriation of the anthropological texts, but rather 
nomadology has been used in contexts not in alignment with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
intentions.431 Bogue’s analysis is intriguing because it returns to the vehicle of the nomadology 
metaphor by referencing Maasai communities in response to Miller’s arguments. Bogue argues 
that Deleuze and Guattari would have no problem with the frequent observation that no mobile 
populations wander aimlessly and randomly. They would simply argue that “the restricted 
circulation of Masai [sic] herders around a village center…represent so many mixtures of 
nomadic and sedentary tendencies, each a particular de facto composite of differences in 
nature.”432 This articulation of Maasai movement is strikingly similar to those articulated by 
Maasai herders in Kenya and Tanzania who explain the interactions between traditional herding 
and modern connections. 
From this analysis, Bogue contends that a better understanding of the vehicle of 
nomadology will contextualize and broaden the metaphor, illuminating its full potential. This is 
an intriguing, but difficult suggestion to adopt. For example, Professor of German John Noyes 
argues that it is possible to re-interpret nomadology via the methodology of transition reading. 
His preferred method is to stop “speaking about nomadism as if it were an anthropological 
question, and rephrase it as the question of the so-called ‘terrorism.’”433 Rephrasing the metaphor 
                                                
431 Ronald Bogue, “Apology for Nomadology,” Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial 
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432 Bogue, “Apology for Nomadology,” 173.  
433 John K. Noyes, “Nomadism, Nomadology, Postcolonialism: By Way of Introduction,” Interventions: 
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of nomadology from anthropological to so-called terrorism contexts may seem a radical step. As 
I have indicated throughout this analysis, herder communities such as the Maasai and 
Mongolians signal a move towards protest via social media that records, but does not always 
create, movements of violence. Yet, Noyes’ recommendation is not fully out of place. What he 
does when recommending the transition from anthropological to terrorist questions is draw this 
dissertation into the late-capitalist milieu of herders as disruptors to national unity, progress, 
development and growth. Recall President Kikwete’s statement, “we cannot move forward with 
this type of pastoralism in the twenty first century,” and Prime Minister Enkhbayer’s “in order to 
survive we have to stop being nomads.” These state directives indicate that herder determination 
to maintain traditional livelihoods are a direct act – perhaps terrorism – against the state.  
Already we can see the way that the Peoples’ Republic of China has inscribed this logic 
onto Uighurs in Xingjing and Tibetans in Tibet, communities of herders that have been classified 
as herder/nomads when they are passive, and terrorists when they act as herder/nomads that 
traverse the once-smooth space of the steppe with their herds. By following Noyes’ suggested 
transition reading, this dissertation highlights one of the largest challenges facing the study of 
both nomadology and herders, the plethora of visions, whereby the same location is viewed by 
nomads as smooth and the state as striated. 
6.10  “REAL NOMADS” 
A contribution of this dissertation to scholarship regarding nomadology is the juxtaposition of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s text to the lived experiences and protests of Maasai and Mongolian 
communities. While the expansive body of literature regarding the anthropological, feminist, and 
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technological criticisms of nomadology are informative, none of these texts directly investigates 
or discusses Mongolians, Maasai, or other groups of herders. This is a critically important gap 
because it necessitates an act of metonymic synecdoche (reduction and representation) of 
singular, out of context parts of historical herder/nomadic identity while simultaneously 
increasing the entry barrier of modern nomads attempting to engage, embrace, negotiate, or 
reject modernity. Each body of literature demonstrates this metonymic synecdoche differently. 
For example, fact checking anthropologists have scoured Deleuze and Guattari’s footnotes and 
found that the experiences of nomadic peoples have been essentialized by the production of 
nomadology.  
Feminist philosophers, such as Rosi Braidottie have revived and reshaped the figure of 
the nomad into a “nomadic subject” which, “though the image of ‘nomadic subjects’ is inspired 
by the experience of peoples or cultures that are literally nomadic, the nomadism in question here 
refers to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes of 
thoughts and behavior.”434 Similarly, professor of English and Comparative Literature at 
Columbia University, Edward Said reflects the positionality of nomadology when he states,  
the nomadism metaphor establishes between critical theory and the politics of 
dislocation, referring to the nomadology concept in A Thousand Plateaus as a 
metaphor about a disciplined kind of intellectual mobility in an age of 
institutionalization, regimentation, co-operation.435  
 
My concern is in the entailments, specifically western privilege, apparent in the intellectual 
mobility pointed to by Said. Many readings and interpretations of nomadology as a process of 
thought that celebrates multiplicity and plurality as the best way to break through unitary, binary, 
and totalizing methods of Western thought. These readings are particularly helpful in finding 
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lines of flight, or developing rhizomatic departures from late-modern capitalism. These lines of 
flight have given rise to a body of literature by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars 
who embrace Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of nomadology. For example, STS scholars have 
used nomadology to analyze William Gibson’s Neuromancer. In these analyses, future smooth 
and striated spaces are present and analyzed via their points of departure, resistance, and re-
inscription of the state. Yet, the experiences of modern herder communities, such as Maasai and 
Mongolians, fade from view and presumably existence in Gibson’s future. While this body of 
scholarship is fascinating, it is also worrying because it illuminates what might happen when 
arguments made through frames of disappearance become dominant.  
Throughout this dissertation I have looked for lines of flight available to modern herder 
communities. In each case study I assessed the ways that governments in Tanzania, Kenya, 
Mongolia, and China have utilized proleptic elegies through a frame of disappearance to lament, 
yet advance, the settlement and disappearance of herding communities. Then, in this chapter I 
assessed these elegies and asked if Mongolian and Maasai herders have already become 
metaphors of themselves and if so, are they still capable of engaging the war machine called 
forth in their name? From this metaphorical analysis, I hope to both understand the current 
application of nomadology, and Miller’s call to move away from the 
smooth space, flow, and negotiated assemblage [that] remains based on fantasies 
of the non-Western world as a realm beyond representation and division to, 
heighten rather than diminish our capacity to understand divisions of world space, 
even as those divisions shift, dissolve, and reform. We must enable ourselves to 
think through borders without simply pretending that they don’t exist: when faced 
with a forest, we should not simply declare that we don’t “believe in trees.436 
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Miller’s biggest fault is that Deleuze and Guattari have moved too quickly through heavy handed 
cultural representations. So what is to be made of my analysis, which has attempted to slow 
down, and investigate the interaction between the Mongolian and Maasai people and 
development rhetoric? 
Can Maasai and Mongolian protests be understood as emergences of war machines? 
Future study is needed to examine the ways that the war machines identified in this dissertation 
inspire cross-border collaboration between herders in Inner Mongolian and Mongolia. 
Additionally, attention should turn to the ways that Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai communities 
have organized protests via posting sites and Internet facilities, resulting in new identifications 
that their respective states cannot to censor. In Chapter Two I discussed the Tanzanian 
government’s accusation that Maasai protesters are actually Kenyan NGO members. Similarly, 
in Chapter Three I discussed Kenyan MP Waitatu’s declaration that all protesting Maasai herders 
are foreigners from Tanzania. These statements are evidence of the state’s attempts to define, and 
control, or as Deleuze and Guattari would indicate, over code, Maasai identity. Future 
scholarship should address the ways that Maasai communities anticipate and subvert this over 
coding, and the new ways that Tanzanian and Kenyan government officials respond to Maasai 
protesters. 
The processes of identity, protest, and response discussed in this dissertation illuminate 
the many ways that states attempt to control herder communities. From turning off Internet 
connections, inhibiting border crossings, and employing netziens to post pro-government 
statements to protester’s message boards, each case study has presented a new government tactic. 
Yet, through processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, Maasai and Mongolian 
herding communities have stayed one step ahead of their governments, reflecting on YouTube 
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that “herders are not lying” and preempting government censorship in their banned songs. Future 
research is needed to better understand the progression of these connections, to ask if Maasai and 
Mongolian herders have traversed the holey spaces between smooth and striated space, or if they 
are succumbing to the integration of nomads and their war machine into the state apparatus.  
6.11 CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I have examined four argumentative frames – bounded land, movement-as-
wandering, movement-as- otor, and disappearance. I found that while all of these frames are at 
play in modern deliberations regarding herding communities, the governments of Kenya, 
Tanzania, Mongolia, and China have each demonstrated a preference for the frame of 
disappearance and used proleptic elegies to convey their arguments in public controversies 
regarding herding communities. Recall Tanzania’s president Kikwete’s statement: “We must 
abandon altogether nomadic pastoralism which makes the whole country pastureland.”437 
Echoing these comments, Kenyan MP Waitatu argued, “I want all Maasais chased away from 
here.”438 In Mongolia, President Enkhbayar is on record saying: “In order to survive we have to 
stop being nomads.”439 And in China I argued that the government propaganda poster, “Let the 
Good News Spread Over the Grasslands,” depicts Mongolian identity in a way that frames 
herding as an obsolete, retrograde tradition. 
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Herders have responded to proleptic elegies with arguments, petitions, and protests. 
Using new and social media, international organizations have recorded, narrated, and responded 
to these protests. In the cases of Tanzania and China, I have presented evidence that texts are 
produced explicitly for online communities that link herders and settled communities in new 
argumentative frames and protests. These protests differ between each community, and each 
herding community has produced unique articulations, narrations, and entailments for their 
arguments and protests. However, a connecting thread – a quilting point – runs through all of 
these communities. Each resists government arguments presented through frames of 
disappearance. These conflicts, occurring in both texts and streets, between herders and 
governments are likely to continue as long as herders have herds, and even if they have lost their 
herds but continue to identify as herders. From the perspectives of Maasai and Mongolian 
herders, this means that conflicts identified in this dissertation will be eternal. 
Communicative scholars can identify multiple points of entry and analysis in these 
conflicts. Future research by communicative scholars might examine the use of new media by 
herders which facilitate trans-national connections not just between Tanzanian and Kenyan 
Maasai but between Maasai and Mongolian herders who meet in herder-specific Facebook 
Groups, in United Nations Special Committees, and at forums organized by organizations such 
as Human Rights International. It is not yet clear how these links, new identities, and emergent 
protests will effect argumentative strategies of governments or herders. However, as evidenced 
by my analysis of links between modern herders and Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology, a 
study of these connections may identify new lines of flight for both herder and settled 
communities. Arguments presented through a frame of disappearance, be they by government 
officials or Deleuze and Guattari who argue that Mongols have succumbed to the state, create 
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significant barriers for herders to achieve argumentative engagement in public controversies 
regarding their future. This dissertation works to reconcile the distance between herders and 
settled communities, highlighting both points of entry and lines of flight to better understand 
arguments by, for, and about herders living in, alongside, and in spite of late modern capitalism. 
Maasai activist Eliamani Laltaika argued in 2009:  
The government is full of promises. It is not totally blind, it is not totally deaf. 
You always get promises that ‘We understand the plight of the pastoralists, we 
promise to rectify this and this.’ But these promises are not translated. What we 
are saying is now is the time to consider pastoralists as part and parcel of the 
economy of this country.440 
 
In his demand that herders be considered as part and parcel of the Tanzanian economy, Laltaika 
signals the Maasai community’s intention to continue herding while participating in national and 
international deliberations. Within the context of the multi-sited argumentative analysis 
presented in this dissertation, Laltaika’s call could be interpreted as rejection of the Tanzanian 
government’s arguments made from a frame of disappearance. But Laltaika is not calling for a 
violent form of protest. Instead, his statement could also be interpreted as opening up 
possibilities in terms of future understandings and new relationships between governments, 
conservation organizations, and herding communities. This is not an easy process, yet Laltaika 
concludes, “I’m positive that where we are heading, pastoralism will be recognized and 
pastoralists will be given their rights… It’s certainly going to be very tough, but we will reach 
there. I’m positive. We are heading there.”441  
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Figure 11: Young Herders.442 
 
                                                
442 Young Maasai herders in Arusha, Tanzania. Allison Hahn, 2012. 
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